UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4901
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDWARD CLINTON JONES, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (2:14-cr-00342-RMG-1)
Submitted: July 31, 2015 Decided: September 3, 2015
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Nathan S. Williams,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Clinton Jones, III, appeals the 151-month sentence
imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to
solicitation of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
373, 1958 (2012), and use of interstate commerce facilities in
the commission of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1958. On appeal, Jones contends that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable, that the district court erred in
failing to sua sponte order a mental competency hearing, and
that the court improperly delegated judicial authority in
imposing a special condition of supervised release. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Jones first contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court abused its discretion
during sentencing by failing to explain its reasons for denying
his motion for a downward variance. In reviewing a sentence, we
must ensure that the district court did not commit any
“significant procedural error,” such as failing to properly
calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In explaining its sentence, the district
court is not required to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s
every subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345
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(4th Cir. 2006). However, the court “must place on the record
an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular facts of
the case before it. This individualized assessment need not be
elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a rationale tailored
to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit
‘meaningful appellate review.’” United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50)
(internal citation and footnote omitted)).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the 151-month sentence. The court
thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors in finding that a
within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate and provided an
adequate explanation for the sentence imposed upon balancing
those factors. Moreover, the record reflects that the court
adequately considered Jones’ arguments for a downward variance
but found those mitigating factors insufficient to warrant a
below-Guidelines sentence.
Jones next contends that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to sua sponte order a mental competency
hearing. The district court must sua sponte order a competency
hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
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proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). “Reasonable cause may be
established through evidence of irrational behavior, the
defendant’s demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning
the defendant’s competence.” United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d
583, 592-93 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The mere presence of mental illness is not, however, “equated
with incompetence.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Competency turns on “whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court did not err in failing to sua
sponte order a competency hearing. See United States v. Dreyer,
705 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “a district
court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing on its own
motion will always be subject to plain error review”); see also
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013)
(providing standard for plain error review). The record
reflects no indication that Jones acted irrationally or
inappropriately at any point during the proceedings. The
district court was aware of Jones’ mental conditions and
medications, and the court adequately inquired into Jones’
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understanding of the proceedings. “Whether reasonable cause
exists is a question left to the sound discretion of the
district court.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion
in this case.
Finally, Jones contends that the district court violated
Article III of the Constitution by delegating its judicial
authority to the probation officer to determine whether mental
health treatment would be a condition of supervised release. A
probation officer has the authority to “manage aspects of
sentences and to supervise . . . persons on supervised release
with respect to all conditions imposed by the court.” United
States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995). A court
may not, however, delegate to a probation officer a judicial
function, as such a delegation violates Article III of the
Constitution. Id. at 808-09. “To determine if a court
improperly delegated the judicial authority of sentencing,
[courts] have drawn a distinction between the delegation to a
probation officer of a ministerial act or support service and
the ultimate responsibility of imposing the sentence.” United
States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the court makes the
determination of whether a defendant must abide by a condition,
it is permissible to delegate to the probation officer the
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details of where and when the condition will be satisfied.” Id.
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err in imposing
on Jones the special condition of supervised release requiring
mental health treatment. The court unequivocally ordered that
Jones undergo mental health treatment as a condition of his
supervised release and tasked the officer with the authority to
determine the type of treatment necessary to fulfill the
condition, a purely ministerial function. Thus, the court did
not violate Article III.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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