In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-08-00907-CR
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MATTHEW JAMES ACHEAMPONG, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 209th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1127354
A jury convicted appellant, Matthew James Acheampong, of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, cocaine, weighing more than 4 grams and less than 200 grams by aggregate weight and assessed punishment at 20 years' confinement. In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that he possessed with intent to deliver the cocaine in question. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Undercover U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent Boucher saw appellant leave apartment 307 at 8152 Richmond Avenue on July 31, 2007, walk across the street to a strip center where Boucher was parked, and approach the driver's side window of a vehicle parked beside Boucher. Agent Boucher saw appellant hand the driver of the vehicle a small, clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. After leaving the parking lot, Houston Narcotics Officer Arista stopped the driver of the vehicle and discovered the contents of the bag to be cocaine.
Meanwhile, Agent Boucher maintained surveillance on the apartment and saw appellant drive away from it. When appellant returned to the apartment a few hours later, Boucher and Arista identified themselves to appellant. Officer Arista then left to get a search warrant for the apartment. Agent Boucher testified that, from the time that appellant was observed handing over the cocaine in the strip center parking lot to the time that the apartment was searched, no one other than appellant entered or left the apartment.
Officer Arista and others searched the two-story, one bedroom, one-and-a-half bath apartment. They found a locked safe in the downstairs closet that appellant denied ownership of, and did not have a key to, in his possession. When police pried the safe open, they found $2,857, 7.9 grams of powder cocaine and a 3.8 gram rock of cocaine, 72.9 grams of Xanax, 63.9 grams of Ecstasy, and marihuana. Nothing identifying appellant was found inside the safe and there was no evidence presented directly linking appellant to the safe or the drugs inside. A comparative analysis between the cocaine in the safe and the cocaine handed over in the strip center parking lot was not conducted.
The apartment lease listed appellant's mother as the resident of the apartment, but appellant's mother testified at trial that appellant was sleeping on the downstairs sofa at the time, kept clothes in the downstairs closet in which the safe was found, and had his mail sent to the apartment. Appellant's two sisters also had keys to the apartment, but it had been a few years since they had lived at the apartment. The supervisor with the Harris County Pretrial Services testified that appellant had listed the apartment as his current address.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant claims that the evidence presented is legally insufficient to link appellant to the cocaine found in the safe. We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely cocaine, weighing more than 4 grams and less than 200 grams, if he knowingly or intentionally possesses the controlled substance in the prescribed amount, by aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(3)(D), 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon 2003). To prove possession with intent to deliver, the State must prove that the defendant (1) exercised care, custody, control, or management over the controlled substance, (2) intended to deliver the controlled substance to another, and (3) knew that the substance in his possession was a controlled substance. Id. at §§ 481.002(38), 481.112(a); Parker v. State, 192 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd).
When, as here, the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which link the accused to the contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). The purpose of this rule is to determine whether the defendant's connection to the substance was more than just fortuitous. Id. at 405-06. The requisite connection can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a reasonable inference of the defendant's knowledge and control of the contraband. See id.; Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Texas courts have identified "many non-exhaustive factors" that may demonstrate a link to contraband. Roberson v. State, 80 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). The number of linking factors present is not as important as the "logical force" the factors create to prove that an offense was committed. Id; see also Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). Examples of links include (1) the accused's presence when a search is conducted, (2) whether the narcotics were in plain view, (3) the accused's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotics, (4) whether the accused was under the influence of narcotics when arrested, (5) whether the accused possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested, (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements when arrested, (7) whether the accused attempted to flee, (8) whether the accused made furtive gestures, (9) whether there was an odor of contraband or narcotics, (10) whether other contraband or narcotic paraphernalia was present, (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the narcotics were found, (12) whether the place in which the narcotics were found was enclosed, (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash, and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Appellant contends that because he was not in exclusive possession of the apartment and there was no direct evidence linking him to the cocaine found in the safe, the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. He bases this argument on the fact that a drug analysis linking the cocaine handed over in the strip center parking lot to the cocaine found in the safe could have been conducted and presented to the jury, but was not.
However, the requisite connection between the defendant and the contraband does not have to be directly proven, but can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405-06; Meeks, 692 S.W.2d at 511. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we note that appellant was seen walking out of an apartment where he was temporarily living and handing over cocaine to a third party. Nobody entered or left the apartment other than appellant between then and the search of the apartment. The only other person in the apartment at the time was appellant's mother, who was not seen delivering cocaine to anyone. The cocaine was found in a safe located in a closet in which appellant kept his clothes. This circumstantial evidence could lead a rational jury to the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the cocaine found in the safe.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Massengale.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)