COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-02-119-CV
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, MOBIL APPELLANTS
PRODUCING TEXAS & NEW MEXICO, INC.,
MOBIL CORTEZ PIPELINE, INC. AND
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; AND SHELL
CORTEZ PIPELINE COMPANY, SHELL OIL
COMPANY, SWEPI LP D/B/A SHELL WESTERN
E&P, KINDER MORGAN CO2 COMPANY,
L.P., AND KINDER MORGAN, G.P., INC.
V.
FIRST STATE BANK OF DENTON, IN ITS APPELLEES
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MAUDE
RAGLAND, DECEASED; AND THE CLASS OF
ALL ROYALTY INTEREST OWNERS FROM
AUGUST 24, 1982 TO DATE UNDER LEASES
TO DEFENDANTS IN ANY OIL, GAS, OR
MINERAL PROPERTY THAT BECAME UTILIZED
BY VIRTUE OF THE MCELMO DOME UNIT
AGREEMENT; AND JOSEPHINE ORR REDDY
AND EASTWOOD CAPITAL, LTD.
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FROM THE PROBATE COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In this interlocutory appeal, appellants complain of the statutory probate court’s class certification order, contending that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order.2 Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because it is moot. We will dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction as moot.
During the pendency of the appeal, appellees filed a motion in the probate court to vacate the class certification order based on the preclusive effect of a final federal court judgment. The probate court granted appellees’ motion to vacate, decertified the class, and ordered the class aspects of the underlying case dismissed.3 Thus, the dispositive substantive disputes in this appeal have been rendered moot, and we have no jurisdiction to address the merits of the probate court’s subject matter jurisdiction.4 Accordingly, we grant appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction as moot.
JOHN
CAYCE
CHIEF
JUSTICE
PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and WALKER, JJ.
DELIVERED: July 29, 2004
NOTES
1. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of class certification order).
3. See Tex. R. App. P. 29.5 (providing that, while appeal from interlocutory order is pending, trial court retains jurisdiction over case and may dissolve order appealed from).
4. See Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000) (holding that appellate court has no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinion once dispute on appeal becomes moot); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (holding that case becomes moot if at any stage there ceases to be an actual controversy between the parties).