Opinion issued December 17, 2009
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-08-00959-CV
__________
FREDDIE LEE WALKER, Appellant
V.
BRAD LIVINGSTON, NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, GARY GOMEZ, LARRY LEFLORE, PAMELA WILLIAMS, BEVERLY STEWART, DOUG WALDRON, J.P. GUYTON, AND RICHARD TRINCI, Appellees
On Appeal from the 412th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 44627
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Freddie Lee Walker, who is incarcerated and represents himself pro se, challenges the trial court’s order dismissing his lawsuit against appellees, Brad Livingston, Nathaniel Quarterman, Gary Gomez, Larry LeFlore, Pamela Williams, Beverly Stewart, Doug Waldron, J.P. Guyton, and Richard Trinci, and other officials with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by refusing to provide him a certain inmate classification. In four issues, Walker contends that a Travis County district court erred in transferring venue of the case from Travis County to Brazoria County, the trial court “improperly dismissed the entire case and should have stayed the remaining lawsuit,” the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his case under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion.
We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In his petition, Walker sought to bring suit on behalf of himself and a number of other “inmate/clients” who had been convicted of felonies and were “incarcerated in Texas” and who had been denied “SAT-2 (G-1) Outside Trusty Status based upon a double-standard determination” by appellees. Walker, asserting a “class action complaint” and an “equal protection claim,” primarily complained that TDCJ officials had incorrectly determined the appropriate classification for him and other unidentified inmates. Walker stated in his petition that he “essentially argue[d] that the statutory scheme create[d] a discriminatory classification that violate[d]” his and other unidentified inmates’ “equal protection rights.”
Appellees filed a motion to transfer venue of the case from Travis County to Brazoria County and an answer generally denying Walker’s allegations. In their motion, appellees asserted that Walker’s lawsuit involved his classification as an inmate while incarcerated within a TDCJ facility located in Brazoria County and that Walker’s “specific contention is that he is being denied promotion to a State Approved Trusty Status Two (G-2)” due to the defendants’ actions. Appellees argued that because Walker was “currently incarcerated in the Scott Unit, located in Angleton, Brazoria County, Texas,” the court should transfer the case to Brazoria County.
Concluding that mandatory venue was in Brazoria County, the Travis County district court granted appellees’ motion and transferred the case to Brazoria County. It also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its transfer order.
Appellees then filed a motion and supplemental motion to dismiss Walker’s lawsuit pursuant to Chapter 14. In their motions to dismiss, appellees argued that Walker’s claims were frivolous and malicious and Walker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the grievance system, to file the statutorily required affidavits relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and to his other previous filings of lawsuits, and to file a statutorily required certified copy of his trust account. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2)–(3) (providing that trial court may dismiss claim if it finds that claim is frivolous or malicious and may also dismiss claim if it finds that inmate filed affidavit or declaration required by Chapter 14 that inmate knew was false), § 14.004 (providing that inmate who files affidavit or declaration of inability to pay costs shall file affidavit or declaration relating to previous filings); § 14.005 (providing that inmate who files claim subject to grievance system shall file affidavit or declaration detailing handling of claim through grievance system), § 14.006(f) (providing that inmate shall file certified copy of inmate’s trust account statement with court). After conducting two hearings, the trial court dismissed Walker’s lawsuit.
Venue
In his first issue, Walker argues that the Travis County district court erred in transferring venue of the case from Travis County to Brazoria County because venue in Travis County was permissive and a transfer was not appropriate.
A party may file a motion to transfer venue on the basis that mandatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by statutory provisions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 86(3)(b). “If the plaintiff’s chosen venue rests on a permissive venue statute and the defendant files a meritorious motion to transfer based on a mandatory venue provision, the trial court must grant the motion.” Wichita County, Tex. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. 1996).
An action that has accrued while a plaintiff “was housed in a facility operated by or under contract with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice shall be brought in the county in which the facility is located.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.019(a) (Vernon 2002). The record before us establishes that Walker’s lawsuit arises from his complaint about his classification status at a TDCJ facility located in Brazoria County and, thus, that his where is his lawsuit accrued. Accordingly, mandatory venue of the case was in Brazoria County. See id. We hold that the Travis County district court did not err in transferring the case to Brazoria County under the mandatory venue provision. See Johnson v. Davis, 178 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
We overrule Walker’s first issue.Dismissal
In his second, third, and fourth issues, Walker argues that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion and in dismissing “the entire case” because the trial court “should have stayed the remaining lawsuit” against certain TDCJ officials and dismissal was improper under Chapter 14. In his fourth issue, Walker contends, based upon the above arguments, that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion.
Under Chapter 14, a trial court may dismiss an inmate suit brought in forma pauperis, either before or after service of process, by finding that the suit is frivolous or malicious. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, a trial court may consider whether: (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. at § 14.003(b)(1)-(4). We generally review a trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s suit under Chapter 14 for abuse of discretion. See Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice–Institutional Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Wilson v. TDCJ-ID, 268 S.W.3d 756, 758 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.).
In his petition, Walker asserted that in 1986 he was sentenced to incarceration for life for committing the offense of burglary. In 1990, while incarcerated for this offense, he obtained the classification of a “SAT-2” and then ultimately the classification of a “SAT-1.” Walker further asserted that although he was placed on parole for his burglary offense in 1994, he “returned [to incarceration] as a parole violator” in 1998 with an additional “five state jail felony offenses.” Walker noted that his punishment was then assessed “at 5/12 years sentences ran concurrent.” Walker alleged that, during his present incarceration, in 2001, he again achieved the classification of “SAT-2,” but, in 2003, he was “down-graded” to a “SAT-3” “for “unclear reasons.” Walker alleged that “[a]s a result, . . . there are currently similarly situated offenders with SAT-2 (G-1) status at the Wayne Scott unit, and throughout the TDCJ-CID System that are serving sentences of life, ninety-nine, and fifty years or more, that do not have confirmed parole dates.”
Liberally reading Walker’s petition, it appears that his complaint is that for “unclear reasons” he was unfairly denied a “SAT-2” classification. However, he did not provide any comprehensible argument as to how his classification is unfair when compared to other inmates.
Walker has cited no authority, in either his petition below or in his briefing to this Court, to support his contention that he has suffered an equal protection violation as a result of appellees’ refusal to grant him a “SAT-2” classification. Although Walker purports to recite numerous TDCJ guidelines and policies regarding inmate classification, he did not clearly explain how he has been denied equal treatment under these guidelines. In fact, Walker frequently cites a purported guideline regarding job assignments made based upon “an offender’s total record.” Thus, the factual assertions made by Walker in his petition did not give rise to any comprehensible equal protection violation. Additionally, in the prayer of his petition, although Walker asked for a different classification, Walker also sought injunctive relief to require the TDCJ to review the status of other, unidentified non-party offenders who are serving sentences of “life, ninety-nine years, or fifty years” and who are “housed at Trusty-Camps.” Inexplicably, Walker sought orders to immediately “rehouse said offenders at a more secured area.” In sum, based upon the claims asserted and the relief requested in his petition, the trial court could have concluded that Walker’s lawsuit lacked any merit and was frivolous. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Walker’s lawsuit under Chapter 14 or in denying Walker’s new trial motion.
We overrule Walker’s second, third, and fourth issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.