Opinion issued May 20, 2010.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-09-01034-CV
MAYUKO MARTIN, Appellant
V.
TIMOTHY E. MARTIN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 328th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 01-DCV-121342
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mayuko Martin brings this appeal to challenge the trial court’s October 23, 2009 dismissal without prejudice of her motion for temporary relief concerning the custody arrangements between herself and her former husband for their child. Those custody arrangements are decreed in a final order that the trial court signed July 28, 2004. The same final order was the subject of Martin’s other recent appeal, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on June 25, 2009.
In a December 22, 2009 order, we informed Martin that the October 23 order did not appear to be appealable and allowed her thirty days to provide a supplemental record demonstrating its appealability before dismissing the case. Since then, a supplemental clerk’s record has been filed, and Martin has filed an additional notice of appeal under this case number, this time from the trial court’s February 11, 2010 order. Although the record does not contain a February 11, 2010 order, the trial court’s docket sheet reflects that on February 11, 2010, the trial court granted a continuance and set trial to commence on June 1, 2010.
Temporary orders may be appealed only when expressly permitted by statute. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 109.001–.003 (Vernon 2002) (permitting any party to suit to appeal final order “when allowed under this section or under other provisions of law”). As we explained in our ruling dismissing Martin’s prior appeal, temporary orders under the Texas Family Code generally are not independently subject to interlocutory appeal.[1] Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001(e) (Vernon 2006) (stating temporary orders in suits affecting parent-child relationship are not subject to interlocutory appeal); see Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991); Chalu v. Shamala, 125 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
Neither the October 23, 2009 order nor the February 11, 2010 order disposes of any parties or claims. They are thus not appealable. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in record, except as necessary to carry out decree). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.[2] All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Hanks, Bland, and Wilson.[3]
[1] The Texas Family Code authorizes interlocutory appeal only for orders appointing a receiver. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.507 (Vernon 2006).
[2] Parties who represent themselves pro se must comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedure and are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. 1978); Kanow v. Brownshadel, 691 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). Thus, the filing of frivolous appeals, whether by attorneys or pro se litigants, may lead to sanctions. See Tex. R. App. P. 45.
[3] The Honorable Davie L. Wilson, retired Justice, First Court of Appeals, participating by assignment.