In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-07-00542-CR
JARRED JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 174th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 01074269
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Jarred Jackson, guilty of aggravated robbery and assessed punishment of 35 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his request for a mistrial following the replacement of a juror after the jury was sworn. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. After the jury was selected and sworn, but before any testimony was heard, the trial court noticed that one of the jurors was uncomfortable and asked her to explain. The juror expressed that her son was a convicted felon who served seven months for drug charges. The trial court explained that the law required her to base her verdict on the evidence, her evaluation of the witnesses, and the court’s instructions, and inquired whether she could put her feelings aside to do so; she responded that, emotionally, she could not. After both parties declined an opportunity to question the juror, the State made a motion to excuse the juror and seat the alternate. The court overruled appellant’s objection, dismissed the juror, and seated the alternate. Appellant then moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Juror Disability
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a mistrial following the dismissal of a juror after the jury had been sworn. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excusing a juror without the requisite showing of illness or disability and by replacing the juror after the jury had been sworn, in violation of article 36.29 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, no reversible error will be found. Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Analysis
Under article 36.29(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, if a juror dies or becomes disabled from sitting, the remaining jury has the power to render a verdict. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.29(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). A juror is disabled if she has a “physical illness, mental condition, or emotional state” which hinders her ability to perform her duties as a juror. Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A disability, for purposes of article 36.29, includes “any condition that inhibits a juror from fully and fairly performing the functions of a juror.” Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Here, the discomfort of the juror was obvious to the trial court. When the trial court sought to determine the source of the juror’s discomfort, she expressly stated that she was still emotionally affected by the experience of her son’s drug conviction and that she could not put her feelings aside and return a verdict based on the law and evidence. Because the juror’s emotional state prevented her from fully and fairly performing the necessary functions of a juror, she was properly determined to be disabled within the meaning of article 36.29. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror and properly denied appellant’s request for a mistrial.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
George C. Hanks, Jr.
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, and Higley.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).