COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-080-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF S.A.A., H.C.A., AND L.S.A.
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FROM THE 231ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Scott A. Akin attempts to appeal from an order granting
attorney’s fees to V. Wayne Ward, who filed a petition in intervention in
Appellant’s original action. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Ward intervened in October 2007, seeking fees for legal services that he
claimed Appellant had not paid.2 On February 13, 2008, the trial court signed
an order entitled, “FINAL JUDGMENT,” in trial court cause number 231-
1
… See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
2
… Appellant asserted that he terminated Ward’s services on July 5,
2007, and did not owe him $11,488.
384629-05, which granted $11,488.00 to Ward as the principal amount, plus
interest. On February 19, on W ard’s motion, the trial court signed an
“ORDER ON MOTION FOR SEVERANCE.” This document ordered that the
intervention be severed from trial court cause number 231-384629-05, “and
made the subject of a separate action, to proceed as such to final judgment or
other disposition in this Court.” The severed action became trial court cause
number 231-434723-08.
On February 27, Appellant filed a document with this court that indicated
his desire to appeal the order granting attorney’s fees in trial court cause
number 231-384629-05. On March 10, we notified the parties that it appeared
that this court lacked jurisdiction because there might not be a final judgment
in the trial court. We based this concern on the language, cited above, that the
trial court used in granting the motion to sever, which it signed six days after
signing the purported final judgment in trial court cause number 231-384629-
05, and which created the separate action under trial court cause number 231-
434723-08.
Our letter also informed the parties that they had until March 31 to
furnish this court with a signed final judgment in trial court cause number 231-
434723-08, and that, if no final judgment had been signed and provided to us
2
by this date, then this attempted appeal would be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
Generally, appellate courts can review only final and appealable
judgments.3 Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001);
Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1985). As a rule, the severance
of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final. Farmer v.
Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). But where,
as here, a severance order expressly contemplates that the severed claims will
“proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in this Court,” a final
judgment is precluded until a later judgment is signed. Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc.
v. Hill, Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex.
2001); see also Thompson v. Beyer, 91 S.W.3d 902, 904 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2002, no pet.) (“As a rule, a severance of an interlocutory judgment into a
severed action makes it final if all claims in the severed action have been
disposed of, unless the order of severance indicates further proceedings are to
be had in the severed action.” (emphasis added))
3
… Certain interlocutory orders may also be appealed. See T EX. C IV. P RAC.
& R EM. C ODE A NN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2007). However, none of those
exceptions to the general rule are applicable to this case.
3
The order from which Appellant attempts to appeal purports to be a final
judgment as to Ward’s intervention, but the language in the subsequent
severance order contradicts that intention. See Diversified Fin. Sys., 63
S.W.3d at 795. Specifically, the severance order’s language, “to proceed as
such to final judgment or other disposition in this Court,” indicates that the trial
court contemplated future action. Id. Therefore, because neither party has
presented us with a final appealable judgment in trial court cause number 231-
434723-08, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 4 See T EX. R. A PP.
P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
PANEL D: MCCOY, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and LIVINGSTON, J.
DELIVERED: May 8, 2008
4
… However, our action should not be construed in a manner that would
prevent Appellant from later pursuing a timely appeal from an actual final
judgment in trial court cause number 231-434723-08.
4