COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NOS. 2-07-118-CR
2-07-119-CR
JUAN MANUEL RAMOS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Juan Manuel Ramos appeals his convictions for possession of
a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon. In four issues,
Ramos challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support
both of his convictions. We will affirm.
1
See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
II. F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND
Detective Moi Tran, a narcotics detective with the Carrollton Police
Department, received intelligence from a school resource officer. The school
resource officer said that someone he knew had gone to a house located at
1826 Kensington Drive in Carrollton and had observed an illegal tattoo parlor
operating in the garage, that a peephole existed from the garage to the outside,
and that drugs were present in the garage. Detective Tran also received
intelligence regarding weapons at the location.
Following up on this information, Detective Tran and other officers
conducted surveillance of the house. The officers noted that most of the
activity at the house occurred late at night. One night, Detective Tran drove
by the house, obtained the license plate numbers of the vehicles parked at the
house, and ran them to see whom the vehicles were registered to. Detective
Tran also researched real estate records to determine who owned the house.
She also performed “trash runs” to ascertain whose name was on the mail
received at the house.2
2
Detective Tran testified that once people put trash beside the curb, it is
considered abandoned property. A “trash run” occurs when an officer
confiscates trash placed for pick up in front of a particular house and examines
the contents of the trash.
2
As a result of three trash runs that Detective Tran performed at the
house, she found illegal substances and evidence of narcotics use.3 Based on
the evidence discovered in her trash runs, Detective Tran obtained a search
warrant for the house.
On August 3, 2006, Detective Tran went to execute the no-knock
warrant at the house. She was accompanied by the SWAT team, an
operational support unit working patrol, and a K-9 unit. As the group
approached the house, officers observed a car leaving the house and stopped
it. The driver of the car was Ramos’s wife, Latonya; her younger brother or a
relative was with her in the car. Latonya told the officers that she lived with
Ramos at the house.
The SWAT team entered the house through the front door, using a
breaching ram and throwing multiple flash-bang grenades into the house.
Officers found Ramos and two children in the house.
3
During Detective Tran’s trash run on July 17, 2006, she found a green
leafy substance that tested positive for marijuana, some drawings of tattoos,
and a clear plastic baggie with a blue plastic straw in it. During Detective
Tran’s trash run on July 24, 2006, she found green leafy stems and seeds that
tested positive for marijuana, a burnt joint, a cigarette, and some pictures.
During Detective Tran’s trash run on July 31, 2006, she found personal papers
and mail in the name of Latonya Montoya and Christine Laparo (though no
testimony at trial explained the latter individual’s connection to the house) and
a plastic baggie that contained a white powdery residue that tested positive for
cocaine.
3
When Detective Tran came into the house, she saw that the officers had
Ramos seated in the living room. Because she was assigned as the primary
narcotics agent, she was responsible for doing a walk-through of the residence
to determine the layout of the house, to determine whether there were any
weapons that were exposed or that had been missed by the SWAT team, to
determine whether there were any substances in plain view, and to determine
where everyone was situated so that she could assign an agent to search each
room.
During the search of the house, a K-9 unit alerted on the water heater
closet in the garage near Ramos’s tattoo workstation, and inside the closet
officers found a dusty baggie of cocaine. In that same water heater closet,
officers also found a red straw, which signified to Detective Tran that “they’re
snorting cocaine.” Testing revealed that the net weight of the contents in the
baggie was 0.01 grams and that the substance contained in the baggie was
cocaine. However, no viable fingerprints were obtained from the baggie.
Detective Tran and Officer Sanchez, the K-9 handler, had begun searching
the master bedroom closet for narcotics when Detective Tran was called
outside. W hen Detective Tran returned, Officer Sanchez notified her that he
had located an SKS assault rifle in the master bedroom closet, which was
4
shared by Ramos and his wife. No viable fingerprints were obtained from the
rifle.
The only fingerprints that the State entered into evidence were those
contained in Ramos’s pen packet and those taken by Investigator Jack
Grassman on the day of the trial. Grassman compared the two sets of
fingerprints and found that they matched, concluding that Ramos was the same
person who had been convicted of the felony offense in the pen
packet—unlawful possession of a controlled substance, to-wit, cocaine in June
2001.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Ramos guilty of the
offense of possession of a controlled substance and guilty of the offense of
possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury assessed punishment at 180 days’
confinement for the offense of possession of a controlled substance and at five
years’ confinement for the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. The
trial court sentenced Ramos in accordance with the jury’s recommendations.
This appeal followed.
III. S UFFICIENCY S TANDARDS OF R EVIEW
A. Legal Sufficiency
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order
5
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d
772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The trier of fact is the
sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See T EX. C ODE C RIM.
P ROC. A NN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency review, we
may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W .3d 735,
740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000). Instead, we
“determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the
combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). We must presume that the fact-finder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
6
The sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of
the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.
Malik v. State, 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Bowden v.
State, 166 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). Such
a charge would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Malik, 953
S.W.2d at 240. The law as authorized by the indictment means the statutory
elements of the charged offense as modified by the charging instrument. See
Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence
cases. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
B. Factual Sufficiency
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.
Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v.
State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We then ask whether
the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is
nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder’s determination is clearly wrong and
7
manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the
evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder’s determination is
manifestly unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23
S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To reverse under the second ground,
we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great
weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient,
contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.
In determining whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a
conviction that is nevertheless supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is not
enough that this court “harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to
overturn [the] conviction.” Id. We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly
wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided differently
than the jury or because we disagree with the jury’s resolution of a conflict in
the evidence. Id. We may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-
finder’s. Johnson, 23 S.W .3d at 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result
is appropriate, we must defer to the jury’s determination of the weight to be
given contradictory testimonial evidence because resolution of the conflict
“often turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were
in attendance when the testimony was delivered.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8.
8
Thus, we must give due deference to the fact-finder’s determinations,
“particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the
evidence.” Id. at 9. An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a
discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the
appellant’s complaint on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003).
IV. S UFFICIENCY OF E VIDENCE TO S UPPORT C ONVICTION F OR
P OSSESSION OF C ONTROLLED S UBSTANCE
In his first and second issues, Ramos argues that the evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he possessed the
cocaine found in the water heater closet in the garage because the State failed
to link it to him. Specifically, Ramos contends that the State failed to establish
that he had exclusive control over the garage where the baggie of cocaine
residue was found or that he knew that the package contained cocaine or even
of its presence in the water heater closet.
The State charged Ramos with “possess[ion of] a controlled substance,
to-wit: cocaine, in an amount of less than one (1) gram by aggregate weight
including any adulterants or dilutants.” 4 See T EX. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN.
4
Possession is punishable as a third-degree felony if the amount of the
controlled substance is less than one gram. T EX. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN.
§ 481.115(b) (Vernon 2003).
9
§ 481.115(a) (Vernon 2003). To prove possession of a controlled substance,
the State had to prove that Ramos (1) exercised actual care, custody, control,
or management over the contraband and (2) that he knew the matter possessed
was contraband. See id. §§ 481.002(38), 481.115(a); Deshong v. State, 625
S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Taylor v. State, 106
S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).
The State does not have to prove that the accused had exclusive
possession of the contraband; joint possession is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. See Cude v. State, 716 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
When there is no evidence that the appellant was in exclusive control of the
place where the contraband was found, however, the State must offer
additional, independent facts and circumstances that “link” the accused to the
contraband. See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Deshong, 625 S.W.2d at 329; see also Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d
158, 161 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“We have used that term ‘affirmative
links,’ but we recognize that ‘affirmative’ adds nothing to the plain meaning of
‘link.’ Henceforth, we will use only ‘link’ so that it is clear that evidence of
drug possession is judged by the same standard as all other evidence.”). The
links between Ramos and the contraband must be established by either direct
or circumstantial evidence. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.
10
No formula of facts exists to dictate a finding of links sufficient to support
an inference of knowing possession. See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 830. It is the
logical force of the evidence, and not the number of links, that supports a fact-
finder’s verdict. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 166. Possible links include but are
not limited to the following: (1) whether the defendant was present when the
drugs were found; (2) whether the drugs were in plain view; (3) the defendant’s
proximity to and the accessibility of the drugs; (4) whether the defendant was
under the influence of drugs when arrested; (5) whether the defendant
possessed other contraband or drugs when arrested; (6) whether the defendant
made any incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant
attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether
there was an odor of drugs; (10) whether other contraband or other drug
paraphernalia was present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right
to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place the
drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with
a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant
indicated a consciousness of guilt. Id. at 162 n.12.
In this case, the dusty baggie of cocaine residue that the K-9 unit alerted
to was found after Detective Tran had performed three consecutive trash runs
at 1826 Kensington Drive that confirmed what intelligence had reported—that
11
an illegal tattoo parlor was being operated and that there were drugs present.
Although the testimony at trial did not establish exactly where Ramos was
found in the house when the search warrant was executed, it did establish that
he was the only adult in the house when the drugs were found. Inside the
same water heater closet, near the baggie with cocaine residue, officers located
a plastic straw that they believed to be for use in snorting cocaine. A business
card for the tattoo parlor advertised that Monolo Montoya, a/k/a Manny 5
operated the tattoo parlor located in the house’s garage. Latonya told Detective
Tran that the substances found belonged to Ramos. The enclosed water heater
closet was close to and accessible from the work area Ramos occupied in the
garage tattoo parlor.
Detective Tran testified, however, that she did not see anything on
Ramos’s tattoo work table in the garage that would indicate narcotics use and
that she was told that there were no fingerprints on the baggie.
Although this evidence satisfies less than the full series of indicia listed
above, viewing the evidence in a favorable or neutral light, the foregoing
evidence is sufficient to enable a rational fact-finder to link Ramos—who had
a prior conviction for possession of cocaine—to the cocaine found in the water
5
The record reflects that Ramos used the alias Monolo Montoya, a/k/a
Manny.
12
heater closet in his garage tattoo parlor. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405,
411-12 (concluding that appellant exercised care, custody, control, and
management over the contraband and that appellant knew the substance
possessed was contraband because there was no evidence that would support
a conclusion that appellant was an innocent bystander to someone else’s drug
operations within his own home where officers found cocaine hidden in ceiling
of master bedroom’s linen closet—a secret place that was accessible to
appellant as a resident but not to a casual visitor). We hold that evidence is
legally and factually sufficient to link Ramos to the cocaine residue. See
Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405, 412; Berrum v. State, No. 11-01-00011-CR,
2002 WL 32341848, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 10, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication) (holding that evidence was legally and factually
sufficient to link appellant to cocaine that was found in a closet underneath the
stairs, which was conveniently accessible to appellant); Thompson v. State,
No. 07-99-00403-CR, 2000 WL 987303, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July
18, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that, although
evidence satisfied less than the full series of indicia, evidence was legally
sufficient to link appellant to cocaine found in a space heater in hall closet);
Matthews v. State, No. 01-97-01348-CR, 1999 WL 233510, at *4-5 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 22, 1999, pet. ref’d) (not designated for
13
publication) (holding that evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
support jury’s finding that appellant was guilty of possession of cocaine that
was found in bedroom closet that appellant shared with his wife). Cf. Pierce
v. State, No. 03-06-00492-CR, 2007 WL 4269796, at *15-16 (Tex.
App.—Austin Dec. 5, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication)
(holding that evidence was legally insufficient to connect appellant to
methamphetamine lab at house because evidence revealed that appellant had
moved and was no longer living at residence where lab was found). We
overrule Ramos’s first and second issues.
V. S UFFICIENCY OF E VIDENCE TO S UPPORT C ONVICTION F OR
P OSSESSION OF A F IREARM BY A F ELON
In his third and fourth issues, Ramos argues that the evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he possessed the
firearm that officers found in the master bedroom closet. Specifically, Ramos
contends that there was no evidence that he exercised actual care, control, or
custody of the firearm and that there is no evidence from which the jury could
have determined that he was aware that the firearm was in his closet.
Texas Penal Code section 46.04 provides that a person who has been
convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm after the
conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from
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confinement. T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 46.04 (Vernon Supp. 2007). Ramos
does not challenge the evidence introduced by the State showing that he was
previously convicted of the felony of unlawful possession of cocaine within the
past five years. Instead, he argues only that he did not possess the firearm that
officers found. Our analysis will therefore focus on this narrow argument.
Possession is defined by the penal code as “actual care, custody, control,
or management.” T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
When there is no evidence that the appellant was in exclusive control of the
place where the firearm was found, the State must offer additional,
independent facts and circumstances that link him to the firearm. Smith v.
State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). The links
between Ramos and the firearm may be established by either direct or
circumstantial evidence. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406. In determining
whether sufficient links exist, we examine the same factors we looked to in
connection with Ramos’s first and second issues, such as whether the firearm
was in plain view, whether Ramos owned the premises where the firearm was
found, whether he was in close proximity to the firearm and had ready access
to it or whether it was found on him, whether he attempted to flee, whether his
conduct indicated a consciousness of guilt, whether he had a special
connection to the firearm, whether the firearm was found in an enclosed space,
15
and whether he made incriminating statements. Smith, 176 S.W.3d at 916.
It is the logical force of the factors, not the number of factors present, that
determines whether the elements of the offense have been established. Id.
As mentioned above, while Ramos was detained in the living room,
Detective Tran and Officer Sanchez had begun searching the master bedroom
closet for narcotics when Detective Tran was called outside. Officer Sanchez
thereafter located an SKS assault rifle with no bullets in it and pointed it out to
Detective Tran when she came back inside the house. The evidence did not
reveal the exact location within the master bedroom closet where the rifle was
found, and no viable fingerprints were found on the rifle. Officers noted that
the master bedroom closet contained mail addressed to Latonya as well as
pictures of and mail addressed to Ramos and that there was female clothing on
one side and male clothing on the other side of the closet. 6 Based on these
findings, Detective Tran testified that she believed that Latonya and Ramos
shared the closet. Pictures admitted into evidence showed that the closet was
neat and tidy.
6
Although it was never independently established that the men’s clothing
in the master bedroom closet where the rifle was found was Ramos’s clothing,
there was no suggestion that any other male lived at the house or shared a
closet with Latonya, who had admitted that Ramos was her husband; thus, it
was at least “a” reasonable inference that it was Ramos’s clothing and that he
lived there. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 165.
16
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact
could have found from the foregoing evidence that Ramos possessed the
firearm that officers discovered in the master bedroom closet, which Ramos
shared with his wife. The pictures of the well-organized master bedroom closet
indicated that it would be difficult to conceal an SKS assault rifle from someone
who presumably went into the closet every day to retrieve clothes and shoes.
Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, the evidence that Ramos shared the
closet with his wife and that there were no viable fingerprints on the rifle
slightly controverts the evidence of guilt but is not so weak that the fact-
finder’s determination is clearly wrong and unjust. We therefore hold that the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that Ramos knew of,
exercised control over, and therefore possessed the rifle. See Smith v. State,
No. 12-06-00021-CR, 2007 WL 2178541, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (holding that
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support conviction for unlawful
possession of firearm when pistol was found in plain view in linen closet next
to bedroom where appellant slept); Austin v. State, Nos. 14-00-01389-CR, 14-
00-01390-CR, 2002 WL 370045, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar.
7, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that evidence was
legally and factually sufficient to support conviction for unlawful possession of
17
firearm that officers found in bedroom closet because closet contained mail
addressed to appellant); Holland v. State, Nos. 05-99-00821-CR, 05-99-00822-
CR, 2002 WL 115582, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 30, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not
designated for publication) (holding that evidence was legally sufficient to
support conviction for unlawful possession of firearm that officers found in back
center closet that was accessible to appellant). We overrule Ramos’s third and
fourth issues.
VI. C ONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Ramos’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; HOLMAN and WALKER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 6, 2008
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