J-S52044-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.S.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.A.S., BIOLOGICAL
MOTHER
No. 625 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order of March 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Orphans’ Court at No.: 2014-0750-IVT
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2015
C.A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the March 11, 2015 order that terminated
her parental rights to J.S.S. (“Child”), born in October 2008. After careful
review, we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, and
consequently, we vacate the order.
On August 5, 2014, J.S. (“Grandmother”) and P.A.S. (“Grandfather”)1
(collectively “Grandparents”) filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s and D.M.’s (“Father”) parental rights to Child. Grandmother and
Grandfather sought to adopt Child.
On October 17, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions.
The hearing testimony established the following summary of the facts
disclosed at the hearing.
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1
Grandfather is Mother’s stepfather and has no biological relationship to
Child. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/17/2014, at 7.
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After Child was born, she lived with Mother and Father in an apartment
with Mother’s sister. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/17/2014, at 14.
Mother worked at a care center. Grandmother would care for Child two or
three nights per week while Mother was working. Id. at 15. Mother and
Child moved in with Mother’s then-boyfriend when Child was about two
years old. Id. at 13, 16. Grandmother continued to care for Child while
Mother worked, approximately three or four nights per week. Id. at 16.
Starting in February 2014, Child lived with Grandparents full-time. Id.
at 13, 16. Mother asked to move into Grandparents’ house with Child
because Mother was leaving her then-boyfriend. Id. at 42. However,
Mother only stayed at Grandparents’ house a few overnights in February and
March. Id. at 16. Mother admitted that she was rarely in the home
overnight because she worked overnight hours or she worked until midnight
and stayed at a friend’s house who lived closer to Mother’s work. Id. at 87-
88. Mother cared for Child while Grandmother was at work from February
2014 until June or July of 2014. Id. at 44. When Mother was at
Grandmother’s during the day, she cared for Child, including feeding,
bathing, and playing with Child. Id. at 88-89. Throughout February and
March, Mother saw Child approximately two or three other times per week in
addition to those times Grandmother was working. Id. at 43, 88.
Sometimes, Child would spend the night at Mother’s house. Id. at 88-89.
However, when Grandmother said that she did not want Child to spend the
night with Mother, the overnights stopped. Id. at 94.
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In June or July 2014, Child told Mother that Grandmother had hired a
babysitter for when Grandmother worked. At the same time, Grandmother
stopped calling to inform Mother of Grandmother’s work schedule.
Grandmother never expressed any concerns to Mother about her caring for
Child, nor did she tell Mother about the babysitter. Id. at 90. After
Grandmother hired a babysitter to watch Child while Grandmother worked,
Mother texted and called Child. Id. at 47. At that time, Grandmother
believed Mother no longer felt welcome in Grandmother’s home. Id. Mother
would occasionally stop to see Child, but said she did not feel welcome. Id.
at 91.
Mother last saw Child in August 2014. Id. at 17. On that day, Child
ran to Mother and jumped into her arms. Id. at 65. However, Grandmother
asked Mother to leave because Mother’s former boyfriend was with her. Id.
at 51. Mother said that Grandmother told her to get out, but did not say
why. Id. at 92.
Grandmother asserted that she routinely took Child to doctor’s
appointments, in part because of Mother’s work schedule. Id. at 17.
Mother stated that she also took Child to the doctor. Id. at 106. Mother
started Child in dance classes and Grandmother had continued that. Id. at
23-24. Mother attended dance recitals and Child’s church plays. Id. at 24-
25. Grandmother, Mother, and Father never entered into a formal custody
arrangement, nor was there a custody order involving Grandmother. Id. at
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18. However, Mother and Father had a custody order that granted Mother
primary custody. Id. at 54.
After Grandmother filed the petition to terminate Mother’s parental
rights, Mother tried to see Child on a weekly basis. Id. at 19. Mother called
Child on her birthday, approximately a week before the hearing, but did not
send a card or gift. Id. at 20-21. Mother did not go to Child’s party
because Grandmother did not invite Mother to the party. Child informed
Mother of the party when Mother called. Id. at 52-53. Mother has called
and texted Child regularly since August 2014. Id. at 103. Grandmother
often does not answer when Mother calls. Grandmother has not kept Mother
informed about Child’s school events or illnesses. Id. at 142.
Grandmother did not believe that Mother acted as a parent to Child.
Id. at 34. Grandmother asserted that there was no longer a bond between
Mother and Child as of February 2014. Id. at 64. Mother disagreed, stating
that Child runs to Mother when Child sees her, gives her hugs, and tells
Mother that she loves her. Id. at 105.
Mother admitted that she is a recovering drug addict. Mother had
been clean for three years until she had a relapse in July 2013. In late
February 2014, she started back at a methadone clinic and had been clean
for approximately three months as of the hearing. Id. at 99. Mother
testified that she could care for Child full-time because, as of the hearing,
she had a stable home on her own and was seeing a counselor regularly.
Id. at 100. Mother moved Child into Grandparents’ home so that Child
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would have stability while Mother sought help with her drug relapse. Id. at
101. Mother explained that she did not try to obtain physical custody of
Child sooner because Mother wanted to ensure that she had a stable home
first. Id. at 108.
Grandparents, Mother, and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the child
each filed a memorandum. The GAL supported termination of Father’s
parental rights, but opposed the termination of Mother’s parental rights. On
March 11, 2015, the trial court issued an opinion and order terminating both
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)
and (b).2
On April 9, 2015, Mother filed a notice of appeal and a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On April 30, 2015, the trial court issued a statement
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), stating that the court was relying upon the
March 11, 2015 opinion and order.
Mother raises one issue for our review:
Whether the lower court abused its discretion or committed an
error of law when it involuntarily terminated the rights of
[Mother] to [Child] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), where the
Petition to Involuntarily Terminate Rights was filed with the
lower court on August 5, 2014, when [Mother] continued to have
substantial contact, exercise parental duties and provide for
[Child’s] essential needs up until at least June or July 2014?
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2
Father has not appealed the termination of his parental rights.
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Mother’s Brief at 2.
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
“will examine the record closely in termination cases to determine whether
the evidence supports a termination and will reverse where the evidence
fails to support a trial court’s decree and/or where the trial court has failed
to give adequate consideration to the effect of such a decree upon the
welfare of the child or children.” In re Bowman, 647 A.2d 217, 219 (Pa.
Super. 1994).
It is well-settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights
bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by clear and convincing
evidence, which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re T.F., 847
A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Termination is a two-step process; a trial court first must determine if
the grounds under subsection (a) are met, and then it must consider
subsection (b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc). The focus in terminating parental rights under
section 2511(a) is upon the parent, while section 2511(b) focuses upon the
child.3 Id. at 1008.
With regard to subsection (a)(1):
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3
Here, Mother has only challenged the trial court’s conclusions as to
subsection (a)(1) and that is the focus of our memorandum.
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The statute thus indicates that in order to terminate parental
rights involuntarily, there must be a showing of both a six-month
period of estrangement and either a settled purpose or intent to
relinquish a parental claim or a failure to perform parental
duties.
To establish a settled purpose to relinquish a parental claim,
appellants must show that [the parent] made a deliberate
decision to terminate the parent-child relationship throughout
the six-month period. Failure to have contact with the child for
six months will not automatically forfeit a parent’s rights.
Moreover, this court consistently has refused to apply the
statutory six-month time frame mechanically. Instead, the court
must consider the individual circumstances of each case.
Adoption of M.S., 664 A.2d 1370, 1373 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations
omitted).
Here, the trial court did not find that Mother evidenced a settled
purpose to relinquish a parental claim. Nor could it have so found. The
evidence indicated that Mother was Child’s primary caregiver until February
2014. After that Child lived primarily with Grandparents, but Mother kept in
weekly contact from February until June or July of 2014. Even after that,
when Mother no longer felt welcome to see Child, Mother called and texted
Child. Mother never evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish her parental
claim to Child.
Instead, the trial court relied upon its finding that Mother had failed to
perform parental duties, and characterized Mother’s relationship with Child
as one of a playmate or friend, rather than a parent. We have defined
parental duties as follows:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
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child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court
has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which
requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. 2010). We have
recognized that:
It is incumbent upon a parent when separated from his child to
maintain communication and association with the child. This
requires an affirmative demonstration of parental devotion,
imposing upon the parent the duty to exert himself, to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004). Additionally,
[A]lthough a parent may fulfill his or her parental duties and
provide for the child by making suitable arrangements for the
child’s temporary care or by allowing others to provide essential
parental services during a period of crisis, extended relegation of
the child to the care of others as a result of parental incapacity is
relevant . . . .
In re Adoption of Sabrina, 472 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. Super. 1984).
It is undisputed that, from Child’s birth until February 2014, Mother
was Child’s primary caretaker, although Mother received substantial
assistance from Grandmother while Mother worked. It is also undisputed
that, after February 2014, Child resided primarily with Grandparents.
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However, the record does not support the conclusion that Mother failed to
perform parental duties during this period. Mother saw Child several times
each week and cared for Child during that time. Mother fed and bathed
Child, took Child on outings, and played with Child. Mother, at times, had
Child solely in her care overnight. Mother was not solely or even primarily
performing parental duties for Child, but she did not fail to perform those
duties in the six months preceding the filing of the petition.
The record provides evidence that Mother took more than a passive
interest in Child. Mother demonstrated a “continuing interest in the child
and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the
child.” See Z.P., supra. Even when Mother no longer felt welcome at
Grandparents’ home, she called and texted Child. Mother made efforts to
maintain a place in Child’s life. The record demonstrates that Mother
“fulfill[ed her] parental duties and provide[d] for the child by making
suitable arrangements for the child’s temporary care or by allowing others to
provide essential parental services during a period of crisis,” namely her
drug relapse. See Sabrina, supra. This is not a case in which Mother left
Child with Grandmother for an extended period of time or abandoned Child
with no contact.4
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4
Child’s GAL filed a brief in support of Mother’s appeal. Notably, the
GAL provided the following argument:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On this record, Grandparents did not meet their burden to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to perform
parental duties. The trial court erred in so finding. Therefore, we vacate the
order.
The trial court has entered a temporary custody order on October 17,
2014 that remains in effect. Either Mother or Grandparents may seek
modification of that order.
Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/28/2015
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
At the time of the hearing in October of 2014, [Mother] was drug
free, had a residence and was seeking employment. She
testified she wants her child back in her care and never
abandoned her child, instead she placed her in the care and
custody of her loving [Grandparents], until [Mother] could
correct her obstacles. Even [Grandmother] testified that
[Mother] will always have a role in [Child’s] life. . . . At best,
this should be a custody case, certainly not an adoption or
termination case.
GAL’s Brief at 3.
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