Opinion issued December 19, 2002
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-01-00370-CV
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LAWANNA DEWBERRY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF VANTRICE DEWBERRY, Appellant
V.
ALLIED METALS, INC. AND HUGHES SUPPLY, INC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 281st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 99-41959
O P I N I O N
Appellant, Lawanna Dewberry, individually and as next friend of Vantrice Dewberry, sued several defendants for personal injuries arising out an automobile accident. The defendants included Johnny J. Hunt and his employers, appellees, Allied Metals, Inc., and Hughes Supply, Inc. Appellant challenges a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees on course of scope of employment and on “no evidence” grounds. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Procedural History
The trial court signed the summary judgment order on March 16, 2001. The same order granted appellees’ motion to sever appellant’s claims against them from appellant’s claims against Johnny J. Hunt by creating a severed cause, number 99-41959-A, for the claims against appellees. Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal from the March 16, 2001 order in Cause number 99-41959, the cause in which the March 16, 2001 order was entered. The record before us on appeal contains only documents from Cause number 99-41959, including the challenged March 16, 2001 order. We have no perfected appeal before us from Cause number 99-41959-A and no record of an appeal from that cause.
Jurisdiction - Finality
Excluding certain statutory exceptions that do not apply here, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of final judgments that dispose of all parties and claims. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (listing appealable interlocutory orders). A judgment is final for purposes of appellate review if it disposes of all pending claims and parties, as determined from the language of the judgment and the record in the case. Lehman, 39 S.W.3d at 195. The March 16, 2001 summary judgment order acknowledges appellant’s claims against Johnny J. Hunt, but does not dispose of those claims. Therefore, the order from which this appeal is taken is interlocutory. See id. Because the order is interlocutory and because no statute authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order applies, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Rule 42.3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure governs dismissals of civil cases. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). On October 24, 2002, in compliance with rule 42.3, we issued an order notifying appellant of our intent to dismiss for want of jurisdiction unless, within 30 days of the date of that order, appellant requested and paid for, and the district court filed within that period, a supplemental clerk’s record demonstrating that the claims of Johnny J. Hunt had been disposed of or severed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3 (requiring 10 days notice of intent to dismiss on appellate court’s own initiative). The 30-day deadline imposed by our October 24, 2002 order has expired without’s appellant’s filing a supplemental record. Based on the record before us, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Conclusion
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction and overrule appellees’ motion to dismiss and any pending motions.
Elsa Alcala
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Alcala, and Price.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.