13‐3819‐cv (L)
EM Ltd. et al. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina et al.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
AUGUST TERM 2014
No. 13‐3819‐cv (L)
No. 13‐3821‐cv (CON)
EM LTD., NML CAPITAL, LTD.,
Plaintiffs‐Appellees,
v.
BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA,
REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA,
Defendants‐Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
No. 1:06‐cv‐7792―Thomas P. Griesa, Judge.
ARGUED: DECEMBER 10, 2014
DECIDED: AUGUST 31, 2015
Before: CABRANES, WESLEY, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from an order entered in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Thomas P. Griesa,
Judge) denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction filed by defendant‐appellant Banco Central de la
República Argentina (“BCRA”). We hold that the District Court
erred in: (1) imputing Argentina’s waiver of sovereign immunity to
BCRA based on an alter‐ego theory; and (2) applying the
commercial‐activity exception to BCRA’s use of its account with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Accordingly, we REVERSE the
District Court’s order of September 26, 2013, and we REMAND the
cause with instructions to dismiss the complaint on sovereign‐
immunity grounds.
JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS (Michael J. Ushkow
and Zeh S. Ekono, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, New York, NY; Jeffrey B. Wall,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Washington,
DC, on the brief), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
New York, NY, for Banco Central de la
República Argentina, Defendant‐Appellant.
CARMINE D. BOCCUZZI, JR. (Jonathan I.
Blackman, Daniel J. Northrop, and Michael
M. Brennan, on the brief), Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, NY, for
Republic of Argentina, Defendant‐Appellant.
2
THEODORE B. OLSON (Matthew D. McGill
and Jason J. Mendro, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC; Robert A.
Cohen and Dennis H. Hranitzky, Dechert
LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, for
NML Capital, Ltd., Plaintiff‐Appellee.
DAVID W. RIVKIN, Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP, New York, NY, for EM Ltd., Plaintiff‐
Appellee.
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
In December 2001, in the midst of a severe financial crisis, the
Republic of Argentina (“Argentina” or “the Republic”) declared a
moratorium on principal and interest payments for more than $80
billion in sovereign debt, including bonds that were issued under a
Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA”). Pursuant to two “exchange
offers” in 2005 and 2010, Argentina “restructured” over 91% of the
then‐existing FAA bonds.1
1 “Debt restructuring” is a process that allows corporations and sovereign
nations facing financial distress to reduce and renegotiate their debts. See David
L. Scott, Wall Street Words: An A to Z Guide to Investment Terms for Today’s Investor
97 (3d ed. 2003) (“Creditors having difficulty making interest and/or principal
payments often restructure their debt to reduce the size of the interest payments
and to extend debt maturity.”). We previously described Argentina’s
restructuring as follows:
3
Plaintiffs‐appellees EM Ltd. (“EM”) and NML Capital, Ltd.
(“NML”) (jointly, “plaintiffs”) own FAA bonds that were not
restructured. Since 2001, Argentina has refused to make any
scheduled payments on these defaulted bonds. In 2003, plaintiffs
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, seeking to recover their unpaid principal and interest.
Plaintiffs eventually obtained judgments against Argentina, which
now total approximately $2.4 billion.
This appeal concerns plaintiffs’ ongoing efforts to satisfy their
judgments against Argentina by attaching funds held by Argentina’s
central banking authority, the Banco Central de la República
Argentina (“BCRA”). In their third amended complaint (“TAC”),
plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that BCRA is Argentina’s
“alter ego” and that, therefore, BCRA is liable for Argentina’s debts.
If successful, plaintiffs’ stated intent is to use the declaratory
judgment to attach unspecified funds that BCRA holds in unnamed
foreign jurisdictions.
In 2005, Argentina initiated an exchange offer in which it
allowed FAA bondholders to exchange their defaulted bonds for
new unsecured and unsubordinated external debt at a rate of 25 to
29 cents on the dollar. In exchange for the new debt, participants
agreed to forgo various rights and remedies previously available
under the FAA.
. . . .
In 2010, Argentina initiated a second exchange offer with a
payment scheme substantially identical to the 2005 offer.
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2012).
4
As an instrumentality of a sovereign state, BCRA is ordinarily
immune from lawsuits in American courts under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. (“FSIA”).2
Accordingly, BCRA moved to dismiss the TAC for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on sovereign‐immunity grounds, as well as for
lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. On September 26, 2013, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Thomas
P. Griesa, Judge) issued an order denying BCRA’s motion.
Relevant to this appeal, the District Court concluded that
BCRA had waived its sovereign immunity under two statutory
exceptions. First, the District Court held that the FAA’s express
waiver of sovereign immunity also waived BCRA’s immunity—
28 U.S.C. § 1603 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
2
(a) A “foreign state” . . . includes a political subdivision of
a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”
means any entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof . . . .
5
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)3—because BCRA is Argentina’s “alter
ego.” Second, the District Court held that BCRA’s use of its account
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) constituted
“commercial activity” in the United States, which waived BCRA’s
sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).4
Because neither of these statutory exceptions applies to this
case, the District Court erred in denying BCRA’s motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we REVERSE
the District Court’s order of September 26, 2013, and we REMAND
the cause with instructions to dismiss the TAC with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I. The Underlying Debt
In 1994, Argentina began issuing debt securities pursuant to a
Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA bonds”). In light of Argentina’s
“history of defaulting on, or requiring restructuring of, its sovereign
obligations,”5 investors demanded that the FAA include a waiver of
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) states in relevant part that a foreign state shall not
3
be immune from jurisdiction if it “has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication.”
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) states in relevant part that a foreign state is not
4
immune from any action “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States.”
5 EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“BCRA I”); see also id. (recording Argentina’s “many contributions to the law of
foreign insolvency through its numerous defaults on its sovereign obligations, as
well as through . . . a diplomacy of default”).
6
Argentina’s foreign sovereign immunity as to “any suit, action, or
proceeding against it or its properties, assets or revenues with
respect to the” FAA bonds, and any suit brought “for the purpose of
enforcing or executing” a judgment obtained in a related
proceeding.6 Argentina agreed to include this waiver of sovereign
immunity in the FAA. 7
In December 2001, Argentina declared a moratorium on
principal and interest payments on more than $80 billion of foreign
debt, including the FAA bonds.8 Since then, Argentina has not made
principal or interest payments on these bonds. In 2005 and 2010,
Argentina successfully restructured over 91% of its debt by
launching “global exchange offers,” pursuant to which creditors
holding the defaulted bonds could exchange them for new securities
with modified terms that substantially reduced their value.9
Plaintiffs EM and NML own FAA bonds that were not restructured.
Beginning in 2003, plaintiffs filed multiple actions against
Argentina in the Southern District of New York in an effort to
recover the full amounts due on their defaulted bonds. Argentina
6 J.A. at 329‐30, 343‐44.
7 Argentina “concedes that in the [FAA] governing the debt instruments
owned by plaintiffs it clearly and unambiguously waived its right to assert its
sovereign immunity from suit in claims regarding those instruments.” NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 176 n.3 (2d Cir.
2011) (“BCRA II”).
8 See id. at 175.
9 Id. at 176 & n.4.
7
did not dispute that its sovereign immunity had been waived in the
FAA. Plaintiffs eventually obtained numerous final judgments
against Argentina, which now total approximately $2.4 billion.10
These judgments remain unpaid.
II. Litigation Against BCRA
On December 15, 2005, Argentina’s President, Néstor
Kirchner, issued two emergency executive decrees—Decree
1599/2005 and Decree 1601/2005 (jointly, the “Decrees”)—both of
which involved funds held by BCRA.11 The first decree provided
that reserves held by BCRA in excess of the amount needed to
support Argentina’s monetary base12 could “be used for payment of
obligations undertaken with international monetary authorities.”13
The decree labeled these excess reserves “unrestricted reserves.” The
second decree directed the Ministry of Economy and Production to
take the necessary steps to repay Argentina’s debt to the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) out of the unrestricted
reserves. As we previously noted:
10 Id. at 176 & n.6.
Reproductions of Decree 1599/2005 and Decree 1601/2005—in Spanish
11
and English translation—are provided in the J.A. at 579‐88.
See BCRA I, 473 F.3d at 468 (defining “monetary base” as being
12
“composed of the monetary circulation of Argentine pesos plus the demand
deposits of the financial entities with BCRA, in checking accounts or special
accounts”) (citing Law No. 23,928 of 3/27/91 art. 6, as amended by Law No. 25,561
of 1/7/02 art. 4) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
13 Id. at 468 (quoting Decree 1599/2005 art. 1, J.A. at 581).
8
At the time of the Decrees, BCRA had
approximately $26.8 billion in reserves and
needed $18.4 billion to cover the monetary
base; thus, approximately $8.4 billion in
reserves became Unrestricted Reserves
pursuant to the Decrees. On December 29,
2005, the Ministry issued Resolution No.
49, directing BCRA to repay [Argentina’s]
debt to the IMF and providing that, in
exchange, [Argentina] would give BCRA a
non‐transferrable note.14
Soon after these Decrees were issued, plaintiffs made their
first attempt to satisfy their judgments against Argentina by
attaching funds held by BCRA. On December 30, 2005, plaintiffs
moved in the Southern District of New York for an ex parte order to
restrain funds held by BCRA. Plaintiffs asserted that the Decrees had
the effect of transferring ownership of certain BCRA assets—
including funds held in BCRA’s account with the FRBNY—from
BCRA to Argentina. The District Court entered temporary
restraining orders with respect to, inter alia, the property held by
BCRA in eight garnishee banking institutions, including the
FRBNY.15
14 Id.
15 Id. at 469. On January 3, 2006, the BCRA paid Argentina’s debt to the
IMF out of the BCRA’s funds. The FRBNY funds that were subject to the
restraining notices were not used in connection with that payment, although the
parties disputed “whether the funds might have been used for this purpose in
the absence of the court‐ordered restraints on the transfer of the funds.” Id.
9
On January 12, 2006, the District Court vacated the temporary
restraining orders.16 Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s decision,
maintaining that the Decrees amounted to an expropriation by
Argentina of BCRA’s assets in order to pay Argentina’s debt to the
IMF, and that, consequently, the funds in BCRA’s FRBNY account
had become Argentina’s property.
On January 5, 2007, we rejected plaintiffs’ argument and
affirmed the District Court’s order, holding that “the Decrees did not
alter property rights with respect to the FRBNY Funds” because they
“did not create an attachable interest on the part of [Argentina] in
the FRBNY Funds.”17 Although we thus rejected plaintiffs’ transfer‐
of‐ownership argument, we noted the difference between two
theories of attachment—(1) that “the Decrees transferred to the
Republic ownership or control over the assets of BCRA”; and (2) that
Argentina controlled “BCRA itself”—i.e., that BCRA was Argentina’s
alter ego.18 We concluded that plaintiffs had not established that
BCRA’s funds were transferred to Argentina, but we noted that
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Argentina’s “misdeeds . . . might
have lent some credence to” the alter‐ego theory.19 That is, we
suggested that plaintiffs could potentially argue that BCRA was “so
extensively controlled by [Argentina] that a relationship of principal
16 Id. at 470.
17 Id. at 472.
18 Id. at 475 (emphasis in the original).
19 Id. at 480.
10
and agent is created,” or that recognizing BCRA’s separate juridical
status would “work fraud or injustice”20—and that, if successful, this
claim would subject all of BCRA’s assets to potential attachment by
Argentina’s judgment creditors.
In September 2006, while BCRA I was pending, plaintiffs
commenced a new action seeking a declaratory judgment that,
pursuant to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (“Bancec”), BCRA was liable for
Argentina’s debts. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that Argentina’s
consistent disregard for BCRA’s independence had vitiated any
presumption of separateness to which BCRA was entitled,
transforming BCRA into Argentina’s “alter ego.”
In this new action, plaintiffs also pursued attachment orders
against BCRA’s FRBNY funds based on this alter‐ego theory. On
April 7, 2010, the District Court granted plaintiffs’ attachment
motions and ruled that, at the time of BCRA’s repayment of
Argentina’s debt to the IMF (December 2005), BCRA was
Argentina’s alter ego.21 The District Court also concluded that the
attachment of BCRA’s FRBNY funds did not violate § 1611(b)(1),
which immunizes “property . . . of a foreign central bank . . . held for
20 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 629 (1983) (“Bancec”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying
corporate‐law principles to determine circumstances under which separate
juridical status of government instrumentality must be disregarded).
See EM Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 302‐04
21
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
11
its own account.” Accordingly, the District Court authorized the
attachment of the $105 million deposited in BCRA’s FRBNY account.
This order was appealed and in 2011, in BCRA II, we vacated
the attachment on the sole ground that the funds held in BCRA’s
FRBNY account were “immune” from execution under
§ 1611(b)(1).22 We declined to reach the District Court’s alter‐ego
determination and instead concluded that these funds were immune
from attachment “without regard to whether the [BCRA] is
independent from its parent state pursuant to Bancec.”23 We thus
intimated no view as to “whether the District Court correctly
determined that [Argentina’s] control of BCRA was sufficient to
disregard the presumption of juridical separateness under Bancec.”24
Accordingly, we vacated the District Court’s attachment orders with
respect to the FRBNY funds and remanded the cause to the District
Court for further proceedings.
III. This Case Upon Remand
On remand, plaintiffs filed the TAC—the operative complaint
for purposes of this appeal.25 Pursuant to our ruling in BCRA II,
funds held in BCRA’s accounts with the FRBNY are immune from
attachment. Accordingly, the TAC is framed more broadly—the
22 See BCRA II, 652 F.3d at 186‐87.
23 Id. at 187–88.
24 Id. at 196 n.24.
25 See J.A. at 3026–83 (filed August 31, 2012).
12
declaratory judgment it seeks would establish: (1) that BCRA is the
alter ego of Argentina; and (2) that BCRA is thus liable for any and
all of Argentina’s debts.26 Plaintiffs’ stated purpose for seeking this
judgment is to enable them to attach any asset held by BCRA
anywhere in the world in satisfaction of their judgments against
Argentina.27 This option was arguably left open by BCRA II, which
foreclosed the possibility of attaching assets deposited in BCRA’s
own accounts in the United States, but did not otherwise address
plaintiffs’ ability to reach BCRA assets elsewhere.
In November 2012, Argentina and BCRA moved to dismiss
the TAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal
jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Oral argument on this
motion was held at a conference of the District Court on September
25, 2013. Plaintiffs argued that BCRA had waived its sovereign
immunity on two grounds. First, plaintiffs asserted a theory of
implied waiver—that is, because BCRA is the alter ego of Argentina,
Argentina’s express waiver of immunity in the FAA should be
imputed to BCRA.28 Second, plaintiffs asserted that BCRA waived its
26 J.A. at 3027 (TAC ¶ 1).
27 See Special App. (“SPA”) at 4 (9/25/13 Tr. 3:21‐23) (“We would like to be
able to have a judgment that holds BCRA liable for the judgments entered
against Argentina that we may enforce as a judgment if we find assets
anywhere.”); id. at 10‐13 (9/25/13 Tr. 9:10‐12:15) (arguing that plaintiffs could take
the declaratory judgment to California, Switzerland, or Germany and use it to
attach BCRA’s assets held in those jurisdictions).
28 See id. at 27‐28 (9/25/13 Tr. 26:24‐27:1).
13
immunity by engaging in “commercial activity” in New York
through its FRBNY account.29
In denying the motion to dismiss, the District Court explicitly
adopted plaintiffs’ arguments for jurisdiction. In its bench order, the
District Court stated:
What I’m going to do this afternoon is to
deny the motions to dismiss the [TAC]. I
believe there is jurisdiction in the way
[plaintiffs’ counsel] Mr. Cohen describes
jurisdiction which makes it appropriate to
entertain the action; and considering the
provisions of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, I believe that there is an
implied waiver here and I believe there’s
commercial activity so that the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and (a)(2) are
applicable.
This really is, denying a motion to dismiss,
exactly what would emerge from a
litigation that has problems. The plaintiffs’
position has problems, as I’ve indicated.
But I think those problems do not require
the dismissal of the action.
And I want to repeat something which I’m
sure I’ve said maybe more than once this
afternoon; and that is, we don’t have a
29 See id. at 29‐31 (9/25/13 Tr. 28:1‐30:2).
14
republic which is acting in a normal way as
far as its debts. We don’t have a situation
[where] there is a completely regular
dealing between the [R]epublic and BCRA
the way that I’m sure would exist with the
Bank of England or the Central Bank of
Germany or France or certainly with the
Federal Reserve Bank. We don’t have that.
We have irregularities.
The reason that I believe the action should
be held open is I think there is a very
legitimate claim by the plaintiffs here that
for certain purposes BCRA is the alter ego
of the [R]epublic.
In the papers before me, the plaintiffs have
made a very powerful case of that, and I so
held in my earlier decision, and that
holding was not what was disturbed by the
Court of Appeals. So, there’s a very good
case of alter ego.
I believe that the Court should entertain the
idea that it would be desirable to have this
Court with its experience in this case and
its background in this case make some kind
of formal ruling of alter ego which could be
legitimately used in a proceeding in
another state or a foreign country so that
the plaintiffs do not have to go to the other
state or the foreign country and start in
again, once again, and maybe more than
15
once again with this presentation about
alter ego.
The motion to dismiss the action is
denied.30
This appeal followed.31
DISCUSSION
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
In general, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to “final
decisions” of district courts;32 the District Court’s order here is
interlocutory. BCRA asserts, however, that we have jurisdiction
under the “collateral order” exception to review BCRA’s claim of
sovereign immunity as a defense to subject matter jurisdiction.33
Under this exception, an interlocutory appeal is available for
“a small class of ‘collateral’ rulings that do not terminate the
litigation in the court below but are nonetheless sufficiently ‘final’
and distinct from the merits to be appealable without waiting for a
30 Id. at 32‐34 (9/25/13 Tr. 31:19‐33:7).
The TAC names both BCRA and the Republic of Argentina as
31
defendants in this lawsuit, and both BCRA and the Republic have appealed the
District Court’s denial of their joint motion to dismiss the TAC.
32 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
See MasterCard Intʹl Inc. v. Visa Intʹl Serv. Assʹn, 471 F.3d 377, 383 (2d
33
Cir. 2006).
16
final judgment to be entered.”34 To fit within the exception, the
interlocutory order must: (1) “conclusively determine the disputed
question,” (2) “resolve an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action,” and (3) “be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.”35
A denial of foreign sovereign immunity generally satisfies the
conditions necessary to invoke the collateral order doctrine.36 For
instance, in Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,37 we held
that all three prongs of the above test were satisfied because: (1) the
district court’s ruling on sovereign immunity conclusively
determined the issue of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the issue of
jurisdiction is separate from the merits; and (3) an appeal from final
judgment cannot repair the damage caused to a sovereign that is
improperly required to litigate a case.38
Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2013)
34
(citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Coopers &
35
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, 735 F.3d 72, 80 (2d
36
Cir. 2013) (collecting cases); Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.
2007); see also Gupta v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 763 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[E]ach of our sister circuits that has considered whether a denial of a motion to
dismiss on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity is an appealable collateral
order ha[s] unanimously held that it is.”) (collecting cases).
37 162 F.3d 748, 755‐56 (2d Cir. 1998).
See id. (“A sovereign that is required to litigate a case on the merits
38
before it can appeal the assertion of jurisdiction over it has not been afforded the
17
Notwithstanding the collateral‐order doctrine, plaintiffs assert
that we lack appellate jurisdiction here because the “immunity
question cannot be decided without addressing [plaintiffs’]
underlying claims on the merits.”39 According to plaintiffs, BCRA’s
alter‐ego status is a predicate to holding that the FAA’s sovereign‐
immunity waiver binds BCRA and, therefore, resolving the
immunity issue now would require an unnecessary and
burdensome inquiry into the extent of Argentina’s control over
BCRA. Accordingly, plaintiffs urge us to defer review until the
District Court issues a final judgment.40
These arguments are unpersuasive. We have consistently held
that the threshold sovereign‐immunity determination is
benefit of the immunity to which it is entitled.”); Foremost–McKesson, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[S]overeign immunity
is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of litigation[.]”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145‐46 (1993) (same in the context of state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment).
Plaintiffs‐Appellees Br. at 21 (quoting Grp. Health Inc. v. Blue Cross
39
Ass’n, 793 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1986)).
40 In so arguing, plaintiffs principally rely on two cases from this Circuit,
neither of which concerned motions to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. In
White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988), we denied interlocutory review of a
failed absolute‐immunity defense, because immunity turned on whether
defendants were liable for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. In
Grp. Health Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass’n, 793 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986), we similarly
denied appellate review where absolute immunity turned on whether the
defendant acted within the scope of its authority.
18
immediately reviewable under the collateral‐order doctrine.41 In fact,
this case is similar to U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Braspetro Oil
Services Co.,42 in which we also reviewed the denial of a motion to
dismiss brought by a purported foreign‐state alter ego, and in which
we held that a court reviewing a district court’s sovereign‐immunity
decision must assess whether plaintiffs “have made a sufficient
showing [of alter ego] at this point in the litigation.”43 As the Supreme
Court has held, “a question of immunity is separate from the merits
of the underlying action . . . even though a reviewing court must
consider the plaintiff’s factual allegations in resolving the immunity
issue.”44
At this stage in the case, we must (1) assume the truth of the
TAC’s factual allegations, and then (2) assess whether these
allegations are sufficient to establish that BCRA waived its sovereign
immunity. If we are able to determine conclusively that the
pleadings do not establish, as a matter of law, that BCRA waived its
41 See ante note 36.
42 199 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 1999).
43 Id. at 98 (emphasis supplied).
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528‐29 (1985); see also Johnson v. Jones,
44
515 U.S. 304, 314 (1995) (a claim of immunity is immediately appealable even
though it is “sometimes practically intertwined with the merits”); cf. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672‐75 (2009) (jurisdiction proper over qualified immunity
appeal concerning legal sufficiency of pleadings because “[e]valuating the
sufficiency of a complaint is not a ‘fact based’ question of law”); Cowan ex rel.
Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 760‐61 (2d Cir. 2003) (existence of qualified
immunity under plaintiffs’ version of the facts “turns on an issue of law” and is
thus immediately appealable).
19
sovereign immunity, it would be inconsistent with the underlying
purpose of the foreign‐sovereign‐immunity doctrine to subject
BCRA to further burdensome litigation.45
Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction under the
collateral‐order doctrine to review the District Court’s threshold
determination that BCRA waived its sovereign immunity pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (the express waiver exception) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (the commercial activity exception).46
45 See Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 865 (2008) (the
foreign‐sovereign‐immunity doctrine “is designed to ‘give foreign states and
their instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit.’” (quoting
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003))).
46 Because we conclude that the TAC fails to establish that BCRA waived
its sovereign immunity, see post Section II, we need not and do not reach the issue
of whether we have appellate jurisdiction (or pendent appellate jurisdiction) over
BCRA’s other asserted grounds for dismissal, which the District Court also
rejected. These grounds include: (1) that plaintiffs lack Article III standing,
because it is speculative whether the declaratory judgment sought by plaintiffs
would redress their injury (i.e., permit them to recover funds in other
jurisdictions); and (2) that the TAC fails to state a plausible claim that BCRA is
Argentina’s alter ego. As to the first ground, we take no position on whether a
declaratory judgment of the type sought here would satisfy the requirements of
Article III. As to the second ground, plaintiffs’ Rule 12(b)(6) argument overlaps
substantially with our discussion of sovereign immunity, but we decline to
exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of
plaintiffs’ 12(b)(6) motion. Rather, as we explain in detail below, the TAC is to be
dismissed solely on sovereign‐immunity grounds.
20
II. Sovereign Immunity
Moving to the merits of this appeal, the sole issue we consider
is whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that BCRA
waived its sovereign immunity. We review this conclusion de novo.47
There is no dispute that BCRA is an instrumentality of
Argentina and that, unless one of the FSIA’s exceptions applies,
BCRA is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity as a defense to
this lawsuit.48 Here, the District Court concluded that two exceptions
applied. First, it held that the FAA’s express waiver of sovereign
immunity under § 1605(a)(1) is imputable to BCRA (as Argentina’s
“alter ego”). Second, it held that BCRA’s use of its account at the
FRBNY constituted “commercial activity” in the United States
within the meaning of § 1605(a)(2).
We address each exception in turn.
See Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 129
47
(2d Cir. 2009) (“We review de novo legal conclusions denying [FSIA] immunity to
a foreign state or its property.”).
48 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5 (1983)
(“[I]f none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the [FSIA]
applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. The District Court’s conclusion that none of the exceptions
to the Act applied therefore signified an absence of both competence and
personal jurisdiction.”).
21
A. Alter Ego
1. Legal Standards
The controlling case for when an instrumentality of a
sovereign state becomes the “alter ego” of that state is First National
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611
(1983)—known as Bancec. In Bancec, the Supreme Court created a
presumption that “government instrumentalities established as
juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign
should normally be treated as such.”49 According to the Court,
[f]reely ignoring the separate status of
government instrumentalities would result
in substantial uncertainty over whether an
instrumentality’s assets would be diverted
to satisfy a claim against the sovereign, and
might thereby cause third parties to
hesitate before extending credit to a
government instrumentality without the
government’s guarantee. As a result, the
efforts of sovereign nations to structure
their governmental activities in a manner
deemed necessary to promote economic
development and efficient administration
would surely be frustrated.50
49 Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626‐27.
50 Id. at 626 (footnote omitted).
22
The Supreme Court drew support for this proposition in the
legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b),51 the provision of the FSIA
addressing the circumstances in which a judgment creditor may
execute upon the assets of a foreign government’s instrumentality:
Section 1610(b) [of the FSIA] will not
permit execution against the property of
one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a
judgment against another, unrelated
agency or instrumentality. There are
compelling reasons for this. If U.S. law did
not respect the separate juridical identities
of different agencies or instrumentalities, it
might encourage foreign jurisdictions to
disregard the juridical divisions between
different U.S. [public] corporations or
between a U.S. [public] corporation and its
51 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) . . . any property in the United States of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial
activity in the United States shall not be immune from
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a
State after the effective date of this Act, if—
(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its
immunity from attachment in aid of execution or
from execution either explicitly or implicitly,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the
agency or instrumentality may purport to effect
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver
. . . .
23
independent subsidiary. However, a court
might find that property held by one
agency is really the property of another.52
Therefore, Bancec recognizes a statutory “presumption that a
foreign government’s determination that its instrumentality is to be
accorded separate legal status” will be honored.53 But this
presumption of separateness may be rebutted by evidence
establishing an alter‐ego relationship between the instrumentality
and the sovereign state that created it. Specifically, the presumption
may be overcome and an alter‐ego relationship established if: (1) the
instrumentality “is so extensively controlled by its owner that a
relationship of principal and agent is created”; or (2) the recognition
of an instrumentality’s separate legal status would work a “fraud or
injustice.”54 As we previously noted, “both Bancec and the FSIA
legislative history caution against too easily overcoming the
presumption of separateness.”55
52 Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627–28 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94‐1487, at 29‐30
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6628‐29).
53 Id. at 628.
54 Id. at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Letelier v. Republic of
Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[A] foreign state instrumentality is
answerable just as its sovereign parent would be if the foreign state has abused
the corporate form, or where recognizing the instrumentality’s separate status
works a fraud or an injustice.”).
Letelier, 748 F.2d at 795; see also Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 502 F.
55
App’x 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2012) (non‐precedential summary order) (Bancec sets forth a
“strong presumption” that an instrumentality has a “separate legal identity”).
24
2. Analysis
Under Bancec, we are thus required to presume that BCRA is
legally separate and distinct from Argentina. This presumption is
overcome only if the TAC alleges facts sufficient to establish that
either: (1) Argentina so extensively controlled BCRA that a
relationship of principal and agent was created; or (2) recognizing
BCRA as a separate entity would work a fraud or injustice.56
For the reasons that follow, neither prong of this test has been
satisfied. Therefore, the presumption that BCRA is separate from
Argentina has not been rebutted. Because Argentina’s express
56 The District Court did not clearly indicate which of these two theories it
relied upon in making its alter‐ego determination. It did, however, observe “that
a general declaration of alter ego could . . . have effects or implications beyond
what [the Court] would intend,” and that “the idea that BCRA is in a general
way liable for the debts of the republic goes way too far.” SPA at 31‐32 (9/25/13
Tr. 30:19‐21, 30:25‐31:2). While the District Court ultimately concluded that
plaintiffs have a legitimate claim that BCRA is the alter ego of Argentina for
“certain purposes,” id. at 33 (9/25/13 Tr. 32:17), it did not specify what those
purposes were.
Our precedent supports the view, however, that once an instrumentality
of a sovereign state has been deemed to be the alter ego of that state under
Bancec, the instrumentality and the state are to be treated as one and the same for
all purposes. See Letelier, 748 F.2d at 794 (“The Bancec Court held that a foreign
state instrumentality is answerable just as its sovereign parent would be if the
foreign state has abused the corporate form, or where recognizing the
instrumentality’s separate status works a fraud or an injustice.”) (emphasis
supplied). Because we conclude that the TAC fails to plead facts that would
establish that BCRA has become Argentina’s alter ego for any purpose, we need
not address the District Court’s novel conclusion that an instrumentality may
become an “alter ego” for just some, but not all, purposes.
25
waiver of sovereign immunity in the FAA does not apply to BCRA,
plaintiffs’ reliance on the § 1605(a)(1) exception necessarily fails.
a. Extensive Control
We address first Bancec’s “extensive control” prong. While
measuring the level of control exercised over an instrumentality by a
foreign sovereign is fact‐intensive, courts have articulated several
indicia to guide the inquiry.57 Among the factors that have been
deemed relevant are whether the sovereign nation: (1) uses the
instrumentality’s property as its own; (2) ignores the
instrumentality’s separate status or ordinary corporate formalities;
(3) deprives the instrumentality of the independence from close
political control that is generally enjoyed by government agencies;
(4) requires the instrumentality to obtain approvals for ordinary
business decisions from a political actor; and (5) issues policies or
directives that cause the instrumentality to act directly on behalf of
the sovereign state.58 These factors are relevant to answering the
touchstone inquiry for “extensive control”: namely, whether the
For instance, the Fifth Circuit in Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of
57
Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 416‐18 (5th Cir. 2006), listed 21 factors to consider to
determine whether the foreign state “complete[ly] control[led]” the
instrumentality. See also Letelier, 748 F.2d at 794.
58 See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); Hester Int’l Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir.
1989).
26
sovereign state exercises significant and repeated control over the
instrumentality’s day‐to‐day operations.59
BCRA was founded in 1935 as Argentina’s Central Bank.60 By
statute, it is “a self‐administered institution,” which is charged with
acting as Argentina’s agent and depository before international
monetary, banking, and financial entities, as well as with regulating
the Argentine banking system and financial sector.61 BCRA’s
primary responsibility is to maintain the value of legal tender in
Argentina—accordingly, it shall “exclusively issue banknotes and
coins in the Argentine Nation,” and “invest a portion of its external
59 See LNS Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, 115 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (alter‐ego test requires a showing that “the government exercises
extensive control over the instrumentality’s daily operations and abuses the
corporate form”), aff’d sub nom. LNC Invs., Inc. v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 228
F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming “for substantially the reasons stated by the
district court”); Seijas, 502 F. App’x at 22 (Bancec requires extensive control of
subsidiary’s “day‐to‐day activities” or abuse of the corporate form.); First Inv.
Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 753
(5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e look to the ownership and management structure of the
instrumentality, paying particularly close attention to whether the government is
involved in day‐to‐day operations, as well as the extent to which the agent holds
itself out to be acting on behalf of the government.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bancec requires
allegations “of day‐to‐day control” in order “to overcome the presumption of
separate juridical status”).
60 BCRA II, 652 F.3d at 177 (citing Law No. 24,144/92, ch. I, § 1 (Oct. 22,
1992, as amended) (“BCRA Charter”)). An English translation of the BCRA
Charter is provided in the J.A. at 2786‐2800.
BCRA Charter, arts. 1, 3‐4 (J.A. at 2786‐87); see also id. arts. 17‐18, 21‐22,
61
25 & 28‐29 (J.A. at 2791‐95).
27
assets in deposits or other interest‐bearing transactions with foreign
banking institutions.”62 Moreover, BCRA is managed by an
independent Board of Directors appointed by the “National
Executive Power” with the consent of the national Senate.63 BCRA
has the authority to purchase and sell property, hold accounts, and
sue and be sued in courts under its own name.64
Thus far, “on paper,” BCRA appears to be a typical
government instrumentality entitled to separate legal status.
However, plaintiffs argue, and the District Court presumably
accepted, that BCRA’s formal independence is belied by Argentina’s
extensive control over BCRA’s day‐to‐day operations. Plaintiffs
attempt to buttress this conclusion with three categories of factual
allegations. Nonetheless, even if we assume the truth of all of them,
these facts do not support a claim of “extensive control,” because
whatever control Argentina exerted was not tied to BCRA’s day‐to‐
day operations.
First, the TAC alleges that Argentina systematically
eliminated BCRA’s legal independence by: (1) permitting the
President to appoint BCRA officers for an unspecified period
without Senate approval; and (2) removing BCRA governors who
supported the central bank’s independence from the executive
62 Id. Arts. 30 & 33 (J.A. at 2795‐96).
63 See BCRA I, 473 F.3d at 479 n.15.
64 Id.
28
branch.65 But courts have consistently rejected the argument that the
appointment or removal of an instrumentality’s officers or directors,
standing alone, overcomes the Bancec presumption.66 The hiring and
firing of board members or officers is an exercise of power incidental
to ownership, and ownership of an instrumentality by the parent
state is not synonymous with control over the instrumentality’s day‐
to‐day operations. Governments commonly exercise some measure
of control over their instrumentalities, much like parent corporations
commonly control certain aspects of otherwise independent
subsidiaries. Missing from plaintiffs’ allegations are any claims that
Argentina’s appointment of board members then caused it to
interfere in and dictate BCRA’s daily business decisions. Ensuring
that a board of directors of an instrumentality shares the sovereign’s
goals and policies for the instrumentality is not, by itself, extensive
control. The sovereign must instead use its influence over these
directors in order to interfere with the instrumentality’s ordinary
business affairs.
65 See J.A. at 3056‐66 (TAC ¶¶ 76‐96).
66 See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La República de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843,
849 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“If majority stock ownership and appointment of the
directors were sufficient, then the presumption of separateness announced in
Bancec would be an illusion.”); Foremost‐McKesson, 905 F.2d at 440 (“[M]ere
involvement by the state in the affairs of an agency or instrumentality does not
answer the question whether the agency or instrumentality is controlled by the
state for purposes of FSIA.”); Hester Int’l Corp., 879 F.2d at 181 (“The two factors
of 100% ownership and appointment of the Board of Directors cannot by
themselves force a court to disregard the separateness of the juridical entities.”).
29
Second, the TAC alleges that Argentina issued executive
decrees and legislative amendments to make it easier for the
government to borrow from BCRA, and that Argentina
subsequently borrowed tens of billions of dollars from BCRA in
order to pay Argentina’s debts to the IMF and other private
creditors (but not to these plaintiffs).67 However, as the United States
argued before us as amicus in BCRA II,68 the repayment by BCRA of
Argentina’s other debts does not establish the existence of an alter‐
ego relationship, because “central banks commonly perform
payment functions for their governments, including central banks
that are relatively independent from their governments.”69 Although
the United States also argued that the IMF’s status as a preferred
67 See J.A. at 3036‐56 (TAC ¶¶ 33‐75) (BCRA’s loans to Argentina between
2005 and 2010 included: (1) $8 billion to pay its debt to the IMF in 2005; (2) $6.7
billion to pay its debt to the Club of Paris in 2008; (3) $6.6 billion to pay its debt to
private creditors in 2010; and (4) $17 billion from 2010 to 2012 to pay a variety of
other debts). The “Club of Paris” is “an international organization established for
the purpose of settling controversies concerning debts that were guaranteed or
owed by LDC [Less Developed Country] governments to creditor governments.”
BCRA I, 473 F.3d at 466 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the
original).
68 In BCRA II, we did not reach the District Court’s earlier holding that
BCRA was Argentina’s alter ego. However, the United States—which appeared
as amicus in BCRA II in support of the position of BCRA—argued in the
alternative that the District Court’s analysis of the alter‐ego issue in that earlier
case was flawed. The amicus brief of the United States from BCRA II has been
included in the record for this appeal. See J.A. at 3543‐3573.
69 J.A. at 3569; see also id. at 3552 (“[T]he United States urges the Court to
clarify that the BCRA’s involvement in repaying the IMF does not support
disregarding the BCRA’s separate juridical status.”).
30
creditor justified the payments,70 that question goes to whether
Argentina’s choice to pay one set of creditors over another was
legitimate—an inquiry that is unrelated to whether Argentina
controlled BCRA in order to accomplish those payments.
Here, the Republic’s plan to borrow money from BCRA was
not executed by the Argentine government alone. Instead, the
proposals received the necessary review and approval by BCRA’s
legal advisers and BCRA’s Board of Directors,71 and one BCRA
Specifically, the United States argued that Argentina’s use of BCRA
70
funds to repay the IMF did not justify ignoring BCRA’s separate juridical status,
because the
decision to pay the IMF in preference to its other creditors was
consistent with the long‐standing policy of the United States and
the other sovereign members of the IMF to recognize the preferred
creditor status of the IMF. In order to protect the funds of its
member states (including the funds invested by the United States),
the IMF rightly expects to be paid even when other creditors are
not. See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, Financial Risk in the
Fund and the Level of Precautionary Balances (Feb. 3, 2004) at 4
(“Member governments and other creditors have agreed to treat
the Fund as a preferred creditor to help achieve its purposes.
Preferred creditor status is fundamental to the Fund’s financial
responsibilities and the Fund’s financing mechanism as this
means that members give priority to repayment of their
obligations to the Fund over other creditors thus protecting the
reserve assets that other members have placed in the custody of
the Fund.”).
Id. at 3568‐69. In fact, “[a]ccording to the IMF staff, many other countries had
repaid the IMF out of international reserves held by the debtor country’s central
bank.” Id. at 3569.
71 See id. at 3049‐50 (TAC ¶ 61).
31
Governor testified before Argentina’s Congress that it made policy
sense to permit the government to borrow funds from BCRA while
its reserves earned relatively low interest.72 Therefore, the Republic’s
decision to use BCRA to repay its debt to the IMF and other
creditors is not indicative of the extensive control that concerned the
Supreme Court in Bancec.73
Finally, the TAC alleges that Argentina and BCRA
coordinated their activities in implementing an “inflationary”
monetary policy.74 However, governments and central banks—
including the U.S. Government and the U.S. Federal Reserve—often
consult and coordinate their actions with respect to monetary
policy.75 Whether the resulting policy is considered by some
commentators as too “inflationary” or “deflationary” is irrelevant to
the question of whether Argentina exercised day‐to‐day control over
BCRA. It is not our role to second‐guess monetary policy decisions
made by foreign governments. We thus agree with the position of
72 See id. at 3056 (TAC ¶ 75).
73 In Seijas, Banco de la Nación also allegedly made favorable loans to
Argentina “in violation of its governing charter” and “to individuals and
corporations” at the Republic’s behest, but we held that this was not sufficient to
establish that the bank lacked independence. See 502 F. App’x at 21; ante note 55.
74 See J.A. at 3066‐76 (TAC ¶¶ 97‐113).
See, e.g., id. at 3593 (U.S. Treasury Department’s Annual Report to
75
Congress, covering Nov. 1, 1996 to Oct. 31, 1998) (describing the coordinated
June 1998 intervention in the foreign exchange markets by U.S. monetary
authorities); id. at 3610 (handbook published by the Centre for Central Banking
Studies) (“[H]owever independent a central bank is, the ultimate decisions on a
country’s currency . . . are usually taken by the government[.]”).
32
the United States in BCRA II—“central banks ordinarily have a high
degree of interaction with their parent foreign governments,” and as
such, “courts should give significant deference to a foreign
government’s conduct vis‐à‐vis its central bank.”76 The alleged
“coordination” of monetary‐policy actions between Argentina and
BCRA is simply not sufficient to establish “extensive control.”
Considered cumulatively, these allegations certainly establish
that the Republic sought the assistance of BCRA in responding to an
extremely severe debt crisis, and that Argentina took steps to ensure
that BCRA shared its policies and goals during this time. They do
not establish, however, that the Republic so extensively controlled
BCRA’s day‐to‐day operations as to transform BCRA into the
Republic’s alter ego. Most of the actions allegedly taken by BCRA
are governmental functions performed by most central banks—i.e.,
paying a nation’s creditors, controlling currency flows, and keeping
foreign exchange deposits. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
that these actions, or any others, were the result of Argentina’s
substantial control over the business decisions or daily functions of
BCRA.77 Thus, these actions, standing alone, are not the type of
76 Id. at 3570‐71 n.*.
See, e.g., McKesson Corp., 52 F.3d at 352 (finding Bancec presumption
77
rebutted where “[r]outine business decisions, such as declaring and paying
dividends to shareholders and honoring [the instrumentality’s] contractual
commitments” were dictated by the sovereign state); Hester Int’l Corp., 879 F.2d at
178 (giving example of extensive control where “all checks in excess of a certain
amount [had to] be signed by a government‐appointed director, a governmental
agency was required to approve all invoices for shipments exceeding a certain
33
activities that illustrate a complete takeover of BCRA’s day‐to‐day
operations by the Republic.78
Because the facts alleged do not establish that the Republic
exercised extensive control over BCRA’s day‐to‐day operations, the
first prong of the Bancec test has not been met.
b. Fraud or Injustice
The second prong of the Bancec alter‐ego test asks whether the
recognition of BCRA as a separate entity would work a “fraud or
injustice.” The purpose of this prong is to prevent foreign states
from “avoid[ing] their obligations by engaging in abuses of
corporate form.”79
For instance, in Bancec itself,80 the presumption that Cuba’s
instrumentality—Bancec—was a separate juridical entity was
rebutted, because Cuba had dissolved Bancec and taken complete
control of its assets in 1961. Because Cuba effectively absorbed
Bancec, the Supreme Court granted Citibank recourse against Cuba
amount, and the . . . government generally exercised direct control over its
operation”).
By rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that BCRA should be held liable for all
78
of Argentina’s debts—see SPA at 20‐21 (9/25/13 Tr. 19:25‐20:1) (“I don’t buy the
idea that BCRA is liable for all the debts of the [R]epublic.”)—the District Court
implicitly agreed that the pleadings do not demonstrate that BCRA has become
the Republic’s alter ego for all purposes. See also ante note 56.
79 Letelier, 748 F.2d at 794.
80 462 U.S. at 615‐16, 632.
34
as the controlling principal and real beneficiary of the lawsuit that
Bancec had filed against Citibank. Similarly, in Bridas S.A.P.I.C.,81 the
Fifth Circuit found “fraud or injustice” where Turkmenistan
dissolved a state‐owned oil company that was in breach of a joint
venture with plaintiff, and replaced it with an under‐capitalized
state‐owned oil company endowed with newly‐enacted immunity
protection. And in an unpublished district court case relied on by
plaintiffs, Kensington International Ltd. v. Republic of Congo,82 the
Republic of Congo structured its relationship to its purportedly
independent oil company by, inter alia: (1) designing the company’s
corporate structure to allow Congo to engage in “unnecessarily
complex transactions and charades for the purpose of confounding
its creditors”;83 (2) passing all proceeds from oil sales on to the
government, rather than permitting the company to exercise its right
to collect a percentage on transactions; and (3) commingling state
and company assets.
The common thread in these cases is that the sovereign states
at issue abused the corporate form. In Bancec, Cuba sought relief in a
court of the United States while simultaneously trying to shield itself
from liability by asserting its claim through its dissolved
instrumentality. In Bridas, Turkmenistan transferred assets from one
81 447 F.3d at 417.
82 No. 03 Civ. 4578 (LAP), 2007 WL 1032269 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007).
83 Id. at *9.
35
instrumentality to another in order to escape liability.84 And in
Kensington, Congo created a “sham” entity with purported sovereign
immunity in order to shield its own assets from judgment creditors.
Plaintiffs’ allegations here fall far short of the flagrant frauds
and injustices exhibited in these other cases. At bottom, plaintiffs’
claim is that it would be a fraud or injustice to allow Argentina to
use funds from BCRA to pay certain “preferred” creditors while at
the same time “stiffing” plaintiffs. As noted above, at least in the
case of the IMF, there is nothing irregular or fraudulent about
Argentina recognizing a preference for repaying one set of creditors
over another.
Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege that BCRA’s separate
juridical status has been actively used by Argentina to block
plaintiffs’ enforcement attempts against Argentina itself, or that
Argentina has transferred its funds to BCRA in order to shield them
from plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs do allege that BCRA transferred
some of the funds deposited in its FRBNY account to the Bank of
International Settlements in Switzerland, this action did nothing to
frustrate plaintiffs’ ability to collect on their judgments against
Argentina. As we held in BCRA II, funds deposited in BCRA’s own
account were in any event immune from attachment.85 Therefore, as
84 See also Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 648‐49 (5th
Cir. 2002) (piercing the corporate veil where a company transferred its operations
from one party to another to avoid liability).
85 BCRA II, 652 F.3d at 196‐97 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)).
36
a practical matter, BCRA was only guilty of moving funds from one
attachment‐proof account to another.
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations simply do not show that
Argentina has used BCRA to frustrate the collection efforts of its
creditors, or that Argentina treated BCRA as a “sham” entity to hide
its own assets. These allegations simply do not establish that the
recognition of BCRA’s separate status would work a “fraud or
injustice” within the meaning of Bancec.
Because the TAC fails to counter, much less overcome, the
presumption that BCRA and Argentina are legally separate entities,
BCRA does not constitute Argentina’s “alter ego” for the purposes
of this suit. Argentina’s express waiver of its own sovereign
immunity in the FAA, therefore, may not be imputed to BCRA.
Accordingly, we conclude that the express waiver exception—
§ 1605(a)(1)—does not apply to this case.86
If we were to determine that these allegations did rebut the Bancec
86
presumption, we would then be required to resolve two additional legal
questions before recognizing a waiver of BCRA’s sovereign immunity under
§ 1605(a)(1): (1) whether Argentina’s waiver of immunity in the FAA covered a
declaratory judgment such as the one requested here—i.e., one designed to
permit attachment of unspecified funds in unnamed foreign jurisdictions; and
(2) whether that waiver may be imputed to BCRA, such that BCRA would then
be held liable for all of plaintiffs’ judgments against Argentina. Because we
conclude that the TAC fails at the first step—i.e., that the TAC does not rebut the
presumption that BCRA is a separate juridical entity—we need not, and do not,
reach these additional questions.
37
B. Commercial Activity
The second exception to sovereign immunity relied upon by
the District Court is the “commercial activity” exception codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), which, in relevant part, provides that a
foreign state is not immune in an action “based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States.” This exception applies only
when there exists “a degree of closeness” between the gravamen of
plaintiffs’ complaint and the commercial activities engaged in by the
foreign state or instrumentality.87
Here, the gravamen of the TAC is that BCRA, as Argentina’s
purported alter ego, is liable for the judgments resulting from
Argentina’s default on its FAA bonds.88 As noted above, BCRA was
87 Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)
(in order for a suit to be based upon commercial activity carried on in the United
States, that commercial activity must form the foundation for “those elements of
a claim that, if proven, would entitle [the] plaintiff to relief under his theory of
the case”); Reiss v. Société Centrale Du Groupe Des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d
738, 747 (2d Cir. 2000) (“To sustain jurisdiction on this basis, there must be a
significant nexus . . . between the commercial activity in this country upon which
the exception is based and a plaintiff’s cause of action.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Transatlantic Shiffahrtskontor GmbH v. Shanghai Foreign
Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2000) (the FSIA’s commercial activity
exception requires “a degree of closeness between the acts giving rise to the
cause of action and those needed to establish jurisdiction that is considerably
greater than common law causation requirements”). See also ante note 4.
As stated above, the TAC’s claim on the merits is that the BCRA is the
88
“alter ego” of Argentina and, therefore, BCRA’s funds should be generally
attachable to satisfy Argentina’s debts. Separately, plaintiffs have invoked
38
not a party to the FAA and was not involved in Argentina’s decision
to cease making principal and interest payments on FAA bonds.
Therefore, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim on the merits is based on
a series of actions taken by BCRA after 2001.
However, none of these actions after 2001—loans made by
BCRA to Argentina, coordination of monetary policy, the
appointment and removal of BCRA governors—are commercial
activities that occurred in the United States.89 In fact, BCRA’s only
alleged commercial activity in the United States was its use of its
FRBNY account to purchase dollars. Plaintiffs assert that these
dollars allowed BCRA to make loans to Argentina, which Argentina
then used to repay dollar‐denominated debts to creditors other than
plaintiffs.90
BCRA’s “alter ego” status as a basis for waiving BCRA’s sovereign immunity.
Accordingly, the facts underlying plaintiffs’ merits and jurisdictional claims
overlap significantly. This opinion concerns only the basis for jurisdiction—i.e.,
the waiver of BCRA’s sovereign immunity—not the merits of plaintiffs’ request
for a declaratory judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (stating in relevant part that a foreign state is
89
not immune from any action “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States”) (emphasis supplied).
90 As we previously noted, it is entirely unremarkable that BCRA
maintained a foreign‐central‐bank account at the FRBNY. See BCRA II, 652 F.3d
at 177 (“Like many central banks around the world, BCRA maintains a foreign
central bank account at the FRBNY in which, among other things, it manages
dollar‐denominated reserve holdings.”); see also id. at 177 n.7 (“FRBNY provides
accounts in which approximately 250 foreign central banks and monetary
authorities manage foreign exchange reserve holdings and other property.”).
39
The fact that these dollars were delivered to BCRA’s account
with the FRBNY, however, is entirely incidental to plaintiffs’ claim
on the merits—that claim would be no different had BCRA
deposited those dollars in any other bank abroad. In this way,
plaintiffs’ claims are similar to those asserted in Kensington
International Ltd. v. Itoua.91 There, a creditor of the Republic of Congo
alleged that a state‐owned oil company had entered into pre‐
payment agreements in exchange for oil rights, which caused
Congo’s oil revenues to be diverted away from the creditor. The
creditor attempted to invoke the FSIA’s commercial activity
exception on the grounds that: (1) the oil at issue was shipped to the
United States; and (2) the premium payments were made in the
United States. We rejected the creditor’s argument, however,
reasoning that the requisite nexus did not exist between the
commercial activity in the United States (the shipment of oil and the
premium payments), and the gravamen of the complaint (the pre‐
payment agreements executed in France). Because the alleged
activity in the United States was entirely incidental to the improper
conduct, we declined to apply the commercial‐activity exception to
waive sovereign immunity.92
As in Kensington, the claim here also lacks any nexus between
BCRA’s commercial activity in the United States (the purchase of
dollars through the FRBNY account) and the gravamen of the
91 505 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2007).
92 Id. at 156‐58.
40
complaint (the alter‐ego claim, which turns on loans made by BCRA
to Argentina in Argentina). It is similarly incidental that BCRA
purchased these dollars using an account in the United States.
Whatever adverse consequences plaintiffs allegedly suffered from
the BCRA’s loans to Argentina, they would have suffered the same
consequences had BCRA used any other bank account in the United
States or abroad.
Accordingly, adopting plaintiffs’ theory for jurisdiction here
would dramatically expand the scope of the commercial‐activity
exception to sovereign immunity. Any allegation of the wrongful
use of dollars outside the United States would conceivably lead to a
sovereign immunity waiver, so long as the plaintiff could show that
these dollars were acquired in U.S.‐based transactions. Given New
York’s role as a financial center, every country and every central
bank would be at risk of losing their sovereign immunity on this
basis. As the United States argued as amicus in BCRA II, weakening
the immunity from suit or attachment traditionally enjoyed by the
instrumentalities of foreign states could lead foreign central banks,
in particular, to “withdraw their reserves from the United States and
place them in other countries. Any significant withdrawal of these
reserves could have an immediate and adverse impact on the U.S.
economy and the global financial system.”93
J.A. at 3550‐51 (citation omitted); cf. Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi
93
Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Undermining the efficiency and
certainty of [electronic] fund transfers in New York could, if left uncorrected,
41
Because such a capacious understanding of the commercial‐
activity exception is inconsistent with the FSIA’s presumption that
foreign states and instrumentalities enjoy sovereign immunity, we
decline to adopt plaintiffs’ proposed rule. Accordingly, we hold that
the commercial‐activity exception to sovereign immunity—
§ 1605(a)(2)—does not apply to this case.
CONCLUSION
We do not condone or excuse Argentina’s continuing failure
to pay the judgments duly entered against it by the District Court.
Our decision that BCRA may invoke its own sovereign immunity in
this lawsuit is not intended to allow the Republic to avoid its
bargained‐for obligations, or to continue shirking the debts it has the
ability to pay, although we suspect that this will be a predictable and
unfortunate outcome of our decision.
Nonetheless, BCRA is entitled to invoke its own sovereign
immunity as a defense to this lawsuit, unless one of the exceptions
codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) applies.
Because both of the exceptions relied upon by plaintiffs fail as a
matter of law, the District Court erred in denying BCRA’s motion to
dismiss under the FSIA.
discourage dollar‐denominated transactions and damage New Yorkʹs standing
as an international financial center.”).
42
In summary, we hold the following:
(1) We have jurisdiction under the collateral‐order doctrine to
review the District Court’s threshold determination that BCRA
waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)
(the express waiver exception) and 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (the
commercial activity exception).
(2) First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (“Bancec”) sets a high bar for when an
instrumentality will be deemed an alter ego of its sovereign state. On
these facts, neither prong of the Bancec test is satisfied—Argentina
does not exercise sufficiently extensive control over BCRA’s day‐to‐
day operations, and recognizing BCRA’s separate status would not
constitute a “fraud or injustice” within the meaning of Bancec.
Accordingly, Argentina’s sovereign‐immunity waiver in the FAA
may not be imputed to also waive BCRA’s independent sovereign
immunity.
(3) BCRA’s use of its FRBNY account is too incidental to the
gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim to serve as the basis for waiving
BCRA’s sovereign immunity under the commercial‐activity
exception to the FSIA.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the District Court’s order of
September 26, 2013, and we REMAND the cause with instructions
to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice.
43
EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date filed: 2015-08-31
Citations: 800 F.3d 78
Copy Citations