[J-25-2015]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
TIMOTHY L. WATTS, : No. 112 MAP 2014
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court, at No. 935 C.D.
: 2013, dated January 7, 2014, Affirming the
v. : Order of the Court of Common Pleas of
: Lancaster County, Civil Division, at No. CI-
: 12-17815, dated May 8, 2013 and
MANHEIM TOWNSHIP SCHOOL : amended May 24, 2013
DISTRICT, :
:
Appellant : ARGUED: April 7, 2015
OPINION
MR. JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: August 26, 2015
We granted review to consider whether the Public School Code of 19491
mandates that a school district provide free transportation to a student from two different
residences where the student’s parents share physical custody of the student and both
parents reside within the school district. The Commonwealth Court held that the
Manheim Township School District (“the School District”) must provide transportation to
both parents’ residences. For the reasons set forth herein, we agree that the School
District is required to provide free transportation to and from both parents’ residences in
this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court.
1
24 P.S. §§ 1-101 – 27-2702 (“the School Code”).
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Timothy L. Watts (“Father”) shares legal
and physical custody of his child, C.W., with C.W.’s mother (“Mother”) on an alternating
week basis pursuant to a court order. Both Father and Mother reside within the School
District where C.W. attends public middle school. Father’s residence is approximately
4 ½ miles from C.W.’s school and Mother’s residence is approximately 5 ½ miles from
the school. C.W.’s bus stop at Mother’s home is approximately 1.9 miles from Father’s
residence.
Before 2010, the School District provided transportation services for its students
to multiple locations, including residences, daycare facilities, and after school activities.
The School District estimated that 400 students benefitted from transportation to
multiple locations, with somewhere between 50 and 75 of these students being
transported to multiple parents’ residences as a result of custody arrangements. The
School District stated that it did not have information on how many students were
subject to an alternating week custody arrangement like C.W.
At the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year, however, the School District
instituted changes in its transportation policy which included eliminating transportation
to and from more than one location per student, expanding the number of students
required to walk to school, and increasing the route efficiency of its busses. The
combined effect of these changes reduced the bus fleet by four busses, saving the
School District approximately $200,000 per year. The School District does not indicate
what portion of its savings was attributable to limiting students in shared physical
custody arrangements to only one residence. Initially, the School District did not strictly
enforce the “one seat per student” policy and instead provided bussing for C.W. to and
from both parents’ residences during the 2010-11 and 2011-12 school years.
[J-25-2015] - 2
In the summer of 2012, the School District notified Father that it intended to
enforce the new transportation policy, and although there was an available seat on an
existing bus route with an established stop servicing Father’s home, the School District
would only transport C.W. to and from Mother’s residence, as her address was listed as
the default address on C.W.’s school paperwork. Because of Father’s work schedule,
he had to hire a nanny to drive C.W. to Mother’s house so that C.W., a seventh-grader,
did not have to walk over 1.9 miles to his bus stop. Father sent several letters to the
School District and attended a school board meeting voicing his objection to the
transportation policy, all to no avail. Subsequently, Father instituted the instant action
seeking, inter alia, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to require the School
District to provide transportation to and from both residences.
Father rested his complaint on Section 1361(1) of the School Code, which states,
in relevant part:
The board of school directors in any school district may, out
of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation
of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten,
elementary school, or secondary school in which he is
lawfully enrolled . . . .
24 P.S. § 13-1361(1) (Provide free transportation).2 Father argued that Section 1361(1)
sets forth a statutory mandate which generally provides students with transportation to
and from school to a pupil’s residence, and where, as here, C.W. is a “resident pupil” of
two residences, transportation to both must be provided. In response, the School
District argued that a student may have only one residence for purposes of the School
Code and therefore Section 1361(1) required only that the School District provide
2
Because of the prolix statutory sections involved in this case, we will offer a
parenthetical after each cited section to aid the reader in maintaining clarity.
[J-25-2015] - 3
transportation to that one residence. Alternatively, the School District asserted that it
had discretion to limit C.W.’s transportation to and from one residence.
The trial court found for Father, determining that because C.W. resided with both
parents equally, the School District is statutorily required to provide transportation for
C.W. to and from both parents' homes, pursuant to Section 1361(1). The court
garnered support for its position from the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Wyland v.
West Shore Sch. Dist., 52 A.3d 572 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), which found that a student who
is subject to a shared physical custody arrangement can be a resident pupil of two
different school districts when each parent resides in one.
The trial court granted Father’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordered
the School District to resume transportation from Father’s residence. Shortly thereafter,
the trial court amended its order by granting a permanent injunction. The trial court
limited its decision to the facts of this case, rendering it applicable only where: 1) both
parents live in the same school district; 2) the student is subject to an equally-split,
shared legal and physical custody agreement; and 3) a school bus already serves each
residence and could accommodate the student without any further cost or adding an
extra stop. The School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a permanent
injunction. Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 84 A.3d 378 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Acknowledging that Section 1361(1) does not expressly state that a school district must
provide transportation to and from a student’s residence, the court determined that the
General Assembly’s use of the term “resident pupil” embodies the intention that
transportation services be provided between the student’s residence and school.
To determine whether a student may have more than one residence for
transportation purposes, the Commonwealth Court initially found this Court’s decision in
[J-25-2015] - 4
In re Residence Hearing Before Bd. of Sch. Dir., Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 744
A.2d 1272 (Pa. 2000) (Cumberland Valley), to be instructive. In Cumberland Valley, the
Cumberland Valley School District argued that students who moved with their mother
into a townhouse in the district to be closer to their private school, while father
maintained a residence outside of the district, were not residents of the Cumberland
Valley School District as contemplated by the School Code, citing 24 P.S. § 13-1301
(“Every child, being a resident of any school district, [between specific ages], may
attend the public schools in his district . . . .”) and 24 P.S. § 13-1302(a) (“A child shall be
considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his
person resides.”). We rejected that argument and held that the term “resides” contained
within Section 1302(a) “refers to a place where the custodial parent maintains a
residence, and, contrary to the [school district’s] view, it need not be a primary
residence or domicile.” Cumberland Valley, 744 A.2d at 1274.
The Commonwealth Court found additional guidance from its decision in Wyland,
supra, which held that a student of separated parents who lived in two different school
districts was a “resident pupil” of both school districts and entitled to transportation
services from both school districts. Although recognizing that Cumberland Valley and
Wyland did not address whether school districts must provide transportation to more
than one residence within the same school district, the Commonwealth Court
interpreted these cases as holding that “a child can have more than one residence for
purposes of the School Code.” Watts, 84 A.3d at 385. The Court reasoned that “[i]t
therefore follows that where . . . a child has two residences within a school district, the
school district must provide transportation services accommodating both residences.”
Id. at 386.
[J-25-2015] - 5
As the School District conceded that C.W. is a “resident pupil” to whom the
School District owes a duty of transportation and the court determined that C.W. has
two residences within the district, the Commonwealth Court found that the School
District must provide transportation accommodating both residences, and that, pursuant
to the School Code, accommodating Mother’s and Father’s residences requires a bus
stop no further than 1 ½ miles from each house. See 24 P.S. § 13-1362 (Distance to
bus stop).3 Because the bus stop within 1 ½ miles of Mother’s residence is more than
1 ½ miles from Father’s residence, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the School
District violated its mandate to provide transportation to and from school to C.W.’s
residences.
Lastly, the Commonwealth Court rejected the School District’s argument that it
had the discretion to limit C.W.’s transportation to and from Mother’s residence only. In
the Commonwealth Court’s view, the School District has discretion to determine the
manner in which it implements transportation services, but not to ignore the statutory
mandate of the School Code, which, as explained, required that transportation be
provided to school from both of C.W.’s residences.
The School District sought this Court’s discretionary review, and we granted its
petition for allowance of appeal to address two issues:
(1) Does the Public School Code of 1949 require the
Manheim Township School District to provide transportation
services to a resident pupil to and from more than one
location within the school district?
(2) Did the Commonwealth Court err in interpreting In re
Residence Hearing Before Bd. of Sch. Dir., Cumberland
Valley Sch. Dist., 560 Pa. 366, 744 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 2000), to
mean that a child can have more than one residence for
3
For full text of 24 P.S. § 13-1362, see infra at 9 n.7.
[J-25-2015] - 6
school purposes, including transportation services under
Section 1361 of the Public School Code of 1949?
Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 99 A.3d 532 (Pa. 2014).
The School District argues that a student may not have more than one residence
under the School Code as a matter of law, and therefore it properly limited C.W.’s
transportation to and from Mother’s residence only. Rather than analyzing sections of
the School Code to support this contention, the School District simply asserts that no
section of the School Code mandates it to provide transportation to multiple residences
and then turns to a discussion of the case law relied on by the Commonwealth Court to
decide the instant case, and in particular, this Court’s decision in Cumberland Valley.
The School District contends that the Commonwealth Court in Wyland, and
consequently in this case, misinterpreted this Court’s holding in Cumberland Valley by
reading that case as establishing that a student may have more than one residence
under the School Code. Instead, the School District argues, Cumberland Valley merely
defined the term “resides” and never reached the question of whether a student may
reside in more than one residence. The School District believes that because we did
not affirmatively state that a student may have more than one residence in Cumberland
Valley, it follows necessarily that a student may not have more than one residence.
The School District alternatively argues that even if a student may have more
than one residence under the School Code, the School District has the discretion to limit
a student’s transportation to and from only one of the residences. In support, the
School District contends that the case law analyzing Section 1361(1) (Provide free
transportation) consistently defers to a school district’s broad discretion.4 Although the
cases cited by the School District involved the location of bus stops and not whether a
4
See supra at 3 for the full text of Section 1361(1).
[J-25-2015] - 7
school is required to provide transportation to multiple residences, the School District,
without analysis, purports it has the discretion to decide both where bus stops will be
placed and whether the School District has to provide transportation to more than one
residence.5
The School District finds that Section 1331, which appears to be facially
inapplicable,6 supports its discretion argument as it provides that where there is:
no public school with the proper grades in session within two
miles by the shortest public highway of the residence of any
child in a school district of [a specified class], such child shall
be furnished proper transportation at the expense of the
school district to and from a school with the proper grades.
24 P.S. § 13-1331 (Mandatory transportation). The School District claims that because
of the phrase “proper transportation,” school boards have total discretion in making all
transportation decisions and that “courts have consistently interpreted Section 1331
[where applicable] to mean that school boards retain the ability to exercise their
5
See School District’s Brief at 34-35 (citing Chipman ex rel. Chipman v. Avon
Grove Sch. Dist., 841 A.2d 1098 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (finding that Section 1361(1) did
not require a school district to discontinue its use of transfer stations for non-public
school students); Morningstar v. Mifflin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 760 A.2d 1221 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2000) (holding a school district properly denied a parent’s request to reestablish a
student’s bus stop in front of her house); and Quasti v. N. Penn Sch. Dist., 907 A.2d 42
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (finding that a school district had broad discretion in affixing bus
routes and the paths which students were required to walk to reach their bus stops)).
6
It appears that the School District does not fall under Section 1331 which applies
only to students living in
a school district of the fourth class, or in a township which is
a school district of the third class, or in a borough which has
a population of less than five hundred (500) inhabitants to
the square mile and which is a school district of the third
class . . . .
24 P.S. § 13-1331; see also 24 P.S. § 2-202 (designation of classes of school districts);
and https://www.mtwp.net/about/district-demographics/ (setting forth the School
District’s geographic size and population).
[J-25-2015] - 8
discretion in determining what constitutes ‘proper transportation.’” School District’s Brief
at 32 (citing Martin v. Garnet Valley Sch. Dist., 272 A.2d 913 (Pa. 1971) (holding a
school district properly exercised its discretion when it required a student to walk less
than a mile on a windy road to the bus stop); Pollock v. Northern Potter Joint Sch. Bd., 9
Pa. D. & C.3d 31 (1976) (finding that the School Code did not require door-to-door
transportation for a student)).
Turning to additional sections of the School Code to support its claim that it has
discretion to decline transportation for a resident pupil to one of his two residences, the
School District notes that it has the authority to require a student to walk up to 1 ½ miles
to a bus stop. 24 P.S. § 13-1362 (Distance to bus stop).7 Here, the School District
concedes that C.W.’s bus stop is within 1 ½ miles of Mother’s residence but nearly 2
miles from Father’s house. Notwithstanding that the bus stop within 1 ½ miles of
Mother’s residence does not meet the 1 ½ mile restriction when C.W. is living at
Father’s house, the School District submits that Father is required merely to drive to the
7
Section 1362 states in relevant part:
The free transportation of pupils, as required or authorized
by this act, or any other act, may be furnished by using
either school conveyances, private conveyances, or electric
railways, or other common carriers, when the total distance
which any pupil must travel by the public highway to or from
school, in addition to such transportation, does not exceed
one and one-half (1 ½ ) miles, and when stations or other
proper shelters are provided for the use of such pupils where
needed, and when the highway, road, or traffic conditions
are not such that walking constitutes a hazard to the safety
of the child, as so certified by the Department of
Transportation.
24 P.S. § 13-1362.
[J-25-2015] - 9
bus stop serving Mother’s residence. Accordingly, the School District concludes that
this construct constitutes “proper transportation.”
In addition to the School Code, the School District cites the State Board of
Education’s regulations8 as conferring discretion upon the School District to provide
transportation to only one residence. Particularly, the School District points to 22 Pa.
Code § 23.4, which states the “board of directors of a school district is responsible for all
aspects of pupil transportation programs” including, inter alia, the selection of means of
transportation and the establishment of routes and schedules. Further, the School
District finds support in the regulatory Section 11.11 which sets forth that
“[t]ransportation for students must be provided consistent with the policy of the school
district that the students are attending.” 22 Pa. Code § 11.11(a)(2) (Enrollment
Regulation).
Lastly, the School District does not believe that it abused its purported discretion
here because the changes “help conserve and better allocate limited public funds.”
School District Brief at 38. The School District finds it absurd and unreasonable to
assert that the General Assembly intended it to bear the additional cost of providing
“enhanced” transportation to some students merely to accommodate their “parents’
particular domestic circumstances.” Id. at 43.9
8
22 Pa. Code §§ 1.1 – 23.40.
9
The Pennsylvania School Boards Association (“Amicus”) filed an amicus brief in
support of the School District’s position. Amicus argues that the School Code and its
regulations contain an unwritten “Single Residency Rule,” which limits a student to only
one residence. Additionally, Amicus’ brief echoes the School District’s argument that
this decision was consistent with the School District’s discretion in “adopting
transportation policies and procedures to ensure the health, safety and welfare of all
students in a reasonable manner, while maintaining fiscal responsibility.” Amicus Brief
at 20.
[J-25-2015] - 10
In response, Father argues that the School Code, and the case law interpreting
it, mandates that the School District provide transportation to both residences here.
Father posits that, although Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation) does not
specify the origination point of transportation to be provided “to and from . . . school,”
the only logical interpretation of Section 1361(1) is that the transportation is to be
provided from a student’s residence (or a bus stop within 1 ½ miles thereof) to the
student’s school and back. Father asserts that as C.W. is a “resident pupil” of both
parents’ residences, the School District must provide transportation to and from both
residences.
Father submits that the School District’s interpretation of Section 1361(1) is
impermissible because it is contrary to the legislature’s intent, which he believes is
embodied in Section 1327 and the exceptions thereto. See 24 P.S. § 13-1327(a)
(Compulsory attendance) (stating “every child of compulsory school age having a legal
residence in this Commonwealth . . . is required to attend a day school”). Because
certain classes of school districts cannot compel attendance if they do not provide
transportation to their students who live more than two miles from their school, see 24
P.S. § 13-1330(5) (Exceptions to compulsory attendance),10 Father finds the purpose
10
Section 1330(5)’s full text reads as follows:
The provisions of this act requiring regular attendance shall
not apply to any child who –
***
(5) Except in districts of the fourth class and those of the
third class located wholly within the boundary lines of a
township, or within the boundary lines of a borough which
has a population of less than five hundred (500) inhabitants
to the square mile, resides two miles or more by the nearest
public highway from any public school in session and no
proper free transportation is furnished to such child to and
from school.
(Scontinued)
[J-25-2015] - 11
behind providing transportation is to compel attendance. Additionally, Father highlights
that those classes of school districts not included in the compulsory attendance
exception are mandated to provide transportation to students who live more than two
miles from school. See 24 P.S. § 13-1331 (Mandatory transportation), full text supra at
8. Father offers that if we accept the School District’s argument here, then the purpose
behind the transportation provisions will only be accomplished half of the time; C.W. will
only be compelled to attend school during Mother’s periods of physical custody but not
when he is living with Father.
In response to the School District’s alternative argument that its policy is within its
discretion to determine what is “proper transportation,” Father argues that the cases the
School District relies upon, see supra at 8-9, are inapposite, contending that in citing
Martin and Pollock, the School District fails to recognize that these cases only involved
the manner of transportation services and not whether the school districts at issue were
required to provide transportation in the first instance as is the question here. Thus,
Father asserts that the School District only has discretion to decide the manner of
transportation, not whether there will be transportation at all.
Father next posits that even assuming arguendo that the School District has
discretion to decide whether to provide transportation to more than one residence,
providing transportation only half of the time is not “proper transportation.” Similarly,
Father advances, requiring a student to walk nearly two miles to a bus stop within 1 ½
miles of Mother’s residence would be an abuse of discretion, as it exceeds the 1 ½ mile
limit set forth in Section 1362 (Distance to bus stops) when C.W. is at Father’s
residence.
(continuedS)
24 P.S. § 13-1330(5).
[J-25-2015] - 12
Lastly, in response to the School District’s argument that its changes to the
transportation policy were necessary to conserve public funds, Father argues that the
cost to the School District is irrelevant. To the extent that the School District’s budget is
relevant, Father points out that the bulk of the School District’s savings likely stemmed
from eliminating transportation to locations other than residences, as only 50 to 75 of
400 students were transported to multiple residences.11
In this case, we are reviewing the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction,
pursuant to agreed-upon facts, and therefore we must determine whether the trial court
committed an error of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
review is plenary. Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 663-64 (Pa. 2002). In order to
establish a claim for a permanent injunction, the party must establish his or her clear
right to relief. Id. at 663. As Father’s request for a permanent injunction rests upon a
purported mandate within the School Code, this case presents a matter of statutory
interpretation. The objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
When the plain language of a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, it is the best
11
We note that all school districts are required to file their budgets with the
Pennsylvania Department of Education. See 24 P.S. § 2-218(a) (“An annual financial
report shall be submitted to the Secretary of Education by each school district”). The
School District has done so and placed its 2015-2016 budget online for public scrutiny,
which shows expenditures of $86,528,116 expected for that school year. See
http://www.mtwp.net/district/business-office/, Proposed Final 2015-2016 Budget PDE-
2028. It is undisputed that the School District’s modification to its transportation policy
affected 400 students and saved approximately $200,000 per year. Of these 400
students, the School District eliminated stops to more than one residence for 50-75
students because of physical custody arrangements. Assuming that the appropriate
number is 75 students and the savings are equal per student, this represents 19% of
the 400 students and therefore $38,000 of the $200,000 in savings. This $38,000
equates to a savings of 0.04% or 4/100 of 1% of the School District’s total 86.5 million
dollar budget.
[J-25-2015] - 13
indication of legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); see also Chanceford Aviation v.
Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 923 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Pa. 2007).
When, however, the words of a statute are ambiguous, a number of factors are
used in determining legislative intent, including the purpose of the statute and the
consequences of a particular interpretation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Furthermore, “it is
axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read
together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire
statute.” Hoffman Mining Co., Inc., v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., Cambria
Cnty., 32 A.3d 587, 592 (Pa. 2011) (internal quotes and citation omitted); see also 1
Pa.C.S. § 1932 (statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the
same persons or things, and statutes or parts of statutes in pari materia shall be
construed together, if possible). Lastly, we presume that the legislature did not intend
an unreasonable or absurd result. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
Generally, courts are restrained when reviewing matters of school policy and
“should not function as super school boards.” Zebra v. Sch. Dist. of City of Pittsburgh,
296 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa. 1972). However, school boards do not have unfettered
discretion; courts have authority to interfere when a school board’s “action is based on a
misconception of law, ignorance through lack of inquiry into facts necessary to form
intelligent judgment, or the result of arbitrary will or caprice . . . .” Hibbs v. Arensberg,
119 A. 727, 728 (Pa. 1923). If such an abuse of discretion occurs, then it is amenable
to the injunctive process, an equitable remedy in which the party seeking injunctive
relief bears a heavy burden. Landerman v. Churchill Area Sch. Dist., 200 A.2d 867, 869
(Pa. 1964).
With these general principles in mind, we turn to the relevant statutory provisions
of the School Code, which are contained within Article XIII, titled “Pupils and
[J-25-2015] - 14
Attendance.” First, we analyze the provisions governing transportation, beginning with
Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation). Section 1361(1) states that “[t]he board
of school directors in any school district may . . . provide for the free transportation of
any resident pupil to and from the . . . school in which he is lawfully enrolled . . . .” 24
P.S. § 13-1361(1). The School District does not dispute that it owes a duty of
transportation to C.W. as a “resident pupil” based on Section 1361(1), as it has elected
to provide transportation for its students. The contested issue is what this duty of
transportation entails, and specifically, whether it requires transportation to Father’s
residence.
Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation) states that a student shall receive
transportation “to and from” school. By using the language “to and from” school,
Section 1361(1) does not state where the transportation begins and where it ends. As
written, this portion of the statute could be construed to mandate transportation to and
from school to wherever a student or his parent desires, whether this be his residence,
daycare, or the front of the corner store.
Section 1361(1) itself, however, only applies to “resident pupils.” Thus, the duty
to transport the student is trigged by his status as a resident of the school district, and
necessarily his residence within the school district. It would be illogical to hold that the
transportation that is provided is from some location other than the student’s residence.
As further support that transportation for purposes of 1361(1) must be to and from
school to a student’s residence, Section 1366 of the School Code sets forth how to
compute any distance specified in the School Code. Specifically, any distance
calculated “between the residence of any pupil and any public school to be attended by
him” must be computed by removing the distance between the student’s “dwelling
[J-25-2015] - 15
house” and the public road. 24 P.S. § 13-1366 (Computation of distances).12
Therefore, the relevant distances in the School Code are based entirely on the student’s
residence. Thus, we conclude that when a school district elects to provide
transportation pursuant to Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation), the origination
and termination point for the transportation is the student’s residence.13, 14
Having established that Section 1361(1) transportation begins and ends at a
student’s residence, we must next determine whether a student may have more than
one residence for transportation purposes, keeping in mind that the singular form of
“residence” in Section 1366 (Computation of distances) is not dispositive. See 1
12
Section 1366 (Computation of distances) states in full:
Where, by the terms of this act, or any other act, any
distance is specified between the residence of any pupil and
any public school to be attended by him, or any
transportation is provided for within or beyond any particular
distance, in computing such distance no allowance shall be
made for the distance that the dwelling house of the pupil is
situated off the public highway. All such distances shall be
computed by the public highway from the nearest point
where a private way or private road connects the dwelling
house of the pupil with the highway to the nearest point
where said highway touches the school grounds of the
school to which the pupil has been assigned.
24 P.S. § 13-1366.
13
This does not preclude a school district from providing transportation to locations
other than a residence, but such transportation is not mandated by Section 1361(1).
14
We acknowledge that when a school district is required to provide transportation
to a student’s residence, this transportation requirement does not entail door-to-door
transportation directly to a student’s residence. Rather, Section 1362 permits a school
district to provide transportation to a bus stop within 1 ½ miles of a student’s residence.
See 24 P.S. § 13-1362 (full text at supra 9 n.7). However, for ease of discussion, we
will refer to the location of a student’s disembarkment from the school bus as his
residence.
[J-25-2015] - 16
Pa.C.S. § 1902 (providing that when interpreting statutes “[t]he singular shall include the
plural, and the plural, the singular.”). As Section 1361(1) does not address the question
before us, we look to other sections of the School Code and its regulations. We begin
by reviewing the provisions dealing with enrollment, a matter that is intrinsically linked
with residency.
Section 1301 establishes that “[e]very child, being a resident of any school
district, [between specific ages], may attend the public schools in his district . . . .” 24
P.S. § 13-1301. The immediately following provision defines “resident” – “A child shall
be considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his
person resides.” 24 P.S. § 13-1302(a). Section 1302 does not explicitly contemplate a
student whose parents do not live together. In 2004, the State Board of Education
addressed this issue when it enacted Section 11.11(a) (Enrollment Regulation) of the
regulations, which reads in relevant part:
§ 11.11. Entitlement of resident children to attend public schools.
(a) Entitlement.
(1) A school age child is entitled to attend the public
schools of the child's district of residence. A child's
district of residence is that in which the parents or the
guardian resides. When the parents reside in different
school districts due to separation, divorce or other
reason, the child may attend school in the district of
residence of the parent with whom the child lives for a
majority of the time, unless a court order or court
approved custody agreement specifies otherwise. If
the parents have joint custody and time is evenly
divided, the parents may choose which of the two
school districts the child will enroll for the school year. .
..
(2) Transportation for students must be provided
consistent with the policy of the school district that the
students are attending.
22 Pa. Code § 11.11(a).
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By giving parents a choice between two school districts when the parents “have
joint custody and time is evenly divided,”15 Section 11.11(a)(1) recognizes that a student
can be considered a resident of both school districts and therefore have two residences.
Obviously, it would be absurd to require, or even permit, a student to attend two school
districts during alternating weeks. Hence, the regulation requires a student’s parents to
choose one or the other district. The fact that a student must ultimately enroll in only
one school district does not detract from the reality that he may reside in two locations.16
Thus, Section 11.11(a)(1) establishes that where the parents have shared physical
custody of a student, that student has two residences for enrollment purposes.
15
While the School Code and the child custody statute, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5301 –
5366, do not provide a definition of “joint custody,” the term is synonymous with “shared
custody.” In re Wesley J. K., 445 A.2d 1243, 1247 (Pa. Super. 1982). Under the child
custody statute, shared custody is defined as follows:
“Shared physical custody.” The right of more than one
individual to assume physical custody of the child, each
having significant periods of physical custodial time with the
child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5322.
Additionally, we note that the child custody statute does not provide a definition
for or any reference to “evenly divided time.” It is not clear whether this phrase is limited
to circumstances where each parent has exactly fifty percent of the child’s time, or
whether it means something less technical, similar to the definition of shared custody.
However, because the parents here each have exactly fifty percent of C.W.’s time, it is
unnecessary for us to analyze this distinction any further to decide this case. Thus, we
leave such question for another day when it is directly before us, replete with briefing
and oral argument.
16
Accordingly, we disagree with Amicus’, The Pennsylvania School Boards
Association, argument that because Section 11.11(a)(1) has the effect that a student
may enroll in only one school district, the regulation necessarily implies that a student
may only have one residence, a concept that Amicus terms the “Single Residency
Rule.”
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Although Section 11.11(a)(1) informs our decision, its primary focus is enrollment
and not transportation. Additionally, it involves choosing between two different school
districts, which is not at issue here. To determine whether a choice between two
residences within the same school district for transportation purposes is necessary, we
review the purpose behind the statutory provisions relating to transportation, which we
find within the sections regarding transportation in the “Enforcing attendance” section of
Article XIII. See Article XIII (b) of the School Code.
Within Article XIII (b) of the School Code, Section 1327(a) sets forth that “every
child of compulsory school age having a legal residence in this Commonwealth . . . is
required to attend a day school.” 24 P.S. § 13-1327 (Compulsory attendance). The
School Code then provides that compulsory school attendance does not apply to a
student who “resides two miles or more by the nearest public highway from any public
school in session and no proper free transportation is furnished to such child to and
from school.” 24 P.S. § 13-1330(5) (Exceptions to compulsory attendance); see supra
at 11-12 n.10 for full text.17 Necessarily, then, the purpose behind school-provided
transportation is to facilitate students’ attendance. Logically, if students reside far from
their school, the legislature has decided that a school district cannot mandate a
student’s attendance unless transportation is provided.
17
The Section 1330(5) exception does not apply to students who reside in school
districts of “the fourth class and those of the third class located wholly within the
boundary lines of a township, or within the boundary lines of a borough which has a
population of less than five hundred (500) inhabitants to the square mile.” Id. The
immediately following provision, Section 1331 (Mandatory transportation), applies to
those school districts excluded from the Section 1330(5) exception, and requires those
school districts to provide transportation or lodging to its students who reside more than
two miles from their respective schools. See 24 P.S. § 13-1331.
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Choosing between two residences within a school district for transportation
purposes is qualitatively different from choosing which district to enroll in because, as
this case illustrates, a student may logically maintain two residences within the same
school district. Here, Mother and Father share legal and physical custody, with C.W.
spending alternate weeks with each parent. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the legislature and the Department of Education intended for the School District to
provide transportation to both residences in order to further the goal of compulsory
attendance. Accepting the School District’s counter-argument, moreover, would tend to
undermine the purpose behind the statute (mandatory attendance) as during the time
C.W. resides with Father, which is half of his time, he would not be required to attend
school given that Father lives more than two miles from C.W.’s school and the School
District is refusing transportation. See 24 P.S. § 13-1330(5) (Exceptions to compulsory
attendance). Thus, the School District’s view that providing transportation from Father’s
residence is merely “enhanced” transportation is erroneous: transportation for half of the
year is anything but enhanced, and, in fact, it is necessary to compel attendance.
Additionally, utilizing the same logic, we reject the School District’s argument that
whether to provide transportation to Father’s residence is a decision that falls within its
broad discretion. The School District does not have the discretion to decide whether to
provide transportation for half of the time C.W. should be in school.
Moreover, the School District concedes that it cannot require C.W. to walk more
than 1 ½ miles to his bus stop, pursuant to Section 1362 (Distance to bus stops), yet it
asserts that it can require Father to drive more than 1 ½ miles to the bus stop. The
School District cannot avoid a statutory prohibition by requiring a parent to drive where it
cannot require a student to walk.
[J-25-2015] - 20
In closing, we note our holding is consistent with the purpose of the School Code,
which we have stated is:
to provide all children residing within the Commonwealth
with a good common school education. In carrying out this
purpose the various school districts are merely the agents of
the Commonwealth. In construing the school laws, therefore,
that interpretation will be adopted which will be more likely to
carry into effect this generous purpose. The child is the
paramount object of our common school law. His education,
and not the exact apportionment of its cost among various
subdivisions of the Commonwealth, is its chief concern.
Harris v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 160 A. 443, 444 (Pa. 1932)
(internal quotes and citations omitted).18
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the School District must
provide transportation from and to both Mother’s and Father’s residences because:
when the School District elected to provide transportation to students’ residences under
Section 1361(1), it was required to do so to C.W.’s residence; C.W. has two residences
by virtue of his parents’ equally shared physical custody; there is no provision requiring
parents to choose a residence for transportation purposes (in contrast to enrollment);
and students cannot be required to travel more than 1 ½ miles from their residence to
the bus stop. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly granted Father’s
18
Although the concurring opinion’s concern for school districts’ budgets is
understandable, a rule requiring school districts to provide transportation to a student’s
two residences only when such transportation is not an “administrative burden” to the
school district is not supported by the School Code as written. As set forth at length
above, this decision required us to conduct statutory interpretation. Interpreting the
statute is not the same as broadening the statute. We have not added any language
nor have we expanded the plain language of the School Code. As we should, we leave
it to the legislature to determine whether adding an “administrative burden”
consideration is appropriate.
[J-25-2015] - 21
permanent injunction because the School District here is mandated to provide C.W. with
transportation to and from school to both of his residences. 19
Based on the foregoing, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Eakin and Madame Justice Todd join the opinion.
Mr. Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Stevens files a dissenting opinion.
19
As noted in the recitation of the issues raised on appeal, we also granted
allowance of appeal to address the propriety of the lower courts’ reliance on our prior
decision in Cumberland Valley. As demonstrated above, however, we have determined
that C.W. has two residences without the need to analyze or rely on Cumberland Valley.
Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to reach the question presented in the second issue
raised on appeal.
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