COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-321-CR
TERENCE STANLEY SMITH APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Introduction
Appellant Terence Stanley Smith appeals his conviction for driving while
intoxicated. In his only point, appellant claims that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress evidence gathered subsequent to the initial
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… See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
traffic stop on the grounds that the arresting officer had no probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to stop or detain him. We affirm.
Background Facts
In the early hours of March, 25, 2006, Roanoke Police Officer William
Taylor stopped at an intersection behind appellant’s vehicle. At the stop light,
Officer Taylor noticed that all three brake lamps on appellant’s vehicle were
activated but that when the light turned green and the vehicle began to move
forward, two of the lights deactivated while the driver’s side brake lamp
remained illuminated. Officer Taylor believed that the condition of the brake
lamp was a traffic violation and posed a possible traffic hazard, and he
immediately stopped appellant’s vehicle to inform him that the light was not
working properly. The resulting interaction betw een Officer Taylor and
appellant led to appellant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the
initial stop, contending that Officer Taylor stopped him without reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause to believe that he was engaged
in criminal activity. At the suppression hearing, appellant testified that prior to
the stop and arrest, he replaced the bulb for the driver’s side turn signal on his
vehicle. Appellant explained that his vehicle was a European model BMW 318i
that required European bulbs in his tail lights. Because the store did not carry
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the European bulb his car required, he used an American bulb that operated at
a higher wattage. Consequently, the higher wattage bulb in the driver’s side
tail light constantly burned brighter than the other lights and made the brake
light below it appear to be constantly illuminated.
After the trial court took judicial notice that appellant’s vehicle was
required by federal law to have three operational brake lights, the court
concluded that Officer Taylor did have probable cause to initiate the traffic stop
under his reasonable belief that the defective light was a traffic violation.
Accordingly, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. After the
trial court overruled his motion to suppress, appellant changed his plea to guilty,
and the trial court assessed a punishment at 180 days’ confinement, probated
for twelve months, and a $500.00 fine.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under
a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own
factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no
pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the
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witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214
S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853,
855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195
S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, we give almost total
deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if
the trial court’s determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn
on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673;
Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when
application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor
of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de
novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19.
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We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact
findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling.
Id. at 819.
When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or
when there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested
findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact
findings that would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. Id.; see
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the
trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by
the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.
We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and
correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court
gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W .3d 401, 404 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).
Constitutionality of Traffic Stops
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials. U.S. C ONST. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d
at 24. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment
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violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that
rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672.
A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure
occurred without a warrant. Id. Once the defendant has made this showing,
the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then required to establish that
the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was reasonable.
See T EX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC. A NN. arts. 18.01, 18.04 (Vernon 2005 & Supp.
2008) (providing requirements for issuance of a search warrant); Amador, 221
S.W.3d at 672–73; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Whether a search is reasonable is a question of law that we review de
novo. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 63. It requires a balancing of the public interest and the individual’s right
to be free from arbitrary detentions and intrusions. Id. A search conducted
without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the
“specifically defined and well-established” exceptions to the warrant
requirement. McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1004 (2003); see Best, 118 S.W.3d at 862.
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A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than
probable cause if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on
specific, articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1880 (1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he or she has
reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Ford, 158
S.W.3d at 492. Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that when combined
with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably
conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
criminal activity. Id. This is an objective standard that disregards any
subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an
objective basis for the stop exists. Id.
Therefore, in stopping vehicles for an investigative detention based on a
traffic violation, the State need not prove that the detainee actually committed
a traffic violation. Drago v. State, 553 S.W .2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977); De Los Santos v. State, No. 02-07-00135-CR, 2008 WL 1777988, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication). The State must only show that the officer reasonably
suspected that the driver was committing a traffic violation. De Los Santos,
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2008 WL 1777988, at *3. If the State establishes reasonable suspicion, then
the stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment even if, upon further
investigation, it is discovered that no traffic violation actually occurred. See
Drago, 553 S.W.2d at 377; De Los Santos, 2008 WL 1777988, at *3.
Applicable Law
The pertinent portion of Texas Transportation Code section 547.323
provides that:
(d) A stoplamp shall emit a red or amber light, or a
color between red and amber, that is:
(1) visible in normal sunlight at a distance of at least
300 feet from the rear of the vehicle; and
(2) displayed when the vehicle service brake is applied.
T EX. T RANSP. C ODE A NN. § 547.323 (Vernon 1999). Additionally, an operator
may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of the vehicle without first giving
a stop signal by lighting signal lamps. Id. § 545.105–06 (Vernon 1999).
Texas law also requires vehicles to comply with federal standards.
Id.§ 547.3215 (Vernon 1999). Federal standards require cars less than eighty
inches wide to have three stoplamps on the rear of the car. See Starrin v.
State, No. 02-04-00360-CR, 2005 WL 3343875, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Dec. 8, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The trial
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court took judicial notice that because appellant’s car was less than eighty
inches wide, it was required to have three operational brake lights.
Discussion
In his sole point, appellant complains that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop because Officer
Taylor had neither probable cause that he had been, or was about to be
involved in criminal activity nor reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot. Specifically, appellant contends that the only issue is whether he
committed a “ticketable” traffic offense because his rear brake lamp remained
continually illuminated. However, the issue here is not whether appellant
committed a traffic violation; rather, the issue is whether Officer Taylor had
reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for a traffic offense. See Drago, 553
S.W.2d at 377; De Los Santos, 2008 WL 1777988, at *3.
Officers have authority to stop and briefly detain persons who are
suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally
required for probable cause to arrest. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Tucker v. State, 183 S.W.3d 501, 508 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Temporary investigative detentions are
appropriate when officers have “specific articulable facts, which, premised upon
[the officer’s] experience and personal knowledge, when coupled with logical
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inferences from those facts would warrant the intrusion on the detainee.”
Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244; Tucker, 183 S.W.3d at 508. A police officer has
the authority to stop and temporarily detain a driver who has violated a traffic
law. Armitage v. State, 637 S.W .2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);
Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet.
ref’d). Further, because a violation of the traffic laws constitutes probable
cause to arrest the violator, the need for reasonable suspicion to stop the driver
is obviated. See T EX. T RANSP. C ODE A NN. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999); Lemmons,
133 S.W.3d at 756; State v. Ayala, 981 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1998, pet. ref’d).
Appellant argues that his vehicle did not violate transportation code
section 547.323 because the three required brake lamps on his vehicle
activated and deactivated as required by law. See T EX. T RANSP. C ODE A NN.
§ 547.323. Appellant testified that the driver’s side brake light only appeared
to be constantly illuminated when the service brake was deactivated because
of a high wattage turn-signal light that continuously shone through the brake
light. However, Officer Taylor testified that he stopped the vehicle because it
appeared that the driver’s side brake light was constantly illuminated and,
therefore, presented a roadway hazard because of a malfunction. Whether the
stop was based on the actual malfunction of the driver’s side brake light or
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merely the appearance of the brake light’s malfunction is inconsequential
because the relevant part of the statute states that a “stoplamp shall emit” the
requisite light “when the vehicle service brake is applied.” See id. Thus, the
function of the brake light is to signal that the vehicle is stopping when it is, in
fact, stopping. If the vehicle’s brake lights are continuously lit, or appear to be
continuously lit, then the vehicle cannot properly indicate when it is actually
stopping. See State v. Fleming, 84 F. App’x 396, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1018 (2004) (not designated for publication) (holding
that probable cause existed when the officer stopped a driver whose brake
lights were constantly illuminated in violation of Texas Transportation Code
section 547.323).
A brake light that is constantly on and that cannot signal when the
vehicle is braking does not comply with transportation code section 547.323.
See T EX. T RANSP. C ODE A NN . § 547.323; Fleming, 84 F. App’x at 396–97.
Because Officer Taylor had a reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic violation
was occurring when he observed the vehicle’s defective brake lights, the
decision to stop the vehicle was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. See Fleming, 84 F. App’x at 396–97. We hold that the trial
court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress and overrule his sole
point.
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Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
JUSTICE
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON, and HOLMAN, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 14, 2008
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