Opinion issued July 1, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NOS. 01-04-00206-CR
01-04-00207-CR
01-04-00208-CR
MICHAEL F. PALMA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 12
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 5406, 5407, 5408
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Michael F. Palma, was charged by complaint with failure to display a valid driver’s license, driving with expired registration, and driving with an expired inspection sticker. Following a jury trial in the municipal court of record, appellant was found guilty and fined $500. Appellant appealed to the county criminal court at law, raising seven issues on appeal. The county court affirmed the municipal court’s judgment. Appellant brings this appeal.
We affirm.
Adequacy of Charging Instrument
In his first issue on appeal, appellant contends the proceedings in the municipal court were void because no formal complaint had been filed when his plea of “not guilty” was entered.
In those prosecutions to which Code of Criminal Procedure article 27.14(d) is applicable, a written notice of a traffic violation serves as a complaint to which the defendant may enter his plea. State v. Shaw, 822 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). A formal complaint is only required if the defendant pleads not guilty, thus necessitating a trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 27.14(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004); Shaw, 822 S.W.2d at 809. Code of Criminal Procedure article 27.14(d) applies to those offenses “for which maximum possible punishment is by fine only or of a violation relating to the manner, time, and place of parking.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 27.14(d).
In the instant case, the maximum possible punishment for appellant’s offenses was by fine only. Appellant received a written notice of the traffic violations for which he was accused. The notice was received on July 19, 2003. After appellant pled “not guilty,” formal complaints were filed on August 26, 2003. Trial commenced on October 16, 2003. Thus, appellant received a notice of the traffic violations prior to his plea of “not guilty” and formal complaints were subsequently filed with the municipal court prior to trial.
We hold that Code of Criminal Procedure article 27.14(d) was applicable to the offenses for which appellant was convicted. We further hold that the procedural requirements of article 27.14(d) were complied with by the trial court.
We overrule appellant’s first issue on appeal.
Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue on appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to convict him of the charged offenses because “the prosecutor did not enter credible evidence in the record.”
We review the factual sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing all of the
evidence as a whole neutrally, not in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In a factual sufficiency
review, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Jones v.
State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The trier-of-fact is the sole
judge of the weight and credibility of the witness testimony. Johnson v. State, 23
S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App.2000).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has recently stated:
There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? However, there are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so [that] the guilty verdict should not stand. This standard acknowledges that evidence of
guilt can “preponderate” in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can “outweigh” the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 WL 840786 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (footnote omitted). We must consider the most important evidence that the appellant
claims undermines the jury’s verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Houston Police Officer C. Anderson, the citing officer. Officer Anderson testified that, on July 19, 2003, he initiated a traffic stop of appellant, after noticing appellant driving a car with an expired registration decal and an expired inspection sticker. Officer Anderson further testified that appellant was unable to produce valid inspection or registration upon request. During the traffic stop, Officer Anderson asked for appellant’s driver’s license and discovered that appellant’s driver’s license was expired as well. Appellant was unable to produce a valid driver’s license.
Appellant also testified at trial. During cross-examination, appellant conceded that, on July 19, 2003, his driver’s license was expired. He further conceded that, on the same date, the inspection and registration of the car he was driving were also expired.
Appellant directs us to no specific evidence which undermines the jury’s verdict.
We hold that the State presented factually sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions.
We overrule appellant’s second issue on appeal.
Discovery Order
Appellant’s third issue on appeal consists entirely of the following:
Judge Gee ordered the prosecutor to return to appellant the Request for Admissions. The prosecutor failed to produce the Admissions until demanded by the Appellant. The responses indicated that (sic) the person filling out this paperwork, nor the prosecutor, knew the basics about their “oath,” the Constitution of the United States of America, the Constitution of the State of Texas, current statutes, Federal Supreme Court decisions or State Supreme Court decisions.
Appellant’s third issue on appeal is not sufficiently developed because it provides no argument or authority to show why the actions of the trial court were erroneous. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. We will not decide an issue on appeal without proper argument and authority showing why the actions of the trial court were in error. Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Therefore, we hold this issue on appeal is inadequately briefed, and, as such, is waived. See id.
We overrule appellant’s third issue on appeal.
Nature and Cause of Offense
Appellant’s fourth issue on appeal consists of the following argument:
The governing law of jurisdiction dictates that, when requested, the accused has a right to obtain the Nature and Cause of the offenses before any proceedings begin. All judges in this proceeding failed to present the Nature and Cause of the offenses. Hence this honorable court must void all prior proceedings.
An accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right to demand the nature and cause of the action against him. DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Notice of the nature and cause of an action against a criminal defendant is accomplished by the filing of a charging instrument if the charging instrument is sufficient to give the accused adequate notice of the acts he allegedly committed, to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and to give the accused notice of the precise offense with which he is charged. See Smith v. State, 895 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, pet. ref’d).
In the instant case, appellant was served with a legible copy of the traffic citation in which each offense was listed. The trial court filed the citation, and appellant appeared in the trial court at the time and place on the citation. After appellant pled “not guilty,” complaints were filed as to all three offenses. Prior to the trial proceedings, the prosecutor read the charges against appellant and appellant pled to each charge.
We hold that appellant was given adequate notice of the nature and cause of the actions against him.
We overrule appellant’s fourth issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Alcala, and Higley.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).