Opinion issued May 14, 2009
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-08-00387-CV
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MICHAEL McLANE, Appellant
V.
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, Appellee
On Appeal from 309th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2002-47785A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is one of several proceedings filed by appellant, Michael McLane, in this Court related to his July 2003 divorce from Sandra McLane, and the trial court’s various decisions regarding child support and child custody for their son.
In March 2008, the trial court held a status hearing in this case. The purpose of the status hearing was to determine what pleadings were still pending before the trial court. At the hearing, the trial court dismissed all of Michael’s motions to modify the original custody order, finding that the motions had previously been disposed of. After the court signed the order of dismissal, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc order which decreed that the only active motion in the case was the Department of Family and Protective Services’ motion to modify the custody order.
In the instant appeal, Michael challenges the trial court’s ruling, contending that the dismissal of his pleadings was an abuse of discretion. Michael also urges this court to find that the dismissal of his pleadings did not nullify a mediated settlement agreement entered in this case. Finally, Michael asks this court to resolve the issue of whether the mediated settlement can be the basis for an order after the child has been in the custody of the Department for over one year. As shown below, we do not have jurisdiction to hear any of these complaints in Michael’s appeal.
JurisdictionGenerally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments that dispose of all parties and claims. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Temporary orders may be appealed only when expressly permitted by statute. See e.g. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001). The Texas Family Code specifically precludes the interlocutory appeal of temporary orders, except those appointing a receiver. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.507 (Vernon 2006); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001(e) (Vernon 2006) (stating temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship are not subject to interlocutory appeal).
Here, the record reflects that there has been no final judgment disposing of all parties and all pending claims in this case. Specifically, pursuant to the trial court’s order, the Department’s motion to modify remains pending in this case. Furthermore, Michael’s complaints on appeal do not concern the appointment of a receiver. Michael has not provided us with any authority, nor can we find any, that permits the interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s orders in this case. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
George C. Hanks, Jr.
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack, and Justices Alcala and Hanks.