Allen Lloyd Carpenter v. State

Opinion issued February 26, 2004





 











In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

 


 

 

                                              NOS. 01-03-00496-CR

                                                        01-03-00497-CR

___________

 

ALLEN LLOYD CARPENTER, Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 


 

 

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 893845 and 915974

 


 


MEMORANDUM OPINION


          Appellant, Allen Lloyd Carpenter, pleaded guilty to two separate first degree felony offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Appellant reached a plea agreement, in which the State agreed to a punishment “cap” not to exceed confinement for 10 years. Following a bench trial on punishment, the trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement for 10 years in each case, with the sentences to run concurrently.

          In two points of error applicable to each case, appellant contends that, at the punishment stage of trial, the trial court erred in admitting (1) testimony from a sexual assault counselor that, in her opinion, it was in the complainant’s best interest for appellant to be incarcerated and (2) a “self-esteem questionnaire” that the complainant had completed.

          Because of appellant’s agreement with the State to a punishment cap, we must initially address whether we have jurisdiction over these appeals.

Jurisdiction

          Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure reads, in part, as follows:

In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea is guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may appeal only:

 

(A)those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or

 

(B)after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.


Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Neither of these appeals raise issues presented in written motions filed and ruled on before trial.

          In each of these cases, the trial court signed a certification of appellant’s right of appeal, which states: “I, Judge of the trial court, certify this criminal case is not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right of appeal.” However, the record indicates that, in each case, appellant signed a “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession” that memorialized appellant’s decision to enter a guilty plea. These waivers also indicate that, with respect to a punishment recommendation, the State agreed to “No agreed recommendation w/a PSI cap of 10 years.” As a part of these waivers, appellant agreed to “waive any right of appeal which I may have should the court accept the foregoing plea bargain agreement.”

          Nothing in the records of these cases indicates that appellant withdrew his guilty plea or that the State withdrew its agreement to seek punishment of confinement for no more than 10 years. In fact, the purpose of the bench trial at the punishment stage was largely to determine whether appellant would be sentenced to confinement in prison for terms of no more than 10 years each or be placed on community supervision for these offenses.

          We have previously held that an agreement to a punishment cap constitutes a plea agreement within the meaning of Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Threadgill v. State, 120 S.W.3d 871, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (applying Rule 25.2’s definition of “plea-bargain case”). Here, the punishments imposed by the trial court did not exceed the punishment caps recommended by the State and agreed to by appellant. Thus, we hold that these cases were plea-bargained cases. See Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

          We note that, in each case, both the judgment and the certification of appellant’s right of appeal incorrectly indicate that these were not plea-bargained cases. However, the records clearly memorialize the agreements between appellant and the State to a punishment cap in each case. Notations in the record that are inconsistent with the parties’ agreement will not convert a plea-bargained case into an open plea, absent some affirmative showing that the plea agreement was actually withdrawn. Threadgill, 120 S.W.3d at 872 (holding that “anything in the record indicating that there was no agreed recommendation did not convert this proceeding into an open plea.”); see Waters v. State, No. 14-03-00183-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2003, no pet. h.) (holding that Rule 25.2 requirements recited in certification of appeal must be true and supported by record).

          Accordingly, in the absence of certifications from the trial court indicating that appellant was given the trial court’s permission to appeal these cases, we must dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction.




                                                                        Terry Jennings

                                                                        Justice


Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Higley.


Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).