Campus Communications Inc., D/B/A "A&M Magazine" and Michelle Brenckman v. Texas A&M University System and Ray Bowen, President of Texas A&M University

Opinion issued on May 8, 2003

     







In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas





NO. 01-02-00878-CV





CAMPUS COMMUNICATIONS, INC. D/B/A A&M MAGAZINE, AND MICHELLE BRENCKMAN, Appellant


V.


TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM AND RAY BOWEN, PRESIDENT OF TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, Appellees





On Appeal from the 272nd District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 02-000208-CV-272





MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Michelle Breckman and Campus Communications, Inc., appellants, sued Texas A&M University and Ray Bowen, appellees, for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prohibit appellees from continuing to violate appellants’ constitutional rights. The trial court granted appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction.

          In two issues, appellants argue that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over appellants’ claims and erred in granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction.

          Because the issues before us are moot, we dismiss this appeal.

Facts

          Appellants entered into a licensing agreement with the University in 1986. The agreement allowed appellants to publish a magazine using the University’s trademarks of “GiG’em Aggies” and “the thumb.” In 1992, appellants’ licensing agreement with the University was automatically renewed. In March of 1995, following disputes over the University’s policies regarding use of trademarks and controversial articles published by appellants’ magazine, the University informed appellants that the licensing agreement would not be renewed at the end of the year.

          Appellants contend that the University’s decision not to renew the licensing agreement was an act of retaliation by the University because appellants had been critical of the University in some of the magazine’s articles. Appellants claim that appellees’ conduct violated appellants’ right to free speech and denied them of property and liberty interests.

Discussion

          In two issues, appellants argue that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over appellants’ claims and erred in granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction. Appellees contend that the case is moot because appellants are not seeking relief that would resolve a justiciable controversy between the parties.

          Declaratory judgment actions cannot be used to resolve hypothetical or contingent situations. Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968). Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). To avoid rendering advisory opinions, a court should only decide cases in which a live controversy exists at the time of the decision. Camarena v. Texas Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988). A case is moot when (1) a party seeks a judgment to resolve a controversy, but no controversy exists, or (2) judgment is sought on a matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot have a practical legal effect on an existing controversy. Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 847-48 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet. h). Cases have also been determined to be moot when the allegedly wrongful behavior has passed and can not be expected to recur. Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406, 92 S. Ct. 577, 579 (1972).

          The licensing agreement between appellants and the University ended in December of 1995. All of the alleged unconstitutional conduct of appellees was related to the publication of the magazine and the licensing agreement between appellants and appellees. Appellants are seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prohibit appellees from violating appellants’ constitutional rights in the future, but we can only speculate as to what situations might arise in the future to prompt further alleged unconstitutional action on the part of appellees. Even if appellees engaged in wrongful behavior in the past, there is no evidence to suggest that similar wrongful behavior will recur, especially in light of the fact that appellants no longer have a licensing agreement with the University. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. at 406, 92 S. Ct. at 579. Accordingly, we hold that the issues before us are moot.

          We overrule issues one and two.

Conclusion

Because the issues before us are moot, we dismiss this appeal.


 

                                                             Sherry Radack

                                                             Chief Justice

 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Nuchia and Hanks.