Timothy Aguilar v. Texas La Fiesta Auto Sales LLC & Patrick J. Miller and Harris County

Opinion Issued June 4, 2009

Opinion Issued June 4, 2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

 

 


NO. 01-08-00653-CV

 

 


TIMOTHY AGUILAR, Appellant

 

V.

 

TEXAS LA FIESTA AUTO SALES LLC, and PATRICK J. MILLER, Appellees

 

 


On Appeal from the 61st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2008-35253

 


 


MEMORANDUM OPINION

           Timothy Aguilar appeals the trial court’s order sustaining the district clerk’s contest to Aguilar’s affidavit of indigency.  Aguilar requests that we reverse the trial court’s order and allow him to proceed as indigent.  We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because no final judgment or appealable order exists in this case.

Background

In June 2008, Aguilar, acting pro se, sued Texas La Fiesta Auto Sales and Patrick Miller, alleging that they provided inaccurate credit information to consumer credit reporting agencies, which caused Aguilar financial injury.  Aguilar filed an affidavit to proceed as indigent in the trial court.  The district clerk contested Aguilar’s affidavit, contending that Aguilar failed to meet the statutory requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145.  The trial court sustained the district clerk’s contest to Aguilar’s affidavit, finding that it was defective.  Aguilar filed a notice of appeal, and the district clerk again contested Aguilar’s affidavit of indigency.  The trial court again sustained the district clerk’s contest.

Aguilar appealed, asking this court to reverse the trial court’s denial and allow him to proceed as indigent on appeal.  On August 26, 2008, we held that, under Rule 20.1, Aguilar’s affidavit did not contain any apparent defects in substance, and that a trial court’s ruling based solely on a defect of form cannot be sustained under the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Higgins v. Randall County Sheriff’s Office, 257 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2008).  On September 9, 2008, after reviewing the district clerk’s contest, we determined that the district clerk’s grounds for objection were insufficient to sustain the contest to Aguilar’s affidavit.  The district clerk objected to Aguilar’s affidavit on the grounds that it did not state (1) the costs and filing fees, if any, and (2) the amount that Aguilar could pay.  We ruled that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1, Aguilar fulfilled the requirements of stating an estimate of the costs and that he was unable to pay them.  Aguilar’s affidavit also contained monthly debt and income information for his household, which indicated that the family’s debt load exceeded their income, supporting his contention that he cannot pay court costs.  Thus, we concluded that the affidavit substantially satisfied the requirements of Rule 20.1, allowing Aguilar to proceed on appeal without advance payment of costs.

Discussion

          Aguilar now attempts to appeal the trial court’s order denying his affidavit of indigency at the trial court level.  More specifically, Aguilar contends that the portion of the trial court’s order requiring the district clerk not to process any settings in Aguilar’s case until he paid the full filing fees and costs incurred in the process of the case constitutes a denial of access to the courts in violation of the state and federal constitution. 

The general rule, with a few exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.  Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).  Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if allowed by statute.  Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001).  The trial court’s order sustaining the contest to Aguilar’s affidavit of indigency is an interlocutory order which is not included in the list of orders made appealable by statute.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon 2008).  We thus lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory indigency order that Aguilar appeals.  See Kilsby v. Mid Century Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 14-07-00981-CV, 2008 WL 889428, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order sustaining challenge to affidavit of inability to pay costs); see also In re K.J.M., No. 02-08-038-CV, 2008 WL 703960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth March 13, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order sustaining challenge to indigency affidavit and denying appointment of counsel to represent appellant in habeas challenge to order of contempt in child-support-enforcement action).[1]

Conclusion

Aguilar complains of no final judgment or appealable order.  We thus dismiss Aguilar’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

 

                                                          Jane Bland

                                                          Justice

 

Panel consists of Judges Keyes, Hanks, and Bland.

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.4

 



[1] We express no opinion about whether the trial court’s order is reviewable by petition for a writ of mandamus.  See Tex. R. App. P. 52.