Opinion issued December 31, 2009
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-09-00694-CV
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ALEITHIA ARTEMIS, Appellant
V.
HOUSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 133rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2009-39569
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 31, 2009, appellant, Aleithia Artemis, filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s July 27, 2009 interlocutory order sustaining the District Clerk’s contest of Artmeis’s affidavit of inability to pay trial court filing fees and costs. In its order, the trial court required Artemis to pay trial court filing fees in the amount of $11,002 by October 30, 2009, and it advised that the case would be dismissed without prejudice if appellant failed to pay the fees and costs by that date.
The general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if allowed by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001). The July 27, 2009 interlocutory order which appellant attempts to appeal is not an order that is made appealable by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon 2008). We thus lack subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal of the interlocutory indigency order. See Kilsby v. Mid Century Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 14-07-00981-CV, 2008 WL 889428, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order sustaining challenge to affidavit of inability to pay costs); see also In re K.J.M., No. 02-08-038-CV, 2008 WL 703960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order sustaining challenge to indigency affidavit and denying appointment of counsel to represent appellant in habeas challenge to order of contempt in child-support-enforcement action).
On September 30, 2009, this Court notified Artemis that, unless she demonstrated, within 15 days, that we had subject-matter jurisdiction over her appeal, the appeal would be dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). More than 15 days have passed, and Artemis has not explained why subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Because we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal, we must dismiss it.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and overrule any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.