COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-284-CR
NO. 2-08-285-CR
ROGER JOHNSON APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 211TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Roger Johnson appeals his conviction for two counts of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver—cocaine in the
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
amount of one gram or more but less than four grams and methamphetamine
in the amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams.2 We will affirm.
II. B ACKGROUND
In February 2006, patrol sergeant Paul Jaworski and officer Eric
Louderback investigated Johnson’s residence because of complaints that
Johnson’s residence had “a lot of traffic” coming “in and out” of it.
Investigators had also received information from Johnson’s wife that Johnson
was using and selling drugs from his residence. After conducting “spot
surveillance” on Johnson’s residence and observing “a number of vehicles
coming and going,” the officers decided to “pull the trash to see . . . what
[they] could find.”
The officers linked multiple trash bags left for waste management to
Johnson’s residence through mail and other publications found in the trash with
Johnson’s name and address on them and a pill bottle with Johnson’s wife’s
name printed on it. The officers also found a number of used and unused
plastic baggies, two broken glass pipes, and almost five grams of
methamphetamine. Jaworski testified that these items were “consistent with
2
… See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112 (Vernon 2003).
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dealing[,] use and sales of narcotics.” The officers then obtained a search
warrant for Johnson’s residence.
In addition to information regarding the complaints, spot surveillance, and
trash pull, the search warrant affidavit for Johnson’s residence alleged that
Johnson, as the person who controls the residence, “has a very long criminal
history and number of known AKA’s. . . . The history involves the states of
Maryland, Pennsylvania and California. The crimes include those involving
narcotics, the manufacture and sale of weapons, robbery, assaults, burglaries
and resisting arrest . . . .” The affidavit also refers to Johnson as “Mark
[Johnson],” “Marcus [Johnson],” and “Roger [Johnson].” The affidavit lists
Johnson’s birth date as March 29, 1954.
Upon execution of the search warrant, police discovered
methamphetamine and cocaine in various locations inside Johnson’s residence,
totaling 10.56 grams methamphetamine and 6.52 grams cocaine, 3 and various
drug paraphernalia. Police also found three guns.
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… The State admits that portions of these drugs were found “in or near
the purse” of a person who was at Johnson’s residence when the warrant was
executed. But the State contends, and Johnson does not dispute, that the
drugs found in the “purse were not necessary to convict [Johnson] of the
charged offenses.”
3
Johnson was indicted in two separate counts for possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver—one count pertaining to the
cocaine and the other pertaining to the methamphetamine. Both indictments
included an enhancement paragraph based on a 1988 robbery conviction in
California. The cases were tried together.
After his arrest and prior to trial, Johnson was represented by at least
four different attorneys. Johnson testified that he fired the previous attorneys
because they had not performed satisfactorily, more specifically, because
“[t]hey just wanted [him] to take a plea.”
On the day of jury voir dire, Johnson’s then-retained trial counsel filed a
motion to withdraw. The record does not reflect whether the trial court ever
ruled on this motion, but Johnson’s trial counsel continued to represent him
throughout Johnson’s trial. Also, before voir dire began, Johnson indicated to
the court that he wanted to file handwritten motions to suppress. The court
instructed Johnson to give his motions to his trial counsel.
Following jury voir dire, the trial court noted that Johnson’s motions to
suppress had been filed and would be carried with the trial, and, if necessary,
the trial court would allow evidence to be heard concerning these motions
outside the jury’s presence. Trial counsel did not object. The motions to
suppress alleged that under Franks v. Delaware, the affidavit supporting the
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search warrant leading to Johnson’s ultimate arrest contained false and
misleading information that, if removed from the affidavit, would have rendered
the affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of Johnson’s
residence. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978).
After the State rested, and outside the presence of the jury, Johnson’s
trial counsel moved for an instructed verdict, which was denied. The trial court
then allowed trial counsel to admit evidence pertaining to Johnson’s motions
to suppress. Trial counsel admitted into evidence documents which he claimed
showed that the police could not have picked up Johnson’s trash on the day
they claimed. Thus, trial counsel argued, under Franks v. Delaware, “the
allegation about the trash run in the search warrant affidavit [is] misleading and
would render the search warrant affidavit . . . untrustworthy, and . . . all of the
evidence [seized at Johnson’s residence] should be suppressed on that theory.”
The trial court denied the motions to suppress.
Still outside the presence of the jury, Johnson’s trial counsel examined
Johnson on the record about his decision to not testify. After extensive
questioning by trial counsel, the trial court also questioned Johnson: “I don’t
care what [trial counsel] told you -- or what you’ve told [your trial counsel] or
what anybody else said. It’s your choice. Do you want to testify or do you not
want to testify?” Johnson replied, “No, sir.”
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A jury found Johnson guilty on both counts and assessed punishment at
fifty-three years’ incarceration for each count. The trial court ordered the
sentences to run concurrently. Johnson filed a motion for new trial, prepared
by his appellate counsel, based on several grounds, including ineffective
assistance of counsel. The trial court conducted a hearing. Johnson,
Jaworsky, Louderback, and Johnson’s trial counsel all testified at the motion
for new trial hearing. Johnson admitted into evidence his handwritten motions
to suppress, a list of questions he allegedly prepared for his trial counsel
pertaining to the indictments’ enhancement paragraphs, and an exhibit from the
waste collection company that serviced Johnson’s residence.
Johnson testified that his trial counsel had initially refused to file his
motions to suppress. Johnson stated that his trial counsel had told him “that
by him filing these motions, I’m saying that everything in the house belonged
to me . . . . Compulsatory (sic) or something. It’s in that letter.” 4 Johnson
also said that there were numerous false statements and inaccuracies that he
had wanted to testify about regarding the search warrant affidavit, including the
4
… Prior to trial, trial counsel corresponded with Johnson by letter
regarding the motions to suppress. In the letter, trial counsel avers that filing
the motions to suppress would be “poor trial strategy” because Johnson might
have to take the stand and possibly either admit to ownership of the drugs or
defeat standing to complain about the drugs by denying ownership.
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date the police collected the trash, the spelling of his name, his criminal history,
and his date of birth. Johnson said that he had wanted to testify at the motion
to suppress hearing, but trial counsel’s “performance of the trial up to that point
forced me [to choose not to testify because] I was scared.” Johnson also said
that his trial counsel had refused to introduce evidence during the punishment
phase, including documentation regarding his drug rehabilitation, attendance
sheets and milestones for alcohol and substance abuse programs, and
information from his employer.
Johnson’s trial counsel testified that he filed various standard pretrial
motions and had examined the State’s file in Johnson’s case. Trial counsel said
that his trial strategy for not wanting to file Johnson’s handwritten motions to
suppress was that some of the information Johnson wanted to address were
“matters within his personal knowledge.” Thus, trial counsel said, his advice
to Johnson was to not file the motions and avoid taking the stand where he
might, through the State’s questioning, be in the quandary of either admitting
to having possessed the drugs or denying possession and creating potential
standing issues. Trial counsel pointed out that Johnson had signified his
compliance with this tactic when he wrote, “I agree” on trial counsel’s memo
to Johnson detailing this reasoning.
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Trial counsel further testified that he did ultimately file the motions to
suppress and, in an attempt to undermine the search warrant affidavit, put on
evidence that indicated that the police did not pick up Johnson’s trash on the
day indicated. Trial counsel also said that Johnson never told him that he
wanted to testify at a Franks hearing. Trial counsel said that it was Johnson’s
choice to not testify during the hearing or at trial. Trial counsel said that he
also put on punishment-mitigating evidence through Johnson’s wife where she
testified that he was a great father, had held down a steady job, and had
attempted to rehabilitate his drug problems. Trial counsel stated, however, that
Johnson never gave him any additional information or documentation about his
attendance sheets and milestones relating to alcohol and substance abuse
programs.
Jaworski testified that he and Louderback picked up Johnson’s trash on
Monday, February 20, 2006, at around 3:00 a.m. Jaworski averred that the
seeming discrepancy between this pick-up time and the document Johnson had
admitted into evidence—which suggested a reported Tuesday, February 21,
2006 trash pickup by the police—was due to when the paperwork was filed.
Jaworski said that he did not provide names of informants or specifically verify
Johnson’s criminal history in the search warrant affidavit because it was his
surveillance of Johnson’s residence and the items collected from Johnson’s
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trash “that led to the probable cause for the search warrant.” Louderback
testified that he assisted Jaworski in the trash pickup and the search of
Johnson’s residence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Johnson’s
testimony was “not credible.” The trial court denied the motions for new trial.
This appeal followed.
III. E FFECTIVE A SSISTANCE OF C OUNSEL
In a single point, Johnson argues that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel in two ways. First, Johnson argues that trial counsel was deficient
by preventing him from adequately challenging the search warrant affidavit
under Franks v. Delaware. Second, Johnson argues that trial counsel failed “to
zealously represent [Johnson] during the punishment phase of the proceedings.”
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords criminal
defendants the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003);
Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1195 (2003). We apply a two-pronged test to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, including challenges concerning counsel’s assistance at
punishment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
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2064 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999);
Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
First, an appellant must show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Under this first
prong, a strong presumption exists that defense counsel’s conduct was
reasonable and constituted sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S. Ct. 2052. We evaluate the totality of the representation from counsel’s
perspective at trial, rather than counsel’s isolated acts or omissions in hindsight.
Gutierrez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 739, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). Any
error in trial strategy will be deemed inadequate representation only if counsel’s
actions lack any plausible basis. Howland v. State, 966 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), aff’d, 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). The fact that another attorney, including appellate counsel, might have
pursued a different course does not necessarily support a finding of
ineffectiveness. Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979);
Johnson v. State, 987 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
pet. ref’d). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; see
also Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (reasoning
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that trial counsel is better positioned than an appellate court to judge the
pragmatism regarding significant decisions of trial strategy in a particular case).
Our scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and every
effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
Second, an appellant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The
second prong of Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial, i.e., a trial whose result
is reliable. Id. In other words, Appellant must show there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The ultimate
focus of our inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding
whose result is being challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at
2070.
A. Trial Counsel’s Strategy Regarding Motions to Suppress
In this case, there was testimony by trial counsel offered during the
motion for new trial hearing concerning counsel’s trial strategy. Trial counsel
said that it was his professional opinion that filing motions to suppress that
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would culminate in Johnson having to testify regarding his personal knowledge
of the drugs found in his residence was “poor trial strategy.” Trial counsel said
that Johnson could have ultimately been questioned by the State, whereby he
would either confess to ownership of the drugs or deny ownership and lose the
motion under the doctrine of standing. Trial counsel testified that an exhibit
admitted into the record by Johnson indicates that Johnson agreed with trial
counsel’s tactic.
Furthermore, trial counsel reasoned that the only legitimate challenge to
the search warrant affidavit under Franks v. Delaware was one that challenged
the actual basis for probable cause—the evidence of the police department’s
independent investigation of watching Johnson’s residence and the discovery
of drugs and drug paraphernalia in Johnson’s trash. See State v. Delagarza,
158 S.W.3d 25, 27–28 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that
magistrate had substantial basis for concluding probable cause to search
residence existed where, although tip concerning suspected drug dealing came
from anonymous informer of unknown reliability, comings and goings at
residence were—in officer’s experience—indicative of unlawful drug dealing,
officers retrieved trash bags left outside residence containing drug
paraphernalia, and bags tested positive for cocaine); see also State v. Raymer,
786 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.) (holding that affidavit
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in support of warrant to search defendant’s house based upon officer’s
knowledge of contents of trash behind defendant’s residence provided
magistrate with substantial basis for determining that illegal drugs were
probably in defendant’s house). Trial counsel did in fact file the motions to
suppress and present evidence in an attempt to undermine the search warrant
affidavit based on this reasoning. We hold that the record demonstrates that
there was a plausible basis for trial counsel’s strategy and that, regarding the
motion to suppress, Johnson has failed to point to any evidence that
undermines the strong presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of his reasonable
professional judgment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
We overrule this portion of Johnson’s sole point.
B. Evidence Presented at Punishment Phase
Johnson also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed
to “zealously represent [him] during the punishment phase” of trial.
Specifically, Johnson argues that trial counsel failed to secure witnesses who
could have corroborated Johnson’s progress and achievements in employment
history, drug abuse therapy, and self-motivated rehabilitation programs such as
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous.
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Johnson’s trial counsel explained at the motion for new trial hearing that
Johnson had not provided him with any documentation regarding personal
achievements nor did Johnson provide a list of additional witnesses he wished
trial counsel to call. Johnson did not dispute this claim at the motion for new
trial hearing. Trial counsel also testified that he discussed presenting mitigating
evidence at the punishment phase with Johnson. Trial counsel said that he
advised calling Johnson’s wife but advised against Johnson taking the stand
because he believed Johnson would appear poorly to a jury under cross-
examination.
The record shows that Johnson’s trial counsel presented evidence in the
punishment phase by calling Johnson’s wife to testify. Johnson’s wife testified
that Johnson had always worked and provided for his family, that he was a
“great father,” that he had been involved in rehabilitation programs, and that
she would support him after he was released from incarceration.
Assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in
the record. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(holding that trial counsel only calling a single witness and defendant at
punishment phase did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where
evidence of what additional witnesses would have testified to was not in
record). Johnson has not shown, to a reasonable probability, how the
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additional witnesses he claims should have been called to testify would have
brought about a different result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064.
There is simply no evidence in the record to support Johnson’s contention
that a jury would have assessed a lighter sentence had these alleged additional
witnesses testified on his behalf. Johnson was convicted of two first-degree
felonies. The punishment range for these convictions is five to ninety-nine
years’ confinement. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon 2003). The
jury assessed punishment at fifty-three years for each conviction. Assuming
without deciding that trial counsel’s decision not to procure more testimony or
to produce extra evidence in an attempt to mitigate punishment violated the
first prong of Strickland, Johnson has not demonstrated that any prejudice
resulted. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22–23, 123 S. Ct. 357, 359
(2002) (reasoning that when it is alleged that counsel performed deficiently at
the punishment phase of trial, defendant must prove that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the sentencing jury would have
reached a more favorable penalty-phase verdict); see also Bone, 77 S.W.3d at
834–36. We hold that Johnson has not demonstrated any prejudice regarding
trial counsel’s performance during the punishment phase of trial. We overrule
this portion of Johnson’s sole point.
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IV. C ONCLUSION
Having overruled Johnson’s sole point in its entirety, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MEIER, WALKER, and McCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 18, 2009
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