Opinion issued April 13, 2006
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-05-00661-CR
TERON LARAY LIPSCOMB, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 180th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 983570
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Teron Laray Lipscomb, was charged by indictment with murder. A jury found him guilty as charged and assessed punishment at confinement for 30 years. On appeal, appellant complains that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2002, Jeremy Mayes rode his bicycle through an apartment complex parking lot. Yolanda Stanford and Latoshia Simpson, who were about to enter Stanford’s truck, exchanged greetings with Mayes, who then rounded a corner. Eleven-year-old Takesha Stafford was on her balcony with her little sister when she saw a young man riding his bicycle through the apartment complex. She saw a man in a hooded black sweatshirt approach Mayes and talk to him. The man in the sweatshirt pulled out a gun, and Mayes said, “No, don’t shoot me, dog.” The man fired the gun and hit Mayes, started to leave, then turned and fired the gun a second time. Mayes ran into a nearby apartment and died in the entryway.
Stanford and Simpson, who had ducked for cover when they heard the shots, saw a man wearing a hooded dark sweatshirt run toward a parked car. The driver got out of the car, the man in the sweatshirt got in the driver’s seat, and the driver got in the passenger seat. They drove away. Stafford, Stanford, and Simpson were unable to identify the man in the hooded sweatshirt.
Approximately one year later, the police still did not have a suspect, although a man known on the street as “Jersey” was considered a person of interest. Then, a woman from Portland, Oregon named Sara Champoux called Crimestoppers and was referred to Investigator M. Reynolds. Champoux told Reynolds that she and appellant had dated when appellant lived in Portland. Appellant told her that he had moved to Portland because he had killed a boy in Houston. She did not believe him. After a few months, appellant returned to Houston, and when Champoux visited him there, he showed her where he had killed the man. He told her that some children had seen the shooting, but had not told the police. Appellant told her that the man he shot had insulted his friend, Jersey. Champoux returned to Portland because she was afraid that appellant might kill her.
Reynolds obtained a warrant and arrested appellant. Reynolds read appellant his Miranda rights and interviewed appellant from about 1:00 p.m. to 4:28 p.m. Reynolds reduced appellant’s statement to writing, which appellant signed, and Reynolds and Officer Davis signed as witnesses at 8:41 p.m.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Suppress
In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement because (1) the statement was involuntary and (2) the statement was the product of an illegal arrest.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Taylor v. State, 945 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d). The Court will afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the findings are based on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The fact finder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and may accept or reject any or all of the witnesses’ testimony. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d at 297. In reviewing a ruling on a question of application of law to facts, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
Involuntary Statement
Appellant contends that his statement was involuntary because (1) he signed it after being held in custody more than nine hours; (2) he was physically abused during interrogation by Officer Davis, who slapped and choked him while he was handcuffed; (3) he repeatedly asked for an attorney on the way to the police station and during the interrogation, yet the officer did not terminate the interrogation; and (4) his limited intelligence made him easy to coerce. When an accused claims that his confession was not voluntary, the burden is on the State to prove its voluntariness. Farr v. State, 519 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). We look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement to determine whether appellant’s will was overborne by police coercion. Guardiola v. State, 20 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th dist.] 2000, pet ref’d).
Reynolds and appellant testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Reynolds testified that he read appellant his rights and that appellant indicated that he understood them. Reynolds testified that appellant was at the police station by about 11:45 a.m., the interrogation started at about 1:00 p.m., he started typing appellant’s statement at 4:28 p.m., and appellant signed it at 8:41 p.m. Reynolds further testified that during that time, appellant was given several glasses of water, was allowed to smoke about 10 cigarettes, was taken to the rest room several times, and declined an offer of snack crackers. Reynolds stated that appellant was not given any dinner, but that the officers did not have dinner either. Reynolds testified that appellant did not request an attorney during the ride to the police station or after they arrived at the station, nor did appellant request that the interview be terminated. He also testified that he did not see Officer Davis or any other officer physically abuse appellant. Reynolds stated that, when he gave appellant the opportunity to make a written statement, appellant said that his handwriting was not good and asked Reynolds to write or type the statement.
Appellant testified that he asked for an attorney while he was being taken to the police station and continually throughout the interrogation. He said that the officer who was not in the courtroom (presumably Davis) slapped and choked him while he was handcuffed, but that Reynolds had not mistreated him. Appellant testified that he was taken to the restroom one time during the interrogation, but that he was not offered any food, although he had informed the officers at the time of his arrest that he had not eaten all day. He said that he was allowed to smoke “after this was all over.” Appellant testified that he told Reynolds that he did not want to write his statement because he “couldn’t read and write that good.”
The length of the interrogation is one factor to be considered in determining whether a suspect’s statement is coerced. See id. (stating that length of detention is relevant to determination of coercion). Here, it is not contested that appellant was in police custody for more than nine hours and was interrogated for almost eight hours before signing his statement. However, a lengthy interrogation does not automatically render a statement involuntary. See Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that eight hours of questioning without food did not render confession involuntary in light of defendant’s willingness to continue).
In this case, appellant was given water, was allowed rest room breaks, was offered food, which he declined, and was permitted to smoke. After Reynolds completed typing the statement, he gave a copy to appellant for his review, and appellant made some changes and corrections, which were then put into the final statement. There is no indication that appellant’s will was overborne due to the length of his interrogation.
The evidence regarding appellant’s complaints that he was physically abused and that the officers failed to terminate the interview after he asked for an attorney was controverted by Reynolds’s testimony. We must therefore defer to the trial court’s fact findings relating to these complaints. The trial court filed findings of fact as follows:
(3)appellant never asked for an attorney nor did he ever request that the interview be terminated;
. . . .
(5)appellant was neither threatened nor coerced by anyone into cooperating, nor was he promised any benefit in return for his statement;
. . . .
Because Reynolds’s testimony is evidence supporting these findings, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that appellant did not request an attorney or that appellant was not coerced.
In support of his complaint that his limited intelligence rendered his statement involuntary, appellant offered the testimony of Dr. John Pinkerman, a psychologist. Pinkerman testified that appellant’s I.Q. was 78 and that his ability to read and write was “very underdeveloped.” He also testified that someone with appellant’s level of intelligence might be more easily manipulated and opined that appellant was wanting to be cooperative in giving his statement. However, Pinkerman also testified that appellant was able to interact with him during the testing process and, generally, was able to understand his questions, although Pinkerman sometimes had to explain specific words. It was his opinion that appellant was fully capable of comprehending the Miranda warnings that were given to him.
The record does not support appellant’s contention that he was coerced in making his statement because of his limited intelligence. We hold that the State has carried its burden to show that appellant’s statement was voluntary.
Illegal Arrest
Appellant also contends that his motion to suppress should have been granted because his statement was the product of an illegal arrest. Appellant argues that the facts supporting Reynolds’s affidavit for the arrest warrant were insufficient to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause to issue an arrest warrant because the affidavit does not reveal that Champoux was a convicted felon who had been on the run from the law or that Reynolds never personally met with Champoux, but had viewed the Spokane, Washington Police Department’s video of Champoux’s statement. Appellant cites no authority to support either of these complaints.
In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for an arrest warrant, we limit our review to the four corners of the affidavit. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The affidavit need only show probable cause to arrest a suspect and need not contain the specificity required for an indictment or the quantity of evidence required to obtain a conviction. Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 822–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). An affidavit that identifies a named informant will support issuance of a warrant if the information provided is sufficiently detailed to suggest direct knowledge by the informant. See Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In this case, Champoux was named as the informant. Reynolds viewed her videotaped statement and spoke with her by telephone several times. She told Reynolds many details, which she said appellant told her, of the murder, including the name of the apartment complex where Mayes was shot, the fact that Mayes was on a bicycle, the fact that two juveniles and an adult were watching from a balcony, the name of appellant’s friend (whom she referred to as “New Jersey” rather than “Jersey”), the fact that appellant changed into a black hooded sweatshirt and black pants before going after Mayes, and Mayes’s statement, “no dog, don’t shoot me,” before appellant shot him.
We hold that Reynolds’s affidavit was sufficiently detailed to show probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for appellant.
We overrule appellant’s first issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because (1) the State did not prove that his statement was voluntary, (2) the State did not prove that he intentionally caused the death of Mayes, and (3) Champoux is not a credible witness. Because appellant makes only a general sufficiency-of-the-evidence complaint and cites only a legal-sufficiency standard of review, we construe appellant’s complaint to be a legal-sufficiency complaint. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that court of appeals may review factual sufficiency “if it is properly raised”).
Standard of Review
In reviewing the evidence on legal-sufficiency grounds, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine “whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony. Jaggers v. State, 125 S.W.3d 661, 671 (Tex App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). The jury may believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). This standard of review applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence. King, 29 S.W.3d at 565.
Involuntary Statement
Appellant first argues that his statement was involuntary and that, without his statement, the evidence is insufficient to meet the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Having held, under appellant’s first point of error, that the State has carried its burden to show that appellant’s statement was voluntary, we need not revisit this issue.
Unintentional Shooting
Second, appellant contends that his statement, if voluntary, clearly shows that he did not intend to kill Mayes. His statement said,
I was going to go back and scare the guy, point the gun at him or maybe even fire a shot up in the air. . . .
As I rounded the corner of the next building the boy happened to be right there on the bike coming towards me. It kind of startled me and I pulled the pistol out of my pocket and shot 2 times. I wasn’t trying to shoot him and was trying to aim kind of up in the air. As soon as I shot I turned and ran back the way I came, I didn’t see the guy fall or get off his bike or anything. The only people I saw were a couple of little kids up on the balcony, and I didn’t see them until after I had already shot and was running away.
A person commits murder if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02 (b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2003). Intent and knowledge are fact questions for the jury and are almost always proven through evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime. Childs v. State, 21 S.W.3d 631, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). We may infer intent from the accused’s words and conduct, and when death results from a deadly weapon fired at close range, the law presumes an intent to kill. Id.
In this case, appellant retrieved his pistol and sought out Mayes. Appellant then shot Mayes two times. Stafford, watching from a balcony, testified, that the man with the gun shot Mays once, started to leave, then turned back and shot a second time. She said, “It looked like he was - - he did it on purpose, like he wanted to shoot him . . . .” Champoux testified that appellant told her that he shot Mayes because “the kid disrespected his friend at the store . . . that he shot and killed the kid . . . .”
Appellant argues that we should discount Stafford’s testimony because she was only 11 years old at the time of the shooting. Appellant also contends that Champoux’s testimony lacks credibility because she is a convicted felon who probably received clemency from an Oregon prosecutor in exchange for her help in this case.
Although it is true that Champoux had been convicted in Oregon of possession of a controlled substance, there is no evidence that she was under indictment at the time of appellant’s trial or that she received any benefit as a result of her testimony. Furthermore, she was questioned under oath by appellant’s counsel regarding her conviction and whether there were any outstanding charges against her or any preferential treatment was given to her in return for her testimony. She testified that there was none. Appellant’s contention is sheer speculation.
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to given to their testimony are for the jury to determine. Jaggers v. State, 125 S.W.3d at 671. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second point of error.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment.
Sam Nuchia
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Keyes, and Hanks.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).