COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-017-CR
ROY STANLEY SPINDOR APPELLANT
V.
STATE
THE STATE OF TEXAS
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FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. Introduction
In two points, Appellant Roy Stanley Spindor appeals his sentence of
eight years’ confinement, contesting the revocation of his community
supervision on a Driving While Intoxicated (DWI)-Subsequent Offense case. We
affirm.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
As part of a DWI plea agreement entered into in March 1999, Spindor
was placed on ten years’ community supervision. The trial court ordered
Spindor to comply with the following conditions: commit no offense against
federal or state laws, abstain from the use of alcohol, and drive only vehicles
equipped with an ignition interlock device.
In December 2005, the State filed a motion to revoke Spindor’s
community supervision, alleging that Spindor had violated the terms and
conditions of his community supervision. Specifically, the State listed the
following violations resulting from a traffic stop: failure to abstain from the use
of alcohol, DWI, and failure to drive a vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock
device. At the hearing, officers that were present at the traffic stop testified
that Spindor’s vehicle did not have an ignition interlock device. The trial court
found that Spindor had violated the terms and conditions of his community
supervision by drinking alcohol, DWI, and driving a vehicle not equipped with
an ignition interlock device. Consequently, the trial court revoked his
community supervision and sentenced him to eight years’ confinement. This
appeal followed.
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III. Revocation of Community Supervision
A. Standard of Review
We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of
discretion standard. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984); Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In
a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community
supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett
v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Allbright
v. State, 13 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d). Proof
by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged violations of the
conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a revocation order.
Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980);
Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
B. Analysis
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In his first point, Spindor complains that the trial court erred by admitting
into evidence statements made by him to his community supervision officer
while in custody regarding Spindor’s alcohol consumption. In his second point,
Spindor argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his oral
request for a continuance to secure expert testimony regarding Spindor’s
intoxication level. Because proof of only one violation is sufficient to support
a revocation order and because neither of Spindor’s points challenges, directly
or indirectly, the trial court’s finding with regard to the ignition interlock device
violation, we overrule both points and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BOB MCCOY
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 2, 2008
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