Brown, Jr., David Lee v. State

Opinion issued May 1, 2003






    

 






In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas





NO. 01-02-00257-CR





DAVID LEE BROWN, JR., Appellant


V.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee





On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 886,169





MEMORANDUM OPINION


          Appellant, David Lee Brown, Jr., pled guilty to the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to three years’ confinement. In its briefing, the State contends that appellant failed to comply with former Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b)(3). We agree. Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

          Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b) was amended to delete the provisions of subsection (b)(3), effective January 1, 2003. Because appellant’s notice of appeal was filed before January 1, 2003, we apply former Rule 25.2(b)(3). Under former Rule 25.2(b)(3), when, as here, an appellant was convicted pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain, his notice of appeal had to state that the appeal was for a jurisdictional defect, a matter raised by written motion and ruled on before trial, or that the trial court gave permission to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3), 948-949 S.W.2d (Tex. Cases) XLI, XCVI (Tex. Crim. App. 1997, amended effective January 1, 2003).           In three issues, appellant complains that (1) the trial court’s judgment is void because appellant is not a convicted felon; (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the judgment; and (3) “appellant was actually innocent of the crime of which he was convicted.” Appellant’s first issue—that the trial court’s judgment is void—can be construed as a jurisdictional challenge. However, appellant’s notice of appeal failed to state that the appeal was for a jurisdictional defect. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that in a plea-bargained, felony case, such as this one, even to raise a jurisdictional defect, the appellant must first comply with former Rule 25.2(b)(3) to invoke our appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424, 427-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Because appellant’s notice of appeal does not comply with the requirements of former Rule 25.2(b)(3), we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of appellant’s claims.

          All three of appellant’s issues, which challenge his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, are based on his contention that he was previously convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony. Appellant does not dispute that his void-judgment claim (i.e., jurisdictional-defect claim), as well as his claims of legal insufficiency of the evidence and “actual innocence,” are unsupported by the appellate record. Rather, in a motion, appellant requests this Court take judicial notice of documents from another proceeding, which he contends establish his earlier conviction was a misdemeanor.

          We are unable to rule on appellant’s motion. Absent appellate jurisdiction, we can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

 


          We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

 

 

                                                             Laura Carter Higley

                                                             Justice


Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Higley.


Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).