Lonnie Henry Rector, Jr. v. State

Opinion issued December 15, 2005

     












In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas





NO. 01-04–01151-CR





LONNIE HENRY RECTOR, JR., Appellant


V.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee





On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 714415





MEMORANDUM OPINION


          A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and, after finding one enhancement paragraph true, assessed punishment at life in prison plus a $10,000 fine. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). Appellant appealed and this court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Rector v. State, No. 01–96–00698–CR, 1997 WL 665503 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 16, 1997, no pet.). On July 15, 2002, appellant filed a Motion for Forensic DNA Testing of Evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The trial court granted the motion and the State submitted the evidence for testing. On October 19, 2004, the trial court adopted the State’s Proposed Findings and found that had the DNA test results been available during the trial of the offense, it was not reasonably probable that the person would not have been convicted. Appellant appeals this finding.

          In one point of error, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding because the trial court’s order did not meet statutory requirements and, thus, the DNA test results were unreliable and inadmissible. Because a review of the sufficiency of the evidence on the criminal side requires consideration of all evidence, even though erroneously admitted, we read defendant’s point of error as complaining of the admissibility of the DNA results obtained pursuant to an invalid order with no showing of reliability. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

          We affirm.

Background

           On January 30, 1996, appellant forced his way into complainant’s car, struck her, choked her, and stabbed her multiple times. The police later arrested him at his apartment. At that time, the police took a knife and a belt from appellant’s apartment. The State did not present DNA evidence at trial, but they did use the knife as an exhibit. Subsequent to his conviction, appellant filed a motion requesting DNA testing on the knife and the belt. The knife and belt were sent to Orchid Cellmark Laboratory along with a sample of the complainant’s blood. No DNA evidence was found on the knife, but the samples found on the belt were consistent with the complainant’s DNA profile. As a result, the State recommended, and the trial court found, that the DNA test results would not have provided exculpatory evidence at appellant’s original trial.

Analysis

          Article 64.03(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth requirements that must be included in the order if the court orders the testing to be done by a third-party laboratory. Among other things, article 64.03(d) requires the court to include requirements in the order that “the DNA testing be conducted under reasonable conditions designed to protect the integrity of the evidence and the testing process” and that “the DNA testing employ a scientific method sufficiently reliable and relevant to be admissible under Rule 702, Texas Rules of Evidence.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(d). Appellant contends that, because the order did not contain the language required under article 64.03(d), the DNA test results lack the reliability required for the trial court to find that the results were not favorable to the appellant. Because we determine that appellant has raised both a procedural and a substantive issue, we will address them separately.

          A.      Procedural Issue

          Appellant argues that the court’s order did not follow the requirements of article 64.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Assuming without deciding that the court’s order was deficient, we find no place in the record where appellant objected to this error. To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a timely, specific objection, at the earliest opportunity and obtain an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Rodriguez v. State, 137 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The order granting appellant’s request for DNA testing was signed on July 15, 2002. The State notified appellant of its intent to have the testing performed by a third-party lab on July 24, 2003. Appellant was notified of the results on October 12, 2004. The State filed its Motion for Findings of Fact, and the court adopted them on October 19, 2004. At no point did appellant object to the deficiency of the order or to the type of lab used. We hold that appellant has waived any error in the trial court’s order.

          B.      Substantive Issue

          Appellant argues that the DNA test results were not reliable under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. However, any procedural defect in the court’s order does not automatically render the evidence unreliable. While the order lacked the language instructing the lab to “employ a scientific method sufficiently reliable and relevant to be admissible under Rule 702,” this does not necessarily mean that the laboratory did not use the requisite scientific method. This was an issue to be raised and ruled on in the required hearing. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.04 (Vernon Supp. 2005).

          Because appellant failed to properly preserve any error as to the court’s order, we hold that the report was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. We overrule appellant’s point of error.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

                                                                        Laura Carter Higley

                                                                        Justice


Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Higley.


Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).