Opinion issued November 23, 2005
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-05-00360-CR
MICHAEL TODD SONTCHI, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 733851
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court adjudicated appellant, Michael Todd Sontchi, guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child on August 1, 1997. The court sentenced Sontchi to thirty years’ confinement. Sontchi did not move for a new trial, file a motion in arrest of judgment, or file a notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a), 22.3, 26.2(a). The trial court’s judgment therefore became final thirty days after sentencing on Monday, September 1, 1997.[1]
More than six years later, on February 27, 2004, Sontchi filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal in the trial court. The trial court denied Sontchi’s motion on April 19, 2004. Sontchi appealed and this court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on June 17, 2004. Sontchi v. State, No. 01-04-00605-CR, 2004 WL 1351731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 17, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
On March 14, 2005, Sontchi filed in the trial court a “Motion to Process Appeal on Original Conviction.” The trial court denied Sontchi’s motion on March 17, 2005. This appeal followed.
Although not styled “Motion for Out-of-Time Appeal,” we construe Sontchi’s “Motion to Process Appeal on Original Conviction” as a motion for an out-of-time appeal. In the motion, Sontchi asks the trial court “to grant this motion so that the movant gets his appeal he would have gotten had the lawyer correctly advised him of his rights to appeal, or at least the second tier of review.”[2] As we noted in Sontchi’s prior appeal, however,
[n]either the trial court nor this Court has authority to grant an out-of-time appeal. The exclusive post-conviction remedy in final felony convictions in Texas courts is through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
Id. at *1.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] The thirtieth day following the judgment fell on a weekend. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a).
[2] In his notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion to process appeal, Sontchi further explains that “[t]he appeal itself is to show that the trial court and the State have jurisdiction to grant the Appellant an appeal on his original conviction, because of responsibilities the trial court did not meet, which are constitutionally required prior to the statutory deadline to appeal passes, as well as the State, and because of constitutional deprivations the Appellant would suffer if the statutory deadline for appeal on the original conviction was applied to him.”