Opinion issued September 25, 2003
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NOS. 01-03-00480-CR
01-03-00481-CR
01-03-00482-CR
01-03-00483-CR
____________
BETTY V. PRESTON, Appellant
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 9
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 5343, 5344, 5345, 5346
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In four separate causes, appellant, Betty V. Preston, was charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license, proof of financial responsibility, a valid inspection sticker, and proper registration. Following a bench trial, the municipal court found appellant guilty in each case and assessed fines against her totaling $300. The county criminal court subsequently affirmed appellant’s appeal from the judgment of the municipal court.
In five issues, appellant contends that (1) the actions of the police officer who cited her were invalid under the Texas Constitution, (2) the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over each case, (3) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, and (4) the State and the municipal court did not follow the requirements of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We affirm.
Factual Background
Houston Police Officer J. Bond testified that, on March 12, 2001, while on patrol, he stopped a Cadillac driven by appellant after he saw that the car’s inspection sticker was expired. Bond determined that the registration sticker on her car was also expired. Upon Bond’s request, appellant was unable to show him either a valid driver’s license or proof of financial responsibility. Bond explained that appellant showed him only a “Republic of Texas” identification card. Appellant did not testify.
On May 29, 2001, the municipal court signed its judgments finding appellant guilty in each case. On July 23, 2001, appellant filed motions for new trial in each case, all of which were denied the following day. The county criminal court subsequently overruled appellant’s points of error and affirmed the judgment of the municipal court.
Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we note that appellant has a right to appeal, to this Court, the judgment of a county criminal court affirming a misdemeanor conviction only “if the fine assessed against [appellant] exceeds $100” or the appeal raises issues of constitutional magnitude. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 30.00027(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003); see, e.g. Thannheiser v. State, 855 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).
In cause numbers 5343, 5344, 5345, and 5346, appellant was assessed fines of $25, $175, $25, and $75, respectively. Under the provisions of section 30.00027(a), we would generally have jurisdiction over only cause number 5344, the case in which appellant was fined $175. However, in her brief to the county criminal court, appellant raised issues common to each case concerning the constitutional authority of the Officer Bond to cite her for the offenses charged and the constitutional jurisdiction of the municipal court over these cases. Thus, we hold that we have jurisdiction to consider these appeals, notwithstanding the amounts of the fines assessed in each case.
Failure to Timely Perfect Appeal
The Texas Government Code provides that, in addition to filing a notice of appeal, “[t]o perfect an appeal [from a municipal court to a county criminal court], the appellant must file a written motion for new trial with the municipal clerk not later than the 10th day after the date on which judgment is rendered.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 30.0014(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). Here, the municipal court’s judgment was signed on May 29, 2001. Appellant did not file her motions for new trial until July 23, 2001, more than 10 days later, and did not otherwise request or obtain an extension of time to do so. Thus, her appeals to the county criminal court were untimely, and she failed to properly invoke that court’s appellate jurisdiction. See id.
In her briefing to the county criminal court, appellant included an affidavit in which she states that the municipal court clerk told appellant that the clerk “would not file any papers unless the presiding judge agreed to the filing.” By implication, appellant argues that she was prevented from timely filing her motion for new trial. However, we find no evidence in the record to support this hearsay statement attributed to the municipal clerk by appellant.
Appellant also argues that she should not be held to the same standards as a licensed attorney. However, pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with all applicable and mandatory rules of procedure. See, e.g., Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.). Appellant was required to file her motions for new trial within 10 days of the date that the municipal court’s judgments were signed, but she did not do so. Therefore, appellant failed to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the county court over her appeals. Accordingly, we hold that the county court did not err in overruling appellant’s issues presented in her appeals from the municipal court’s judgments.
We overrule appellant’s issues.
The orders from the county criminal court recite that “the judgment of the [municipal] court is AFFIRMED.” Because appellant did not timely invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the county criminal court in these cases, her appeals should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reform the orders of the county criminal court to reflect that appellant’s appeals in these cases were “dismissed,” and as reformed, we affirm the orders of the county criminal court.
Conclusion
We reform the orders of the county criminal court to reflect that appellant’s appeals of the municipal court’s judgments be dismissed and, as reformed, affirm. All pending motions are denied.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Hanks.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).