COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-341-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF H.B.P.,
A CHILD
------------
FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WICHITA COUNTY
------------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
------------
Appellant Lindsey C. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to H.B.P.2 We will affirm.
At the termination trial, the trial court heard testimony that Lindsey had
admitted using methamphetamine while H.B.P. was in her possession and that
Lindsey had never completed a drug-treatment program. 3 Lindsey also had
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
… The trial court also terminated the parental rights of H.B.P.’s biological
father, B.L.P., but only Lindsey appeals the trial court’s judgment.
3
… The day before the termination trial, Lindsey learned that there was
a bed available at a drug treatment program and that she was required to report
within forty-eight hours. On the day of the termination trial, Lindsey appeared
failed to undergo individual counseling, had failed to complete her parenting
classes, and had failed to remain drug-free during the course of the case.4 The
trial court heard evidence that Lindsey appeared for only twenty of the eighty-
five visits that she was allowed with H.B.P., that she always left early, and that
she did not have a regard for H.B.P.’s physical or emotional needs. Lindsey
never presented the case worker with proof of employment or with her address,
causing the case worker to have to spend a day locating her each month. The
record also revealed that Lindsey had been involved in domestic violence
disputes. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that Lindsey had
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child,
that she had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of the child, that she had constructively abandoned the child, that she had
at the courthouse prior to the hearing but disappeared before the trial started.
The record revealed that she had previous opportunities to attend drug
treatment programs but did not take advantage of them.
4
… A police officer testified that he pulled over a vehicle at 11:17 a.m.
on June 27, 2008, in which Lindsey was a passenger and gave her a citation
for possession of a syringe and a glass pipe. Lindsey told the officer that she
had been sober for a day. The CPS caseworker testified that June 27, 2008,
was a visitation day, that Lindsey had left the visit early (approximately 10:30
or 10:45 a.m.), and that she had failed to show for a urinalysis, which she had
promised to give after her visitation.
2
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established
the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the child, that she used a
controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the
child, and that termination of Lindsey’s parental rights was in the best interest
of H.B.P.
Lindsey’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In his motion,
counsel avers that he has conducted a professional evaluation of the record
and, after a thorough review of the applicable law, has reached the conclusion
that there are no arguable grounds to be advanced to support an appeal of this
cause and that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are
no reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might
arguably support the appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741, 87
S. Ct. 1396, 1398 (1967); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). This court has previously held that Anders
procedures apply in parental rights termination cases. In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d
774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Lindsey was given the
opportunity to file a pro se brief on her own behalf, but she did not do so.
3
In our duties as a reviewing court, we must conduct an independent
evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining
that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); Mays, 904 S.W.2d at 923. Only then may we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109
S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and Lindsey’s appellate
counsel’s brief. We agree with her appellate counsel that the appeal is wholly
frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005). Therefore, we grant Lindsey’s appellate counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Lindsey’s parental
rights to H.B.P.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MEIER, J.
DELIVERED: June 11, 2009
4