Opinion issued March 18, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-03-00588-CR
JUAN ALBERTO MENDOZA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 847,234
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Juan Alberto Mendoza, was indicted for murder, with an enhancement of a conviction for felony theft. A jury found appellant guilty as charged, found the enhancement allegations true, and assessed punishment at confinement for life. In two points of error, appellant challenges the evidence admitted at the punishment stage of the trial. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant engaged in an altercation with Jesse Zuniga, Louis Quinones, Jose Lopez, Robert Witt, and several others outside his apartment complex. Appellant and his wife left the complex and went to his father’s home to spend the night. Later that evening, appellant returned alone to the complex with a .9 millimeter handgun. The men were still outside the complex. Appellant spoke with Zuniga, then started shooting. Zuniga was struck five times, Quinones three times, and Lopez once. Appellant shot at Witt and missed, but the bullet ricocheted and struck Witt. Quinones died from a wound to his chest. Zuniga, Lopez, and Witt recovered and testified at trial. The medical records relating to Zuniga’s and Witt’s injuries were admitted into evidence at the punishment stage of the trial over the defense’s objections that they were irrelevant and that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the medical records of Zuniga and Witt into evidence because (1) the records were not relevant to the jury’s assessment of punishment for the murder of Quinones and (2) the records were unduly prejudicial. We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Appellant argues that the records were “victim-impact evidence,” citing Brooks v. State, 961 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.), which, according to appellant, supports his contention that the medical records are victim-impact evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has described victim-impact evidence as “evidence concerning the effect the victim’s death will have on others, particularly the victim’s family members.” Mosely v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). In Brooks, when we used the term “‘victim impact’ evidence,” we referred to the testimony of the victim’s sister, at the punishment hearing, regarding the effect the death of the victim had on the sister’s life. Brooks, 961 S.W.2d at 397. The sister’s statement was clearly victim-impact evidence as that term has been defined by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The medical records of Zuniga and Witt are not victim-impact evidence because they do not relate to the effect of the offense on the victim or a member of the victim’s family. See e.g., Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (determining that testimony by nurse regarding care given to surviving victim who was not named in indictment was not victim-impact evidence). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting improper “victim-impact” evidence.
Appellant also argues that Zuniga’s and Witt’s medical records should have been excluded because they were not relevant. Section 3(a) of article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the admission of evidence at the punishment stage of a criminal trial. That article provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[E]vidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to . . . the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and . . . any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act. . . .
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Appellant argues that the trial court’s discretion regarding what evidence it “deems relevant to sentencing” under article 37.07 is limited by rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 401. The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that this definition is not a perfect fit in the punishment context. Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The “admissibility of evidence at the punishment phase of a non-capital felony offense is a function of policy rather than relevancy.” Id. (quoting Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). The rationale behind the policy of permitting the article 37.07 evidence at the punishment stage is to provide the jury with complete information to help it determine the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular case. Id.
The medical records of Zuniga and Witt were evidence of the circumstances of the murder for which appellant was being tried. They were also evidence of bad acts committed by appellant for which he could be held criminally responsible. As such, the records fell within the ambit of section 3(a) of article 37.07. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the records were relevant as that term is used in article 37.07.
Appellant argues that, even if relevant, the records should have been excluded because the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice. Appellant contends that the contents of the records—a day-by-day description of the medical services received by Zuniga and Witt—and the volume of the records—over 100 pages—are factors that weigh against the admissibility of the records.
The State offered the records without comment except to identify them as the medical records of Zuniga and Witt. The trial court admitted the records into evidence over appellant’s objections that they were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. In the State’s closing argument, which comprises seven pages of the record, only 15 lines are devoted to the medical records. The State refers specifically only to the damage to Zuniga’s heart and lung and to the odor from Witt’s urine.
“Unfair prejudice” refers to an undue tendency to suggest a decision made on an improper basis, usually an emotional basis. Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the probative value of the medical records was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the records into evidence.
We overrule appellant’s two points of error and affirm the judgment.
Sam Nuchia
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Alcala, and Hanks.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.