Opinion issued July 10, 2003
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-02-01335-CR
MIKE ROY MATTHEWS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 76,969G
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the of denial habeas corpus relief relating to a 1994 misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). In a single point of error, appellant contends the 1994 conviction is void because the sentence imposed was illegal. We affirm.
On May 23, 1994, appellant, Mike Roy Matthews, pleaded guilty to DWI, and the trial court, in accordance with a plea agreement between appellant and the State, assessed punishment at 365 days’ confinement and a $750 fine. Pursuant to article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court suspended the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for 24 months. One of the conditions of appellant’s community supervision was that he pay the $750 fine.
On September 28, 1995, the State moved to revoke appellant’s community supervision. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision in an order that provided in part:
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that the State of Texas do have and recover of the Defendant the sum of $ none Dollars, the unpaid balance on the fine hereinbefore assessed, and all further costs incurred in this cause subsequent to the granting of probation, for all of which execution may issue, and that Defendant be imprisoned in the County Jail of Brazoria County, Texas, for a period of 45 days and until the unpaid balance of said fine and all further costs incurred as aforesaid are fully paid, or otherwise discharged by law, for which a writ of commitment shall issue. The Defendant’s jail time is to [be] served on weekends beginning at 6pm on 2-21-97. (Emphasis added).
In November 2002, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the sentence imposed after the 1997 revocation of community supervision was void because an illegal sentence was imposed. After issuing the writ, the trial court denied the requested relief. This appeal followed, in which appellant contends the 1997 sentence was illegal, because it did not impose a fine as required by the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed.
It is true that the punishment assessed must always be within the minimum and maximum fixed by law, Williams v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), and that a sentence that fails to assess a statutorily-imposed fine is void because it falls below the minimum punishment required by law. See Thompson v. State, 626 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
Appellant argues that the sentence imposed after the 1997 revocation of community supervision is void because no fine was imposed. However, we disagree with appellant’s interpretation of the record. The 1994 judgment shows that a $750 fine was imposed and that appellant had to pay that $750 as a condition of his community supervision. The 1997 order revoking community supervision acknowledges the imposition of the $750 fine and provides that the State recover “the sum of $none Dollars, the unpaid balance on the fine hereinbefore assessed . . .” (Emphasis added).
The record does not show that no fine was imposed; rather, it shows that a $750 fine was imposed and paid by appellant. The record clearly shows that a $750 fine was imposed in 1994, that appellant was required to pay that amount as a condition of his community supervision, and that at the time his community supervision was revoked in 1997, there was no unpaid balance on the fine.
Because the record supports the trial court’s determination that a fine was assessed, as the statute at the time required, the trial court did not err by denying appellant habeas corpus relief.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
We affirm the judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Higley.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).