Bobby Andrews v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

Opinion issued August 26, 2004




            












In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

 


 

 

NO. 01-03-00817-CV

____________

 

BOBBY ANDREWS, Appellant

 

V.

 

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Appellee

 


 

 

On Appeal from the 152nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2001-49985

 


 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Bobby Andrews (Andrews), challenges the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), in his suit alleging that Exxon used his race as a motivating factor in its decision to terminate his employment. In two points of error, Andrews, who is African-American, contends that the trial court erred in granting Exxon’s summary judgment motion because he provided more than a scintilla of evidence to establish (1) his prima facie case of employment discrimination and (2) that Exxon’s stated reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for racial discrimination. We affirm.

Facts

          In November 1999, Andrews, who had been employed at Exxon’s Baytown refinery as a process technician for over 20 years, applied for a “designated position” as a “sliding” console operator. Sliding is a process whereby a wage employee, such as Andrews, assumes supervisory responsibilities on a temporary basis and receives additional compensation for doing so. Andrews began his training for this new position in January 2000. In order to qualify for this designated position, Andrews was required to review Exxon’s “Alcohol and Drug Use Policy,” to sign a “Statement of Compliance for Designated Positions,” to submit to drug and alcohol testing, and to pass a background check.

          Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy read, in pertinent part, as follows:

[Exxon] recognizes that alcohol, drug, or other substance abuse by employees will impair their ability to perform properly and will have serious adverse effects o[n] the safety, efficiency[,] and productivity of other employees and [Exxon] as a whole.

 

. . . .

 

A positive test result or refusal to submit to a drug or alcohol test is grounds for disciplinary action, including termination.


The Statement of Compliance for Designated Positions read, in pertinent part, as follows:

I have read and understand Exxon’s Employee Alcohol and Drug Use Policy. I understand that I will be required to participate in random alcohol and drug tests. I will also be required to have periodic medical examinations by qualified medical personnel, which includes alcohol and drug tests.

 

. . . .

 

I do not have a substance abuse problem, and I am in compliance with Exxon’s Employee Alcohol and Drug Use Policy.


On March 31, 2000, Andrews signed the statement of compliance and added the following handwritten comment at the bottom of the page: “I do not totally understand the policy because some parts are vague, but I am willing to sign it. I believe I understand what it means.” Andrews then submitted it to one of his supervisors.

          On July 5, 2000, after having passed a background check, Andrews reported to Exxon’s medical department and provided a urine specimen for drug and alcohol testing. Exxon sent Andrews’s specimen to Quest Diagnostic Substance Abuse Testing Laboratory (Quest) for testing. When Quest tested Andrews’s urine for prohibited substances, the specimen tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinoids (THC), “the primary marijuana metabolite.” When Quest performed a subsequent, confirmatory test using a more precise method of testing, Andrews’s specimen again tested positive for THC. Quest then notified Dr. Richard Dockins, an Exxon Medical Review Officer, of the results of its testing.

          On July 10, 2000, Dr. Dockins contacted Andrews and informed him of the results of Quest’s testing. Andrews informed Dr. Dockins that he was currently taking several prescription drugs, in particular Dronabinol, and that he believed that one of these drugs had caused his urine specimen to test positive for THC. Andrews gave Dr. Dockins the name of the doctor who had prescribed Dronabinol to him, the name of the pharmacy that had filed the prescription, and the prescription number. When Dr. Dockins contacted the pharmacy, a pharmacy employee informed him that the prescription number that Andrews had given Dr. Dockins was for a prescription for Cypro, an antibiotic. When Dr. Dockins contacted Andrews’s doctor, the doctor told Dr. Dockins that he had not prescribed either Dronabinol or Marinol to Andrews. Dr. Dockins then asked Dr. Julie George, another Exxon Medical Review Officer, to follow up with Andrews.

          Dr. George subsequently contacted Andrews and scheduled a meeting to review the prescription drugs that he was taking. When Dr. George met with Andrews and reviewed his prescription drugs, she determined that none of these drugs could have caused Andrews’s urine specimen to test positive for THC. Dr. George then informed Exxon’s management of Andrews’s positive test results.

          On July 17, 2000, Andrews met with the head of his department, Craig Joseph, who informed Andrews that Exxon was terminating his employment. At this meeting, Joseph gave Andrews a letter that read, in part, as follows:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that your employment with [Exxon] is terminated effective July 17, 2000, as a result of your violating the Alcohol and Drug Use Policy.


          On July 21, 2000, the Gulf Coast Industrial Workers Union, of which Andrews was a member, filed a grievance with Exxon’s management, asserting that Andrews had been “unjust[ly] terminated.” Exxon’s management subsequently denied the grievance at each step of its grievance process. The Union then advanced the grievance to arbitration and “submitted the issue of whether Andrews had been terminated for just cause.” On June 1, 2001, following a hearing, the arbitrator denied Andrews’s grievance, concluding that “[Andrews] has only himself to blame [for his termination], not the Union, not Management, [and] not some other hourly employee.”

          On June 18, 2001, Andrews filed a charge of discrimination with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. On September 28, 2001, after having received notice of his right to file a civil action, Andrews filed this lawsuit, alleging that Exxon had violated section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code by using Andrews’s race as a motivating factor in its decision to terminate his employment.

          On March 26, 2003, Exxon filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting both traditional and no-evidence grounds. In its summary judgment motion, Exxon asserted that Andrews could produce no evidence that (1) he was qualified for employment in Exxon’s “drug-free workplace,” (2) “an employee outside of his protected class was treated differently under circumstances ‘nearly identical’ to [his],” and (3) Exxon’s reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for racial discrimination. In its motion, Exxon also argued that, as a matter of law, it had established that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for having terminated Andrews’s employment, namely, that Andrews had violated its Alcohol and Drug Use Policy by testing positive for a chemical contained in marijuana.

          In his response to Exxon’s motion, Andrews asserted that (1) he was qualified to work for Exxon because he had worked for Exxon for more than 20 years and “should have been terminated years ago” had he not been qualified and (2) two other Exxon employees outside of his protected class, Elizabeth McCormick and a man identified as “Humphreys,” had tested positive for prohibited substances, and Exxon had not terminated their employment. In support of his response, Andrews attached several exhibits, including Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy, the Statement of Compliance for Designated Positions that he had signed, his deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of Dr. Dockins.

          In his deposition, Andrews admitted that, prior to having provided Exxon with a urine specimen on July 5, 2000, he had smoked marijuana four times between April and May of 2000. Andrews also admitted that, during the course of his 20-year employment with Exxon, he had smoked marijuana “once or twice” per year and had “experimented” with cocaine and with a “package of pills.” Andrews also testified that it was his understanding that McCormick, a Caucasian Exxon employee, had tested positive for “drugs” and that Exxon had allowed her to retake the drug test without terminating her employment.

          In his deposition, Dr. Dockins testified that, when Quest performed the initial and confirmatory tests, Andrews’s urine specimen had tested positive for THC both times. Dr. Dockins further testified that, when McCormick tested positive for amphetamines, he had discussed the results with her and had learned that she had been taking several “over the counter” medications containing amphetamines. Dr. Dockins also testified that McCormick had been retested to determine whether she had a legal or an illegal form of amphetamine in her system and that the retest had confirmed the presence of a legal form of amphetamine in her system. Additionally, Dr. Dockins explained that, because McCormick had presented a “legitimate explanation” for her positive test results, the test results were actually reported as being negative, according to standard Exxon testing policy.

          On April 29, 2003, Andrews filed a supplemental response to Exxon’s summary judgment motion and attached several exhibits, two of which had not been attached to his original response. One of these supplemental exhibits was an affidavit from Kennith Evans, Vice President of the Gulf Coast Industrial Workers Union. In his affidavit, Evans stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

I represented to my union members that the cut-off point for testing positive for marijuana was 20ng. If the confirmatory test is 20ng or above, there is a positive test result for marijuana. Andrews tested at level 16ng for marijuana. Thus, Andrews did not test positive for marijuana.

Andrews also attached the deposition testimony of Dr. Dockins, who stated that the cut-off point for a positive test result for the presence of marijuana was 20ng on the initial test and 15ng on the confirmatory test. Dr. Dockins explained that Andrews had tested positive under both tests.

          On May 7, 2003, following a hearing, the trial court, without specifying the grounds upon which it relied, signed an order granting Exxon’s motion for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

          To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, a movant has the burden of proving that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985); Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, 927 S.W.2d 663, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). To prevail on a no-evidence summary judgment motion, a movant must allege that there is no evidence of an essential element of the adverse party’s cause of action or affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Although the non-moving party is not required to marshal its proof, it must present evidence that raises a genuine, material fact issue on each of the challenged elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). A no-evidence summary judgment motion may not properly be granted if the non-movant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. Id.; Spradlin v. State, 100 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). When reviewing a traditional or a no-evidence summary judgment motion, we assume that all evidence favorable to the non-movant is true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-movant. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49; Spradlin, 100 S.W.3d at 377.

          When a trial court’s order does not specify the grounds under which summary judgment was granted, we will affirm the judgment on any meritorious theory advanced in the motion. Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1995).

Employment Discrimination

          In his first point of error, Andrews argues that the trial court erred in granting Exxon’s summary judgment motion because Andrews produced more than a scintilla of evidence to establish his prima facie case of employment discrimination.

          Under Texas law, an employer “commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race . . . the employer . . . discharges an individual.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051 (Vernon 1996). Section 21.051 is a provision of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), and one of the purposes of the TCHRA is to “provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its subsequent amendments.” Id. § 21.001(1) (Vernon 1996). Accordingly, when interpreting the provisions of the TCHRA, we may look to analogous federal statutes and to the cases interpreting them for guidance. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001).

          Federal courts recognize two types of Title VII employment discrimination cases, each requiring different elements of proof. Id. The first type is the “pretext” case, in which the plaintiff’s ultimate goal is to show that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for discrimination. Id. The second type is the “mixed motive” case, in which the plaintiff has direct evidence of discriminatory animus. Id. Here, because Andrews does not have direct evidence of discriminatory animus, this is a pretext case. See id.

          In a pretext case, a plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by showing that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for a position that he lost, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) non-protected class employees were not treated similarly. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). Generally, adverse employment actions involve hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995). Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 477. The defendant’s offer of a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action eliminates the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff’s prima facie showing. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. Even though the burden of production shifts, the burden of persuasion remains continuously with the plaintiff. Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

          Exxon argues that Andrews did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination because he “was not qualified for any position with [Exxon] because

[Exxon] is a drug free workplace and there is no evidence that Andrews was drug-free when fired.” Exxon also argues that “no non-African Americans were treated differently than Andrews under circumstances nearly identical to his.”Andrews argues that he was qualified for employment with Exxon because (1) he had worked for Exxon for more than 20 years and “should have been terminated years ago” had he not been qualified and (2) “simply testing positive [for marijuana] does not in and of itself render an employee [un]qualified.”

          In order to prove that he was qualified for the position that he lost, Andrews was required to produce more than a scintilla of evidence establishing that, when Exxon terminated his employment, he had been in compliance with Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy. Andrews applied for the designated position as a sliding console operator and began training for the position in January 2000. To qualify for the position, he was required to sign a statement that he was in compliance with Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy and would remain in compliance with the policy, as verified by drug and alcohol testing. Compliance with Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy was a required qualification that Andrews accepted, and, to prevail in his employment discrimination case, he had to establish that he actually was qualified at the time that Exxon terminated his employment. See Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting, in Title VII gender discrimination case, that plaintiff was required to prove that she was qualified for denied position “at the time she applied”).

          Here, rather than producing more than a scintilla of evidence establishing that, when Exxon terminated his employment, he was in compliance with Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy, Andrews actually produced summary judgment evidence establishing that he was not in compliance with the policy. In support of his response to Exxon’s summary judgment motion, Andrews attached his own deposition testimony, in which he testified that, prior to having provided Exxon with a urine specimen on July 5, 2000, he had smoked marijuana four times between April and May of 2000. Moreover, Andrews attached deposition testimony from Dr. Dockins, who testified that, when Quest performed both the initial and confirmatory tests, Andrews’s urine specimen had tested positive for THC each time. Thus, the summary judgment record indicates that, at the time that Exxon terminated his employment, Andrews was not in compliance with Exxon’s Alcohol and Drug Use Policy and was not qualified for the position that he lost.

          In regard to Andrews’s argument that Exxon treated non-protected class employees differently from how it had treated him, Andrews asserted that he had evidence that Exxon had retained four Caucasian employees, McCormick, Troy Browning, Forest Speer, and “Humphreys,” after those employees had tested positive for drug use. Here, Andrews was required to produce more than a scintilla of evidence establishing that these four employees were not treated as he had been treated under “nearly identical circumstances.” See Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that, in Title VII race discrimination case, plaintiff must prove employer treated non-protected class employees differently under “nearly identical” circumstances). However, Andrews did not produce any summary judgment evidence with respect to “Humphreys.” Moreover, the summary judgment record indicated that Andrews, McCormick, Browning, and Speer did not share “nearly identical circumstances.” Attached to his response, Andrews produced his own deposition testimony, in which he stated that, rather than having tested positive for drugs or alcohol, Browning and Speer had actually been arrested for driving while intoxicated. Moreover, Andrews attached the deposition testimony of Dr. Dockins, who explained that McCormick had presented a verified, “legitimate explanation” for having tested positive for the presence of amphetamines because she had been taking several legal, “over the counter” medications containing amphetamines. Although Andrews initially maintained that a prescription for Dronabinol had caused his positive drug test result—a claim that was determined to be false—he later testified that, before he provided Exxon with a urine specimen on July 5, 2000, he had smoked marijuana four times between April and May of 2000. Thus, Andrews’s summary judgment evidence established that he, McCormick, Browning, and Speer did not share “nearly identical circumstances.”

          Because Andrews did not produce more than a scintilla of evidence establishing that he was qualified for the job that he lost or that non-protected class employees were treated differently from how he was under “nearly identical circumstances”—both of which were essential elements of his employment discrimination claim—we hold that Andrews did not raise fact issues establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court did not err in rendering a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Exxon.

          We overrule Andrews’s first point of error.Conclusion

          Having held that the trial court did not err in granting Exxon’s summary judgment motion on the ground that Andrews did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, we need not address Andrews’s second point of error, in which he contends that he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to establish that Exxon’s reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for racial discrimination.

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 


                                                                        Terry Jennings

                                                                        Justice


Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Stricklin.