Opinion Issued May 6, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-03-00478-CR
DAVID JENNINGS WILLIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from Criminal Court at Law Number 11
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 0996549
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant, David Jennings Willis, pleaded nolo contendere to driving while intoxicated. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to three days in the Harris County Jail, a one-year suspension of his driver’s license, and a $1,000 fine. In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the “illegal” stop and detention of appellant. We affirm.
Facts
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 18, 2000, Houston Police Officer William Lindsey, Jr. saw appellant driving a car on Richmond Street at the Hillcroft intersection. At that intersection, Richmond is composed of three east-bound lanes, three west-bound lanes, and one left-turn lane. Lindsey saw appellant stop his car in the middle west-bound lane and then make a sharp left turn. This erratic movement caused appellant’s car to partially enter the cross-walk and sit perpendicularly across two lanes of traffic. When the left-turn signal turned green, appellant turned left onto Hillcroft. Lindsey immediately stopped appellant and subsequently arrested him for driving while intoxicated.
At the motion to suppress hearing, appellant argued that the left turn was not illegal under the Texas Transportation Code, and, therefore, Lindsey lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. Lindsey testified that he stopped appellant because he considered the left turn to be illegal. The trial court held that appellant failed to comply with the law and denied his motion to suppress evidence.
Discussion
In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the State failed to demonstrate that it had reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop. Furthermore, appellant contends that, since the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop, his subsequent detention and all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop should have been suppressed. The State argues that the initial stop was legal because appellant made an illegal turn.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that depend on credibility, while we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Id. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
An officer may initiate a traffic stop if he has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic offense. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416-17 (1990). Texas Transportation Code section 545.101(b) provides:
To make a left turn at an intersection, an operator shall:
(1) approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to a vehicle moving in the direction of the vehicle; and
(2) after entering the intersection, turn left, leaving the intersection so as to arrive in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of the vehicle on the roadway being entered.
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.101(b)(1), (2).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Lindsey testified that he believed that appellant made an illegal left turn because appellant (1) did not approach the traffic light in the left turn lane; (2) entered the crosswalk to turn towards the left turn lane after stopping in the middle west-bound lane; and (3) caused his car to sit perpendicularly across two lanes of traffic while waiting for the left turn signal. Although appellant agrees with the basic facts as testified to by Lindsey, he contends that the lane correction from the middle west-bound lane to the left turn lane was not a violation of the statute.
Proof of the actual commission of an offense is not necessary for an officer to initiate a traffic stop. Praska v. State, 557 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, Lindsey had reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant had committed a traffic offense.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. We overrule appellant’s sole point of error.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Keyes.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.