Opinion issued June 7, 2007
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-05-01130-CR
DAVID CLYDE BILLODEAU, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 351st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1001543
DISSENTING OPINION
Because the majority errs in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) precluding appellant from cross-examining the complainant about his threats, made after the instant offense, but prior to his trial testimony, of false allegations of sexual abuse against Nancy and Nathan Kline and (2) excluding the Klines' testimony about the threats, I respectfully dissent.
Although the majority acknowledges that the complainant's "credibility was a crucial element" here, it agrees with the State that "the trial court reasonably concluded that the testimony had little probative value and would unduly prejudice and confuse the jury 'in light of the nature of the evidence and the timing and circumstances surrounding those threats.'" The majority emphasizes that the complainant made his threats against the Klines "over a year after the instant offense" and that there is "no evidence at trial that [the complainant] had a propensity to lie or a vengeful temper towards adults prior to or upon [his] allegation toward appellant."
It also emphasizes that the complainant's threats that he would falsely report the Klines generally for "molestation" were not "identical" to the complainant's specific allegations against appellant.
The majority, "in light of the remoteness in time and the dissimilarity between the specific instances of conduct toward the Klines and the charged offense," concludes that the complainant's testimony on the point had little probative value and would have been unduly prejudicial or confusing, and it overrules appellant's second point of error, relying on Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Likewise, it also concludes that the Klines' testimony about the threats is irrelevant, and it overrules appellant's first point of error, distinguishing Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd).
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the "ultimate goal" of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause "is to ensure reliability of evidence" and that the Sixth Amendment "commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has acknowledged that the Confrontation Clause "occasionally may require the admissibility of evidence that the Rules of Evidence would exclude." Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 225. In order to determine whether the Confrontation Clause demands the admissibility of certain evidence, a court must balance the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced against the risk its admission may entail. Id.
In Lopez, the complainant, a young boy, testified that the defendant compelled
him to perform oral sex on the defendant numerous times over several months. Id. at 221. The defendant sought to impeach the complainant's credibility "with evidence that two years earlier, [the complainant] had complained to the Texas Department of Human Services that his mother had thrown him against a washing machine, and that case had been closed without any action taken against the mother." Id. at 221-22. The court held that the Confrontation Clause did not demand admissibility of this evidence. Id. at 226. In concluding that the evidence's "probative value was extremely low, and the risk that its admission would confuse the jury was high," the court emphasized (1) "the prior accusation was never shown to be false" and (2) the allegation that the complainant's mother had physically abused him had "almost nothing in common" with the complainant's accusing the defendant of forcing him to perform oral sex on the defendant. Id. at 225-26.
Here, in stark contrast, appellant presented evidence that the complainant, after making his complaints against appellant, but prior to testifying in trial, threatened two witnesses with false allegations of sexual abuse. In appellant's bill of exception, Nancy Kline testified that the complainant, who was at her home, called his sister a "bitch." When Nancy attempted to discipline the complainant, he became very angry and told her that he was "going to call the cops and tell them that you're molesting me." When Nancy told the complainant that he did not know what "molest" means, the complainant defined molestation for her and "had a smirk on his face like he thought it was kind of funny." Nathan Kline testified in the bill of exception that when he refused to let his siblings out of his home to play with the complainant, the complainant threatened to tell his parents that Nathan was "molesting" him.
The majority's reliance on Lopez is misplaced because the Klines' testimony goes to the very core of the reliability of the complaint as a witness in this sexual assault case. The Court's holding that this evidence has "little probative value and would have been unduly prejudicial or confusing" cuts at the very heart of the Confrontation Clause, i.e., that credibility be "tested in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. The fact that the complainant made threats about general allegations of "molestation" a year after the instant offense is of little consequence. Appellant presented evidence that the complainant, who was at the time a witness against appellant in a pending sexual assault case and very familiar with the seriousness of the allegations, was willing to threaten, and did threaten, two other individuals with false allegations of sexual assault when he lost his temper. Moreover, the Klines' testimony may also serve to prove that the complainant testified untruthfully to the trial court outside the presence of the jury when the complainant denied making any such allegations.
Likewise, the majority erroneously distinguishes this Court's previous decision in Thomas. In Thomas, an aggravated rape case, the defendant presented evidence in a bill of exception that the complainant, previously, had falsely told her mother that she had been raped. 669 S.W.2d at 422-23. We held that the trial court's "refusal to allow appellant to question the complainant on these matters before the jury amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to fully cross-examine his accuser." Id. at 423 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1111 (1974)). We emphasized that "the complainant's credibility would have been cast in doubt" by the admission of such testimony. Id.
The bottom line is that in such situations, as in the instant case, "the jury should [be] allowed to hear the testimony and decide on the issue of the complainant's credibility." Id. Here, given that the complainant's credibility was "crucial," one cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court's error did not contribute to appellant's conviction. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). Accordingly, I would sustain appellant's first and second points of error and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Higley.
Justice Jennings, dissenting.
Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).