Opinion issued October 14, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-04-00954-CR
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JORGE LUIS MUNOZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 268th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 40,034 (Count I)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jorge Luis Munoz, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine weighing 400 grams or more on July 30, 2004. Contemporaneously with the plea, appellant signed under oath a document entitled “Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal” that provided, in pertinent part:
I, the Defendant, have previously been admonished concerning the right to appeal, to-wit: that if the punishment assessed by this Court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the State and agreed to by myself and my attorney, I must have the permission of this Court before I may prosecute an appeal on any matter in this case, except for those matters raised by written motions prior to trial.
. . .
With the knowledge and understanding of the above, I voluntarily waive my right to file a . . . notice of appeal, . . . or any right to appeal that I may have in this cause of action.
The trial court found appellant guilty of possession of cocaine and, following the plea agreement, sentenced appellant to confinement for 15 years. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The trial court’s certification of appellant’s right of appeal states that appellant waived the right to appeal.
A valid waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without the consent of the trial court. Willis v. State, 121 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The record indicates that appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. The record does not indicate that the trial court consented to an appeal.
In Alzarka v. State, 90 S.W.3d 321, 323-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the record directly contradicted and rebutted any presumption raised by the form waiver of the right to appeal. This case is unlike the record presented in Alzarka in two important ways. The first is that appellant signed a document that waived only his right to appeal; that is, the waiver was not part of a form waiver of multiple rights. Second, unlike Alzarka, the record does not reflect that the trial court granted permission to appeal.
Because the record in this case reflects that appellant’s waiver of the right to appeal was valid and that the trial court did not consent to an appeal, we order the appeal dismissed.
All pending motions are denied as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, and Higley.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).