Opinion issued July 8, 2010
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-08-00994-CV
__________
JOHN GANNON, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee
V.
MATTHEW D. WIGGINS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
On Appeal from the 212th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 06-CV-0246
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant/cross-appellee, John Gannon, Inc. (“JGI”), challenges the trial court’s judgment, entered after a jury trial, awarding JGI damages in its suit for breach of contract against appellee/cross-appellant, Matthew D. Wiggins. In two issues, JGI contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of its damages and denying its request for a continuance. Wiggins, as a cross-appellant, contends in two issues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in which he asserted that there was no enforceable contract between the parties, who had not agreed upon the essential terms of the contract, and, alternatively, the trial court erred in denying his summary judgment motion in which he asserted that any contract between the parties was terminable at will or violated the statute of frauds.
We reverse and render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Wiggins.
Factual and Procedural Background
In its petition, JGI alleged that it constructed three advertising billboards for Wiggins on Wiggins’s land for a total cost of approximately $260,400 and Wiggins owed JGI an outstanding balance of approximately $110,000 for its construction costs. “[I]n addition,” JGI and Wiggins agreed that JGI would receive 25% of the billboard rental income, Wiggins failed to pay JGI its share of the rental income, and JGI had also incurred various advertising and maintenance costs that it was entitled to recoup from Wiggins. JGI asserted claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit, and it sought an accounting of all rental income derived from the billboards. Wiggins filed a general denial and counterclaim, in which he alleged that JGI had agreed to act as his agent in connection with renting his billboards, but JGI had misappropriated money, breached its fiduciary duty, and breached the contract. At trial, John Gannon testified that he is the owner and operator of JGI and, in 2001, he and Wiggins engaged in many discussions in which they orally agreed that JGI would build three billboards “at industry cost” for Wiggins on his properties in Kemah. JGI was to handle the leasing and maintenance of the billboards, Wiggins would secure the necessary permits, JGI would be entitled to 25% of the rental income from the billboards after expenses, and Wiggins would be entitled to the remaining 75%. Gannon explained that because JGI was “in the business” to “rent” rather than “build” signs, JGI agreed to construct Wiggins’s billboards “below cost.” Under the “pretty simple” agreement, JGI was to secure clients, place the advertising on the billboards, and authorize repairs and maintenance.
Gannon further testified that the billboards remained on Wiggins’s property, Wiggins was free to sell the billboards, and JGI did not acquire an interest in Wiggins’s property or the billboards. Gannon conceded that “there was no mention” of the business arrangement as being “a long-term deal” and the parties had not discussed their termination rights in the event that they became dissatisfied with the arrangement or the other party’s performance. Gannon stated that it was his “assumption” that Wiggins “would keep these properties for a long period of time.” Pursuant to their agreement, JGI completed construction of the first billboard, referred to as the “restaurant billboard,” in June 2002 and a second billboard, referred to as the “bridge billboard,” in September or October 2002. At some point in 2002, JGI also began construction of a third billboard, referred to as the “park billboard,” and, after encountering permitting problems, JGI completed construction of the park billboard at Wiggins’s instructions. However, Wiggins subsequently instructed JGI to remove the park billboard, and JGI thereafter constructed a tri-faced billboard, referred to as the “2094 billboard,” on another of Wiggins’s properties.
Gannon explained that JGI placed advertising on some of these billboards for Wiggins’s restaurant in the Kemah area, in part, as an attempt to “force” Landry’s restaurants, owner of the Kemah boardwalk and other competitor restaurants, to advertise on Wiggins’s billboards. JGI charged Wiggins for the layout, printing, and placing of advertising for Wiggins’s restaurant on the billboards. Although JGI did not charge Wiggins any rental fees for the advertisements, Gannon thought that JGI should have done so. JGI did furnish invoices to Wiggins for the restaurant, bridge, park and 2094 billboards for total construction and associated costs of $260,000. And Wiggins did pay JGI $150,000, leaving an outstanding balance of $110,000, plus some additional costs.
Gannon also testified that on December 23, 2003, JGI received from Wiggins a letter in which Wiggins stated that he had completed “a deal with Landry’s on the land and the billboards on [his] property in Kemah” and “Landry’s has now changed out” the billboards. Wiggins requested a new bill from JGI reflecting revenues for the restaurant, bridge, and 2094 billboards and credits for materials from the park billboard, which had been removed. Gannon noted that Wiggins had not expressed any dissatisfaction with JGI’s performance under the parties’ business arrangement. At the time that Gannon received Wiggins’s letter, JGI had already reached agreements to lease the 2094, bridge, and restaurant billboards to other clients, and JGI had provided Wiggins with copies of the leases and an accounting of all monies received under these leases. When Gannon went to the billboard sites, he saw that someone had posted “no trespassing” signs and new contact information on the billboards. Gannon believed that Wiggins had breached their agreement, he felt “duped,” and, when he complained to Wiggins, Wiggins told him to file a lawsuit. Gannon had to cancel the lease agreements with his other clients as a result of Wiggins’s new agreement with Landry’s.
On cross-examination, Gannon agreed that he had not provided Wiggins with anything in writing to set forth the construction costs for the billboards. But Gannon explained that he had provided Wiggins with oral estimates, subject to variances, of costs of $35,000 to $45,000 for the restaurant billboard, $85,000 to $90,000 for the bridge billboard, $65,000 for the park billboard, and $75,000 for the 2094 billboard. Gannon also agreed that JGI did not secure its first paying customer for the billboards until August 2003. But he explained that JGI could not secure customers until 2003 because Wiggins had permitting problems and the billboards did not have electricity for lighting. Gannon further agreed that JGI had not provided Wiggins with any statements reflecting rental amounts paid by third parties. But he explained that JGI had previously split the advertising revenues from the billboards by providing Wiggins with credits for costs associated with the billboards.
Wiggins testified that in 2001, Gannon offered to construct the restaurant and park billboards for $25,000 to $30,000 each and Wiggins accepted the offer. Wiggins understood that JGI would be making a profit from building the billboards, and they had not discussed any business arrangement in which JGI would rent the billboards. After JGI completed the restaurant billboard, Wiggins instructed it to place on it advertising for Wiggins’s restaurant. JGI then commenced construction of the park billboard, but the City of Kemah eventually challenged the construction of the park billboard. In July 2002, Wiggins agreed to donate the land on which the park billboard sat to Kemah, and, in exchange, Kemah provided Wiggins with permits for constructing the 2094 and bridge billboards.
Wiggins stated that JGI had provided him with cost estimates of $60,000 to $90,000 to construct the bridge billboard and $40,000 to $50,000 to construct the 2094 billboard. After Wiggins had agreed to pay these construction costs, Gannon and Wiggins, for the first time, discussed an agreement to split revenue from any lease agreements for the billboards that JGI brought to Wiggins. Wiggins stated that any such lease agreements were subject to the availability of the billboards and he was entitled to advertise his own businesses on his billboards without paying rent to JGI. Wiggins explained that he and Gannon had not agreed to, or even discussed, a duration of this business arrangement or how to handle the situation of one party becoming “unhappy with the arrangement.” Rather, the business arrangement would last “as long as it worked,” and he denied that the parties intended for the arrangement to last for as long as he owned the billboards.
JGI began building the bridge billboard in August 2002 and sent Wiggins an invoice totaling approximately $270,000 for construction costs for all four billboards. Wiggins noted that the invoiced amounts for the bridge and restaurant billboards were “close” to JGI’s original estimates, but the amount for the park billboard quote was not “close” to the original estimate. At the time, the 2094 board was not constructed, so Wiggins did not consider that portion of the invoice. After Wiggins discussed the invoice with Gannon, JGI submitted a revised bill for approximately $260,000. Wiggins then paid JGI $150,000 ($30,000 for the restaurant billboard, $30,000 for the park billboard, and $90,000 for the bridge billboard), which is what Wiggins believed he had originally agreed to pay for these billboards. JGI began building the 2094 billboard shortly thereafter and completed it in November 2002.
Wiggins further testified that he personally rented one face of the 2094 billboard to a third party and he did not share that revenue with JGI because that was not part of their agreement. Wiggins complained that JGI had in the Kemah area other billboards, which “were full” of advertising, but his billboards were not. He noted that JGI had never requested permission to place signs on the billboards advertising that JGI was renting them, and, when he inquired about the lack of advertising that JGI was bringing to the billboards, Gannon told him that “things were a little bit slow.” Wiggins believed that the bridge billboard had electricity for lighting in September 2002, the restaurant board in January 2003, and the 2094 board in March 2003.
In August 2003, Wiggins informed Gannon that he was getting a “deal” with Landry’s and, as a result, his restaurant and bridge billboards would not be available for leasing. Although Wiggins denied putting “no trespassing” signs on any of his billboards, he had no further communication with JGI after he sent it his December 2003 letter. Wiggins assumed that JGI would continue to try to sell advertising for the tri-faced 2094 billboard because he had not told JGI that their arrangement in regard to the 2094 billboard was over. JGI did not procure any additional business for the 2094 billboard, and Wiggins continued to try to personally sell advertising for it.
At the time that he had sent the December 23, 2003 letter, Wiggins understood that JGI was claiming an outstanding balance of $110,000, but Wiggins believed he only owed JGI $50,000 for the construction of the 2094 billboard, plus other costs for the installation of vinyls on the boards. He noted that there were additional, outstanding accounting issues, including his claim of a credit for salvaged materials used on the park billboard as well as his claim for his percentage of the rental revenues from the billboards as JGI had never paid him any of the rental revenue from the billboards. In May 2005, Wiggins received a letter from JGI stating that he still owed it approximately $116,000 for the billboards.
On cross-examination, Wiggins agreed that he owed JGI money, but he did not know how much. He noted that the parties disputed the reasonableness of the amount claimed for the construction costs and other costs, and he had previously complained to Gannon that the price that JGI was charging for the 2094 billboard was different than the agreed price. Wiggins also agreed that he had leased to Landry’s the properties and all the improvements on the land on which the park and restaurant billboards were located and, under the lease, he could not do anything to the properties. Wiggins explained that he had entered into the lease with Landry’s to settle an unrelated lawsuit concerning other properties in the Kemah area. He noted that the billboards were not a major part of his lease with Landry’s and the lease actually covered real properties in the Kemah area.
After the closing of the evidence, the trial court, in its charge, submitted to the jury the following question:
QUESTION NO. 1
Did JGI and Wiggins intend to bind themselves to an agreement that included the following terms:
a. An estimated price for the construction of four billboards in Kemah, Texas and the removal of one of them in 2002; and
b. JGI would rent the billboards and would pay 75% of net advertising revenues to Wiggins keeping 25% of such revenues for itself; and
c. The duration of this agreement was to be so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.
ANSWER: YES
The trial court also submitted a series of four questions predicated upon a “Yes” answer to the first question, asking whether (1) Wiggins failed to comply with the agreement, (2) JGI failed to comply with the agreement, (3) Wiggins’s failure to comply was excused by JGI’s previous failure to comply with a material obligation of the same agreement, and (4) JGI’s failure to comply was excused by Wiggins’s previous failure to comply with a material obligation of the same agreement. The jury found that both Wiggins and JGI failed to comply with the agreement and that neither party’s failure was excused.
The trial court then submitted, and the jury answered as indicated, the following damages questions:
QUESTION NO. 6
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate JGI for its damages, if any, that resulted from Wiggins’s failure to comply with the Contract.
Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.
The amount owed to JGI, if any, for construction and demolition costs of the billboards.
The amount owed to JGI, if any, as compensation for its portion of rental income generated by the billboards.
. . . .
a. Construction/demolition costs sustained in the past:
ANSWER: $123,418
b. Rental income sustained in the past
ANSWER: $14,447.16
QUESTION NO. 7
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Wiggins for his damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such conduct?
Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.
The value of the materials salvaged from the removal of the park billboard.
The amount of rental income due to Wiggins from the income collected by JGI between September 2002 and March 2004.
. . . .
a. Value of materials from park billboard sustained in the past:
ANSWER: $0
b. Unpaid rental income sustained in the past
ANSWER: $34,367.48
These damages questions were predicated on the jury’s finding that the parties’ failed to comply with the agreement and the failures were not excused.
JGI subsequently filed its motion for entry of a judgment on the jury’s verdict. Wiggins then filed its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, contending that the evidence presented at trial established that there was no agreement as to the duration of any business arrangement between JGI and Wiggins. Wiggins asserted that the trial court should disregard the jury’s finding in question number one that JGI and Wiggins intended to bind themselves to an agreement that included a term that “the duration of the agreement was to be so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.” Wiggins requested that the trial court enter a take-nothing judgment in its favor. Wiggins’s motion was overruled by operation of law.
The trial court granted JGI’s motion for entry on the jury’s verdict and entered its final judgment, awarding JGI actual damages from Wiggins in the amount of $103,497.68.
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
In his first issue, Wiggins, as cross-appellant, argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was no enforceable contract between the parties, who had not agreed upon the “essential terms” of the duration or of the manner of termination of their agreement. Wiggins asserts that there is no evidence to support the jury’s finding that JGI and Wiggins “intend[ed] to bind themselves to an agreement” with a duration for “so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.”
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper when a directed verdict would have been proper. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1991). We review both the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence as “no evidence” points of error. Steinberg v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 180 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). We will sustain a legal sufficiency or “no-evidence” challenge if the record shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, a court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. Id. at 822. If the evidence allows only one inference, neither jurors nor the reviewing court may disregard it. Id. However, if the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions, then jurors must be allowed to do so. Id. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
We initially note that the record supports the jury’s finding (under subpart a of that question) that JGI provided Wiggins with an estimated price for the construction of four billboards and the removal of one of those billboards and that Wiggins agreed to pay JGI the construction and other associated costs. In fact, Wiggins agreed that he owed JGI an outstanding amount for these construction and other costs, although he disputed the amounts claimed. The record also supports the jury’s finding (under subpart b of question number one) that JGI and Wiggins agreed to share advertising revenues derived from these billboards and that JGI would rent the billboards and would pay 75% of the net advertising revenues to Wiggins and keep 25% of such revenues for itself. Again, Wiggins agreed that JGI would be entitled to 75% of any net advertising revenues from business that JGI brought to the billboards, although the parties disputed whether this was an exclusive business arrangement. Thus, the jury’s findings that the parties “intend[ed] to bind themselves to an agreement” to the terms set forth in subparts a and b of question number one are supported by legally sufficient evidence.
However, the submitted question, in subpart c, further asked the jury to determine whether the duration of the agreement between JGI and Wiggins “was to be so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.” More significantly, as explained below, the jury’s award of damages, and the resulting judgment entered in favor of JGI, was predicated upon an affirmative finding by the jury that the duration of the agreement “was to be so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.”
In his testimony, Gannon conclusively established, contrary to the jury’s finding, that the parties did not intend to enter into their business arrangement regarding revenue sharing for “so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.” During Gannon’s testimony, the following exchange occurred:
[Wiggins’s counsel]: Back to this agreement that you testified. . . . Did you go back any make any notes and write down what the terms of the agreement were?
[Gannon]: No. I can remember that much. It’s 25, 75.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: Were there any other terms of the agreement other than what you testified about?
[Gannon]: No. It’s pretty simple.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: So, counsel said that Mr. Wiggins was to own the boards?
[Gannon]: That’s correct.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: And he was free to — I assume he was free to sell them to whoever he wanted to if he decided to sell them?
[Gannon]: I assume so.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: He could have sold these boards after they were constructed you wouldn’t have had a complaint about it?
[Gannon]: I would have had a severe complaint with that.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: But these were his boards?
[Gannon]: I’m not in the business to build boards. I’m in the business to build faces. The only reason we did this was for the income stream in the future. I mean that’s one thing we need to clear up.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: . . . I’m just wondering you told us all the terms to this agreement. Was there any discussion between you and Mr. Wiggins of that fact that as far as you were concerned he wasn’t free, even though he owned the boards, he was paying you to build them, he was not free to sell them to somebody else without running into problems with you.
[Gannon]: Matt owned these properties where these signs were build. And Matt had not sold any property down there. He had just been buying. So my assumption again is that he would keep these properties for a long period of time.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: . . . .That was your assumption that this would be a long term deal?
[Gannon]: That’s correct.
[Wiggins’s counsel]: What I’m asking you was there an agreement? Was there specifically an agreement that this would be a specific long-term deal.
[Gannon]: No. There was no mention of that.
(Emphasis added.) Gannon also agreed that the parties had no discussion of what would happen in the event that JGI defaulted under the agreement or how a party to the agreement could terminate the agreement if it was dissatisfied with the other party’s performance.
Wiggins also testified that the parties had not agreed, or even discussed, how long the business arrangement would last. He did not provide Gannon with any guarantee that the agreement would last a certain period of time, and Gannon never asked for any such guarantee. Rather, Wiggins testified that he intended the agreement to last “as long as it worked.” Thus, the trial testimony of both parties reveals that they had not agreed to a long-term deal and, more relevant to the wording of jury question number one, there is no evidence that the agreement was to last “as long as Wiggins owned the billboards.”
Based upon the surrounding circumstances, the understandings of the parties, and the subject matter of the contract, JGI asserts that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the “implied duration” of the agreement was for as long as Wiggins owned the billboards. It further asserts that “both parties understood the agreement to be an ongoing contract.”
Texas courts have explained that the lack of a specific duration term in an agreement “does not necessarily suggest that the parties did not enter into an enforceable agreement.” Cytogenix, Inc. v. Waldroff, 213 S.W.3d 479, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet denied) (quoting O’Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)). If an agreement does not provide a “time for performance,” “the law may imply a reasonable one if the contract is ‘sufficiently definite for a court to be able to fix the time when it can be enforced.’” Id. (citing Moore v. Dilworth, 142 Tex. 538, 543, 179 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1944); O’Farrill Avila, 974 S.W.2d at 245). For example, a reasonable duration may be implied when an “agreement contemplates that one party will make substantial expenditures or other investments in accordance with performance.” O’Farrill Avila, 974 S.W.2d at 245. Courts may examine the surrounding circumstances to determine the intended duration of a contract, “so long as a standard exists by which one can test performance.” Cytogenix, Inc., 213 S.W.3d at 486; see also Metromarketing Servs., Inc. v. HTT Headwear, Ltd., 15 S.W.3d 190, 195–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (stating that courts may imply reasonable duration “from all the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the agreement, the situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the contract”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) (1981) (“The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.”).
Here, however, there is a complete lack of evidence supporting any “implied duration” found by the jury. There is no evidence that either party entered into the agreement intending to bind Wiggins to a revenue-sharing relationship with JGI for “so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.” Such a term could have potentially established an extremely lengthy commitment from Wiggins. Yet, the only evidence even remotely related to such a finding was Gannon’s testimony that he “assumed” that he had a “long-term” deal with Wiggins. However, Gannon, in no uncertain terms, testified that he and Wiggins did not have any discussions about such a “long-term” deal. More importantly, he provided no evidence that their agreement was to last for “as long as Wiggins owned the billboards,” which is what the jury was required to find in order to answer question number one affirmatively. In fact, not only is there no evidence to support the jury’s implied duration finding, but the evidence presented conclusively established that the parties did not agree to a revenue-sharing agreement for “so long as Wiggins owned the billboards.” As noted above, an affirmative finding to subpart c was necessary in order for the jury to make an affirmative finding to question number one. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s answer to question number one and the trial court erred in denying Wiggins’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
We sustain Wiggins’s first issue.
Excluding evidence of Landry’s Lease
In its first and second issues, JGI argues that the trial court erred in excluding “any evidence of future damages associated with the parties’ contract and related to the lease” between Wiggins and Landry’s and in denying its request for a continuance “because the billboards were guaranteed to be in use for 40 years” under Wiggins’s lease with Landry’s and “JGI was entitled to a portion of the revenue attributable to the boards.”
During voir dire, JGI explained to the venire panel that, at trial, it would be seeking 25% of the net revenues associated with the billboards for a 40-year term, based upon the fact that it had obtained a copy of Wiggins’s lease with Landry’s and had learned that the lease provided for monthly payments of $16,666 per month for 40 years. JGI further explained that it believed that it was entitled to a present value figure of approximately $2.1 million, which it calculated to be 25% of the net revenues from the billboards for the lease term. Following voir dire, Wiggins objected to any attempt by JGI to introduce evidence of damages exceeding the amounts disclosed in JGI’s responses to requests for disclosure, which were approximately $151,000. The trial court sustained Wiggins’s objection, precluding JGI from presenting evidence that it was entitled to future revenues for the 40 year term set forth in the Landry’s lease. The trial court also denied JGI’s request for a continuance.
The record reveals that the trial court sustained Wiggins’s objection to JGI’s attempts to introduce evidence that it sustained approximately $2 million in damages on the ground that JGI had not timely supplemented its discovery responses to reflect such a dramatic change in the damages it was seeking. A party may request disclosure of “the amount and any method of calculating economic damages.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(d). “A party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response in a timely manner may not introduce in evidence the material or information that was not timely disclosed, . . . unless the court finds that: (1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response; or (2) the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a). The party seeking to introduce the evidence bears the burden of establishing good cause or the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice, and such a finding must be supported by the record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(b). The trial court has the discretion to determine whether the party has met its burden. Brunelle v. TXVT Ltd. P’ship, 198 S.W.3d 476, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). If a party seeking to introduce the evidence fails to carry the burden, “the court may grant a continuance or temporarily postpone the trial to allow a response to be made, amended, or supplemented, and to allow opposing parties to conduct discovery regarding any new information presented by that response.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(c).
We hold that because JGI failed to meet its burden of establishing good cause or the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice, the trial court did not err in excluding JGI’s damages evidence. Prior to voir dire, JGI never disclosed that it would be seeking lost revenues of approximately $2 million based upon the argument that it was entitled to share revenues for a deal spanning four decades. As explained above, such an argument would have been contrary to the evidence that JGI and Wiggins had, at most, an ongoing business arrangement for revenue sharing. The evidence presented at trial provided no basis to support JGI’s argument that it was entitled to seek damages based upon the 40-year model. Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying JGI’s motion for continuance.
We overrule JGI’s first and second issues.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Wiggins.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Bland.