Opinion issued April 8, 2004.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-03-00674-CV
IN RE AUTONATION USA CORP.; AUTONATION, USA; AUTONATION, INC.; AUTONATION, INC. A/K/A MERCEDES BENZ OF HOUSTON–NORTH; HOUSTON AUTO IMPORTS NORTH, LTD.; HOUSTON AUTO IMPORTS NORTH LTD. D/B/A MERCEDES BENZ OF HOUSTON NORTH; AUTONATION INC., A/K/A MERCEDES BENZ OF HOUSTON–GREENWAY; HOUSTON AUTO IMPORTS GREENWAY, LTD. D/B/A MERCEDES BENZ OF HOUSTON–GREENWAY, RELATORS
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By mandamus, relators, AutoNation USA Corp.; AutoNation, USA; AutoNation, Inc.; AutoNation, Inc. a/k/a Mercedes Benz of Houston–North; Houston Auto Imports North, Ltd.; Houston Auto Imports North, Ltd. d/b/a Mercedes Benz of Houston North; AutoNation Inc., a/k/a Mercedes Benz of Houston–Greenway; and Houston Auto Imports Greenway, Ltd. d/b/a Mercedes Benz of Houston–Greenway (collectively, “the AutoNation parties”), challenge an order denying the AutoNation parties’ motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings of real party in interest, Erika Green. We determine whether we have jurisdiction over the mandamus proceeding or the accompanying interlocutory appeal. We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus for want of jurisdiction.
Background
Green began working at the Mercedes-Benz of Houston—Greenway in October 1998 as Client Relations Manager. Park Place Motor Cars of Houston, Ltd. (Park Place) owned the dealership at that time. On October 12, 1998, Green signed an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement” (the arbitration agreement) with Park Place. The arbitration agreement covered all discrimination claims based on an employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
In 1999, Park Place sold the dealership’s assets to Houston Auto Imports Greenway, Ltd. d/b/a Mercedes Benz of Houston—Greenway (HAIG). In November, 2000, Green was transferred to Mercedes Benz of Houston North dealership, owned by Houston Auto Imports North, Ltd. (HAIN). Green claimed that she was transferred pursuant to a settlement agreement based on a sexual-harrassment and discrimination claim that she had made. Green stated that, after the transfer, she continued to be ostracized, received a reduction in pay, and had conflicts with management because of her earlier discrimination claim. Green was fired in October 2001.
On November 15, 2002, Green filed a lawsuit against the AutoNation parties for race and gender discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, fraud, and other employment-related wrongs. The AutoNation parties answered the lawsuit and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration agreement. The trial court denied the AutoNation parties’ motion, and they perfected this appeal.Interlocutory Appeal or Mandamus
The trial court did not expressly determine whether the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA) or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.001-.098 (Vernon 2003); 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2001). The method of review depends on which act applies. Mandamus is appropriate to review an order denying arbitration when the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement. See In re Valero Energy Corp., 968 S.W.2d 916, 916-17 (Tex. 1998); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272-73 (Tex. 1992). Interlocutory appeal is appropriate to review an order denying arbitration when the TAA applies. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.098(a)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2004). The AutoNation parties stated that they filed both an interlocutory appeal and a mandamus proceeding “out of an abundance of caution.”
The arbitration agreement in this case specifically refers to the TAA; it does not mention the FAA. Section 10.1 of the arbitration agreement states, “Any proceeding pursuant to the ADR Procedure shall be an arbitration proceeding subject to the Texas General Arbitration Act.” Additionally, section 12.3 of the arbitration agreement makes the following reference to the TAA:
Applicability of Arbitration Statute. The arbitration proceeding shall be deemed an arbitration proceeding subject to the Texas General Arbitration Act. If this ADR Procedure is in conflict with any mandatory requirements of the Texas General Arbitration Act, the statute shall govern. The Arbitrator shall have all powers granted to arbitrators under the Texas General Arbitration Act.
Given the arbitration agreement’s express adoption of the TAA, we hold that this agreement falls under the TAA. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 80 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding). Interlocutory appeal is, thus, the appropriate method to review the order denying arbitration. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.098(a)(1), (2). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus.
George C. Hanks, Jr.
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Hanks.