Harold L. Phillips v. Linda v. Phillips

Opinion issued December 16, 2004














In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

____________


NO. 01-03-00676-CV

____________


HAROLD L. PHILLIPS, Appellant


V.


LINDA V. PHILLIPS, Appellee





On Appeal from the 306th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 96FD2095





MEMORANDUM OPINION

          This is an appeal of an interlocutory order issued by the trial court denying appellant’s, Harold L. Phillip’s, motion to recuse trial court judge P.K. Reiter and declaring appellant to be a vexatious litigant. In four issues, appellant challenges the propriety of these orders. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

          Generally, a Texas appellate court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). An appellate court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders and judgments only when specifically authorized by statute. Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000). A statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is strictly construed because it is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment is appealable. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sunset Valley, 8 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).

          There is no specific statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to recuse or from an order imposing sanctions on a vexatious litigant. Neither is set out in the statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (authorizing interlocutory appeal only from order appointing receiver or trustee; order overruling motion to vacate appointment of receiver or trustee; order certifying or refusing to certify class action; order granting or refusing temporary injunction or overruling motion to dismiss temporary injunction; order denying summary judgment based on sovereign immunity; order denying motion for summary judgment based on claim against media; order granting or denying special appearance; order granting or denying plea to jurisdiction; or orders granted in regard to expert report); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 1205.105 (Vernon 2000) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of amount of bond or dismissal for failure to pay bond in public securities case). An appeal from a final judgment is the proper method to challenge denial of a motion to recuse. See In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). Likewise, appeal of an order imposing sanctions on a vexatious litigant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion as part of an appeal of the final judgment. See Spiller v. Spiller, 21 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

          We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Any other pending motions in this appeal are overruled as moot. The Clerk is directed to issue mandate within 10 days of the date of this opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 18.1.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Alcala.