In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-02-00162-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.L.E., A MINOR CHILD
On Appeal from the 245th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 91-25279
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a child-support enforcement action. The Office of the Attorney General (the AG) alleged that Ronald Lee Edwards (Father) had not satisfied a prior 1991 judgment for unpaid child support. The AG filed a motion to suspend Father’s driver’s license and requested the court to enter a new judgment on the unpaid child support. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed with prejudice all causes of action regarding child support. We reverse and remand.
Background
On October 24, 1991, the trial court found that Father failed to pay court-ordered child support for L.L.E. in the amount of $13,000, and rendered judgment against Father as follows:
judgment in the amount of $13,000 together with interest at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date of this Order, is granted against [Father], in favor of Obligee for which let execution issue.
The 1991 judgment ordered Father to pay $200 each month for regular child-support payment and an additional $50 each month for arrears. The judgment further ordered that, once Father’s regular support obligation ended (depending on the child’s age), Father was required to pay $250 each month toward the balance of the arrearage.
In December 2000, the AG filed this enforcement action, requesting the trial court to render judgment on Father’s unpaid child support and accrued interest. Additionally, the AG filed a motion to suspend Father’s driver’s license.
The trial court held a hearing on November 2, 2001. The AG stated that Father paid the $13,000 in 1997. Two years later, in 1999, the AG sent Father letters to notify him about the unpaid interest. Accordingly, the only unpaid obligation was the interest on the $13,000. During the hearing, the trial court voiced concerns about the interest calculation.
[Father]:What they did, Your Honor, is go all the way back to October 31st of ‘91 and assess the interest from that point forward. And I might also add at that particular time by [the AG’s] own admission they were not collecting interest at that time but yet he expects me to go back and pay all that interest.
[Court]:Was interest not being calculated then?
[AG]:Didn’t have the computer capability of calculating it at that time. . . .
[Court]:. . . And so when he paid it off, he didn’t know about the interest?
[AG]:He didn’t know other than he did have a copy of the order that ordered him. . . .
[Court]:But he didn’t know that the A.G.’s office was going to collect it because they hadn’t calculated it, told him what he owed.
[AG]:That’s correct.
[Court]:And for two years you didn’t call him and tell him he owed anything?
[AG]:Did not, Judge. I would only argue that certainly two years – if we were talking about 10 or 15 years, certainly he might have a better case; but certainly two years is a relatively short period of time. . . .
* * * *
[Court]:So when does the interest start to accumulate?
[AG]:Well, the interest would still be running on the unpaid balance.
[Court]:Well – but where in your order does it say that?
[AG]:It just says it’s at 10 percent.
[Court]:It just says interest, but it doesn’t say when it starts.
[AG]:That’s correct, Judge. It does not.
[Court]:So it doesn’t say that it doesn’t start at the end whenever he – the Court’s going to deny your motion to reduce it to a judgment or to take his license.
On November 16, 2001, the trial court denied the AG all relief and dismissed with prejudice all causes of action regarding child support. In its sole point of error, the AG contends that the trial court erred in denying the AG’s motion to recover the balance Father owed under the 1991 judgment and in dismissing with prejudice all causes of action regarding Father’s unpaid child support, including the AG’s motion to suspend Father’s driver’s license.
Analysis
The 1991 judgment ordered Father to pay “$13,000 together with interest at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date of this Order.” Accrued interest is part of the child support obligation and may be enforced by any means provided for the collection of child support. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.267 (Vernon 2002).
Section 157.263 provides for confirmation of arrearages as follows:
(a)If a motion for enforcement of child support requests a money judgment for arrearages, the court shall confirm the amount of arrearages and render one cumulative money judgment.
(b)A cumulative money judgment includes:
(1)unpaid child support not previously confirmed;
(2)the balance owed on previously confirmed arrearages or lump sum or retroactive support judgments;
(3)interest on the arrearages; and
(4)a statement that it is a cumulative judgment.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.263 (Vernon 2002) (emphasis added). This statute imposes an affirmative, mandatory duty on the trial court to reduce a child support arrearage to a money judgment upon request. In the Interest of Gonzalez, 981 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); In re Dryden, 52 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). The trial court had a duty to confirm any amount of the arrearage plus any accrued interest and render a money judgment in the total amount due and owing the obligee. In re M.C.R., 55 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.). We hold that the trial court erred in denying the AG’s motion for confirmation of arrearages.
We sustain the AG’s sole issue.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the court below for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Adele Hedges
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Hedges, Jennings, and Alcala.