Opinion issued December 23, 2003
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-02-01089-CV
____________
JANICE M. FRAZIER, Appellant
V.
EARLENE FRAZIER, Appellee
On Appeal from the 280th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2001-28896
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interpleader suit, appellant, Janice Frazier, challenges the trial court’s judgment, entered after a bench trial, awarding appellee, Earlene Frazier, the proceeds from a life insurance policy held by Eddie Frazier, deceased. In her sole point of error, Janice Frazier contends that “the trial court made an error in the application of the law to the facts.” We affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
On March 9, 1987, Eddie Frazier (“Frazier”) designated Earlene Frazier (“Earlene”), who was his wife, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by John Hancock Life Insurance Company (“John Hancock”) and provided by his employer, Halliburton. Subsequently, Frazier, on July 7, 2000, divorced Earlene and, on October 3, 2000, married Janice Frazier (“Janice”).
On October 23, 2000, Frazier, suffering from “respiratory arrest,” was admitted to the Methodist Hospital in Houston. Frazier had been previously diagnosed with “progressive squamous cell carncinoma of the lung,” and x-rays revealed that he had a “progressive extensive tumor” in his chest. Following his admission to the hospital, Frazier was intubated and placed on a ventilator machine.
During Frazier’s 13-day stay at the hospital, his doctors and members of his family repeatedly discussed the possibility of removing him from the ventilator machine. Although Frazier’s daughters, Sharon Scott, Tamalar Bedford, Terrie Alexander, and Juanita Frazier, were in favor of removing him from the ventilator machine, Janice was against it because, according to Terrie Alexander, “she had some business she had to take care of.” However, on November 5, 2000, Janice changed her mind, and Frazier was “weaned” off of the ventilator machine and died shortly thereafter.
Following Frazier’s death, Janice filed with Halliburton a “Beneficiary Designation Form” showing that she was the designated beneficiary of Frazier’s life insurance policy. Frazier allegedly signed this form on November 2, 2000.
Thereafter, Janice and Earlene both asserted claims to the proceeds from the life insurance policy. Faced with these competing claims, John Hancock filed its petition in interpleader against them. The trial court subsequently “released and discharged” John Hancock from all liability, and accepted the proceeds from the life insurance policy into the court’s registry.
At trial, Earlene contested whether Frazier actually signed the “Beneficiary Designation Form.” She testified that she had seen Frazier’s signature on many occasions and that the signature on the form was not his signature. Moreover, Sharon Scott, Terrie Alexander, and Juanita Frazier testified that Frazier did not have the capacity to sign the form on November 2, 2000. Sharon Scott testified that, when she visited her father that day, he “la[y] [in bed] staring up into space” and “he couldn’t even squeeze [her] hand.” Terrie Alexander testified that her father “was heavily sedated” and “he didn’t even wake up” during her visit. Juanita Frazier testified that she tried to communicate with her father by having him write on a note pad, but he could barely even “hold a pencil.”
Following the bench trial, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
1)At the time of Frazier’s death, [Earlene] was the beneficiary under the life insurance policy in question.
2)Frazier did not sign the change of beneficiary designation form submitted by [Janice].
3)[Janice] never became the beneficiary under the insurance policy in question.
4)The proceeds of the insurance policy in question should be awarded to [Earlene].
“Application of the Law to the Facts”
In her sole point of error, Janice argues that “the trial court made an error in the application of the law to the facts” because (1) “the evidence of record demonstrate[d]” that Frazier designated Janice as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy, and (2) there was “undisputed evidence” that Earlene “waived her status as the designated beneficiary” in her and Frazier’s divorce decree.
We construe Janice’s argument as a challenge to the trial court’s findings of fact. The trial court expressly found that Frazier did not sign the “Beneficiary Designation Form.” Moreover, the trial court impliedly found that Earlene did not “waive her status as the designated beneficiary” because it found that she was the beneficiary of the life insurance policy at the time of Frazier’s death. Janice asserts that the evidence supports contrary findings. Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of fact.
In an appeal of a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the court’s findings of fact have the same weight as a jury’s verdict, and we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence used to support them, just as we would review a jury’s findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); In re K.R.P., 80 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Our review of a legal sufficiency point requires us to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding, disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). If there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding, i.e., more than a mere scintilla, we will overrule the issue. Id. In our review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence, and we will set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
In regard to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Frazier did not sign the “Beneficiary Designation Form,” Earlene testified that she had seen Frazier’s signature on many occasions and that the signature on the form was not his signature. Furthermore, Sharon Scott testified that, on November 2, 2000, her father “couldn’t even squeeze [her] hand,” and Juanita Frazier testified that her father could barely even “hold a pencil.” Additionally, Terrie Alexander testified that her father “was heavily sedated” that day and “he didn’t even wake up” during her visit. Taken together, this testimony provided “more than a mere scintilla” of probative evidence that Frazier did not sign the “Beneficiary Designation Form.” Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Frazier did not sign the “Beneficiary Designation Form.”
In regard to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Frazier did not sign the “Beneficiary Designation Form,” Janice did not introduce any evidence to contradict this finding. Given the lack of evidence offered by Janice, and the substantial amount of evidence offered to prove that Frazier did not sign the form, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Frazier did not sign the “Beneficiary Designation Form.”
In regard to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Earlene was Frazier’s beneficiary at the time of his death, it was undisputed that, on March 9, 1987, Frazier designated Earlene as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. Moreover, Earlene testified that Frazier’s signature did not appear on the form that purported to name Janice as the new beneficiary. In light of this evidence, we conclude that there was “more than a mere scintilla” of probative evidence proving that Earlene was the beneficiary of the life insurance policy at the time of Frazier’s death. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Earlene was Frazier’s beneficiary at the time of his death.In regard to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Earlene was Frazier’s beneficiary at the time of his death, Janice failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary. When Janice attempted to introduce a copy of Frazier’s and Earlene’s divorce decree into evidence, Earlene objected to it on the basis of hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. The trial court then postponed the trial so that Janice could obtain an “authenticated copy of the divorce decree,” but she never produced one to the trial court. Because there is no evidence in the record showing that Earlene “waived her status as the designated beneficiary,” we cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Earlene was Frazier’s beneficiary at the time of his death.
We overrule Janice’s sole point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Hanks.