This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0065
Victoria Lynn Robinson, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed August 24, 2015
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-11-2198
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Jessica Lynn Stott, Assistant County Attorney,
Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of her postconviction petition, arguing that the
postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying her petition because
(1) she alleged deficiencies at the St. Paul Police Department Crime Lab that should
allow her to withdraw her plea, (2) the petition was timely filed within two years of when
the claim arose under the newly discovered evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions,
and (3) the facts asserted in her postconviction petition demonstrate that she is entitled to
relief. Because we conclude that her petition is time-barred, we affirm the postconviction
court’s summary denial of Robinson’s petition.
FACTS
On June 7, 2011, a Cottage Grove police officer responded to a report of a reckless
driver and identified the driver as appellant Victoria Lynn Robinson. A police sergeant
arrived at the scene and observed a plastic baggie containing a white crystalline substance
in a purse on the floor of the back seat of the car. The officers also found a glass pipe
inside the purse. The St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (the SPPDCL) tested
the pipe and the contents of the plastic baggie; both tested positive for methamphetamine.
The state charged Robinson with fifth-degree controlled substance crime
(possession), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(b)(1) (2010). The state
disclosed documentation and correspondence that it had received from the SPPDCL to
Robinson. Robinson did not challenge the validity of the test results or dispute the
allegation that the substance was methamphetamine. On October 20, 2011, Robinson
pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine. During the plea hearing, Robinson
admitted to the following factual basis:
Q: During your contact with the police officer, did he find
methamphetamine?
A: Yes.
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Q: Where did he find it; do you recall?
A: In a purse in the back seat.
Q: Was that your purse?
A: Yes.
Q: Was it your methamphetamine?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you know that the methamphetamine was in your
purse?
A: Yes.
The district court sentenced Robinson to a stayed sentence of 19 months and placed her
on probation for five years.
In July 2012, the SPPDCL came under public scrutiny and was the subject of a
Frye-Mack hearing in an unrelated Dakota County District Court case. Independent
reviews of the SPPDCL revealed systemic problems in its laboratory protocols and
testing processes. Robinson petitioned for postconviction relief on July 19, 2014, arguing
that the postconviction court should permit her to withdraw her guilty plea or grant an
evidentiary hearing on the grounds that (1) the deficient SPPDCL testing is newly
discovered evidence; (2) the state violated Brady v. Maryland by not disclosing the
deficient testing to Robinson; (3) the state violated Robinson’s due-process rights by
using unreliable scientific evidence to obtain the guilty plea; (4) Robinson’s guilty plea
was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent; and (5) she received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Although Robinson filed her petition more than two years after entry of
judgment of her conviction, she argued that her petition was timely because it met the
newly discovered evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions to the statutory two-year
time-bar.
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The postconviction court denied Robinson’s petition without a hearing, concluding
that the petition is time-barred and fails on the merits. Robinson now appeals.
DECISION
Robinson argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by determining
that her petition for postconviction relief is time-barred. “A person convicted of a crime
who claims that the conviction violates his rights under the constitution or laws of the
United States or Minnesota may petition for postconviction relief unless direct appellate
relief is available.” Roberts v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. App. 2014), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014). The
petitioner must file the petition for postconviction relief within two years of “the entry of
judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(a) (2014). But there are five statutory exceptions to the two-year filing deadline.
Here, Robinson argues that two exceptions apply: (1) “the existence of newly
discovered evidence, including scientific evidence, that could not have been ascertained
by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-
year time period for filing a postconviction petition” and (2) “the petition is not frivolous
and is in the interests of justice.” Id., subd. 4(b) (2014). If an exception applies, the
petition must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises. Id., subd. 4(c) (2014).
A claim arises when the petitioner “knew or should have known” that the claim existed.
Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Minn. 2012). A petitioner must demonstrate that
she satisfies one of the statutory exceptions before she will be entitled to relief or an
evidentiary hearing on an untimely petition. Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 290. “If the
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petitioner does not demonstrate that an exception applies and that application of the
exception is timely, the postconviction court may summarily deny the petition as
untimely.” Id. We must first determine if any exceptions to the time limitation apply
before we address the substantive claims of the petition. Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d
575, 582 (Minn. 2010).
We review “the denial of a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing for
an abuse of discretion.” Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Minn. 2013). The
postconviction court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d
162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Newly Discovered Evidence Exception
Under the newly discovered evidence exception to the statutory filing deadline, a
postconviction court may hear an untimely petition if (1) the petition alleges that newly
discovered evidence exists, (2) the evidence “could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence” within the two-year time frame for filing a petition, (3) the
evidence is not cumulative, (4) the evidence “is not for impeachment purposes,” and
(5) the evidence “establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is
innocent.” Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 290 (quotations omitted); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2). In Roberts, we held that the deficiencies at the SPPDCL did not
warrant application of the newly discovered evidence exception because the deficiencies
could have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence and the deficiencies did not
clearly and convincingly establish that Roberts was innocent. 856 N.W.2d at 290-92.
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Analyzing the due-diligence prong, we concluded that Roberts had access to the
test results under the discovery rules, and therefore, he could have challenged the
foundational reliability of the test results or investigated the validity of the test results.
Id. at 291. Similarly, here, the state disclosed the documentation from the SPPDCL to
Robinson. Robinson could have investigated or challenged these documents and
discovered the deficiencies at the SPPDCL. Robinson has not shown that she could not
have ascertained the evidence by the exercise of due diligence at the time of her district
court proceedings.
In Roberts, we also concluded that Roberts had not shown clear and convincing
evidence that he was innocent because he did not “offer evidence regarding the chemical
composition of the particular substance in his case. In fact, Roberts has never claimed—
in district court, during postconviction proceedings, or on appeal—that the substance was
not cocaine.” Id. at 291-92. Here, the criminal complaint alleged that the pipe and
baggie found in Robinson’s purse tested positive for methamphetamine. Robinson has
not offered any evidence regarding the chemical composition of the substance found in
her purse, and she has never claimed that the substance was not methamphetamine. To
the contrary, Robinson admitted in the factual basis of her guilty plea that the officer
found methamphetamine in her purse, that the methamphetamine belonged to her, and
that she knew the methamphetamine was in her purse.
We conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that Robinson’s petition does not fall under the newly discovered evidence
exception to the statutory two-year filing deadline.
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Interests-of-Justice Exception
To satisfy the interests-of-justice exception, a petitioner must establish that “the
petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(b)(5). We will only apply the interests-of-justice exception “in exceptional situations.”
Gassler, 787 N.W.2d at 586. The Minnesota Supreme Court has “identified a non-
exclusive list of factors to be considered.” Id. Those factors include “the degree to
which the party alleging error is at fault for that error, the degree of fault assigned to the
party defending the alleged error, and whether some fundamental unfairness to the
defendant needs to be addressed.” Id. at 587.
In Roberts, we concluded that the petition did not meet the interests-of-justice
exception because the problems at the SPPDCL did not “stem from a flaw in the judicial
process,” and therefore it was not “necessary to act in the interests of justice to protect the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” 856 N.W.2d at 293. We also concluded that “it is
not fundamentally unfair to hold Roberts accountable for his choice to accept the state’s
scientific evidence at face value and resolve his case with a guilty plea.” Id. For the
same reasons, fundamental fairness and the interests of justice do not necessitate
postconviction relief for Robinson. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that Robinson’s petition does not fall under the interests-of-justice
exception to the two-year filing deadline.
We conclude that Robinson’s postconviction petition is untimely and that neither
the newly discovered evidence nor the interests-of-justice exception to the statutory time-
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bar applies. Therefore, the postconviction court acted within its discretion by summarily
denying Robinson’s petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.
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