COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00497-CR
SEAN ARMSTRONG APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1375092D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Sean Armstrong appeals from his conviction for forgery by
possession with intent to pass a forged writing, to-wit: money. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 32.21(e) (West 2011). After Armstrong pleaded true to the repeat-
offender paragraph, the trial court sentenced him to fifty-four months’
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
confinement. In one point, Armstrong argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting his confession that was allegedly obtained by law
enforcement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.2 Because Armstrong’s complaint
concerning the admission of his confession was not asserted in the trial court, we
will affirm.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the trial to the bench, Carmen Serrato testified that she was a
cashier at the Albertson’s in Lake Worth on June 24, 2014. Armstrong came to
Serrato’s lane to check out and handed her two fake twenty-dollar bills to pay for
his items. Serrato testified that she could tell that the money was fake because it
felt like ordinary paper and because the ink was blue. Serrato marked the bills
with a counterfeit marker; the mark turned black, indicating the bills were fake;
and she called the manager to come to her register. Serrato testified that the
manager came to her register and that Armstrong attempted to leave the store
but was stopped.
Jerry Sallee, a police officer with the Lake Worth Police Department,
testified that on June 24, 2014, he received a dispatch that someone was trying
to make a purchase at Albertson’s using counterfeit money. When Officer Sallee
arrived at Albertson’s, he met with loss prevention and Serrato to find out what
had happened. Officer Sallee then made contact with Armstrong, who had been
2
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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detained by loss prevention, and asked him if he had any additional fake money.
Armstrong responded that he had more fake money in his back pocket and that
his mother had given him the money. Officer Sallee retrieved a white envelope
from Armstrong’s back pocket; inside the envelope were six additional counterfeit
twenty-dollar bills. Officer Sallee testified that he read Armstrong the Miranda
warnings at 11:37 a.m., placed him under arrest, and transported him to jail.
Officer Sallee testified that he could not recall whether he had read Armstrong
the Miranda warnings prior to talking to him.
Detective Christopher Gregory with the Lake Worth Police Department
testified that he and Special Agent Victor Martinez with the Secret Service
interviewed Armstrong after he was transported to jail. Detective Gregory said
that Officer Sallee had read Armstrong his rights on the scene, that Armstrong
had indicated his understanding of each of the rights by signing the Miranda card
containing the warnings, and that Armstrong had agreed to waive those rights
and to speak to Detective Gregory. During the interview, which was recorded,
Armstrong gave an oral confession; the recording was admitted into evidence
without objection. Armstrong also provided a written statement, which was also
admitted without objection. Detective Gregory testified that the Miranda warnings
were listed at the top of Armstrong’s written statement and that Armstrong had
initialed below them, indicating that he was waiving his rights. Armstrong’s
written statement contained the following: “I got the bills From. Stan Beck. An
Christian Walker. The money is from them. Im sure there making it. Lancaster
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Ave.” Armstrong admitted during his oral statement that he knew that the money
was counterfeit when he tendered it at Albertson’s.
Special Agent Martinez testified that the money seized from Armstrong
was counterfeit because, among other things, it all had the same serial number, it
was not made of the type of linen paper that is used with genuine currency, and it
had a security thread that was not clear. Special Agent Martinez further testified
that in his expert opinion, the bills seized from Armstrong were forged writings
and were not genuine currency produced by the federal government.
III. COMPLAINT FORFEITED
In his sole point, Armstrong argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting his confession that was allegedly obtained by law enforcement in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona.
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds
for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d
259, 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Sanchez v. State, 418 S.W.3d 302, 306
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Further, the trial court must have ruled
on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the
complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt, 407 S.W.3d at 263. A reviewing court should not
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address the merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Ford v.
State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Here, Armstrong did not file a motion to suppress and did not object when
his oral and written confessions were admitted at trial. Because Armstrong did
not raise his complaint in the trial court, the merits of the complaint he raises in
his brief are forfeited. See Brantley v. State, No. 07-13-00218-CR, 2015 WL
780266, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (holding that appellant’s failure to communicate his
complaints—regarding a violation of his Miranda rights or the involuntariness of
any statements he made—in his written motion to suppress and his failure to
complain during trial about the issues upon which he sought relief on appeal
operated as a forfeiture of those complaints); cf. Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359,
365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding alleged violation of Miranda right-to counsel
warning was waived because “global statements” in pretrial motion to suppress
“were not sufficiently specific to preserve” appellant’s argument), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 861 (2006). We overrule Armstrong’s sole point.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Armstrong’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
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DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 27, 2015
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