Opinion issued April 7, 2005
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-04-00810-CV
VALENTINA POLANCO, Appellant
V.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, Appellee
On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2003-0522OJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Valentina Polanco, appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, T.P. Polanco’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief, in which he concludes that, after his evaluation of the entire record, there are no grounds that can arguably support any appeal. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) brought suit to terminate Polanco’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court signed a decree terminating Polanco’s parental rights to T.P. The decree recited that termination of Polanco’s parental rights was in T.P.’s best interests and that Polanco had “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [T.P.] with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of [T.P.] . . . .” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon 2002).
Anders applies to termination-of-parental-rights cases. See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); accord In re D.E.S., 135 S.W.3d 326, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). We have reviewed counsel’s brief and hold that counsel has met the briefing requirements set forth in Anders: the brief sets forth a professional evaluation of the record and states why there are no arguable issues to assert on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Counsel explains, for example, why he concludes that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the termination, which requires at least one basis for termination enumerated in Family Code section 161.001(1) and evidence that termination was in T.P.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (Vernon 2002). We have reviewed the entire record and concur with counsel’s evaluation concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.
Furthermore, counsel’s motion to withdraw recites that counsel has delivered a copy of the motion and supporting brief to Polanco and informed her of the right to file her own pro se response and to review the appellate record. See Sowels v. State, 45 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.). To date, Polanco has not filed a response. We have also discharged our responsibility, upon the filing of an Anders brief, to search the record for possible reversible error, but have found none. For example, trial counsel appears to have represented Polanco vigorously; no clearly harmful, erroneous evidentiary rulings are evident; DFPS’s pleadings support the judgment; and no fundamental error is evident. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
We grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Stephens v. State, 35 S.W.3d 770, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). We note that counsel still has a duty to inform Polanco of the result of this appeal and also to inform Polanco that she may, on her own, pursue discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Tim Taft
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Hanks.