COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-060-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.H. AND C.H., JR.
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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Teresa A. (“Mother”) attempts to appeal from an order
terminating her parental rights to her children, C.H. and C.H., Jr. We dismiss
for want of jurisdiction.
On March 3, 2009, we notified the parties that it appeared that this court
lacked jurisdiction because there might not be a final appealable order in this
case. Our letter also informed the parties that unless they filed a response
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
showing grounds for continuing the appeal by Friday, March 13, 2009, this
attempted appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.
P. 42.3(a). No response has been filed.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments
and from specific types of interlocutory orders designated by the legislature as
appealable. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see,
e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon 2008); see also Tex.
R. Civ. P. 301 (“Only one final judgment shall be rendered in any cause except
where it is otherwise specially provided by law.”). A judgment is final and
appealable if it disposes of all parties and all issues. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at
195. An order that does not dispose of all parties and all issues in the case
must be classified, for purposes of appeal, as an interlocutory order. Ruiz v.
Ruiz, 946 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.). Without
affirmative statutory authority to hear an interlocutory appeal, this court is
without jurisdiction. See id.; see also Kiefer v. Kiefer, 132 S.W.3d 601, 602
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that protective order rendered
during the pendency of a divorce was not a final, appealable order). Compare
D.R. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 08-07-00355-CV, 2008
WL 5256431, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 18, 2008, no pet.) (holding
that an order terminating a father’s parental rights was not final until the order
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addressing additional parties and children involved in the case was entered)
with In re T.L.S., 143 S.W.3d 284, 287, 289 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.)
(interpreting now-repealed portion of section 263.401 of the family code with
section 109.002 of the family code to conclude that an order that terminates
the parent-child relationship and appoints the State or someone else as the
child’s managing conservator is a “final order” for purposes of appeal).
This court’s records reflect that the case remains pending in the trial court
with regard to the children’s father’s parental rights and that Mother has not
filed a motion to sever. See Thompson v. Beyer, 91 S.W.3d 902, 904 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (stating that, as a general rule, severance of an
interlocutory judgment into a severed action makes it final if all claims in the
severed action have been disposed of). Therefore, we conclude that we lack
jurisdiction over this attempted appeal, and we dismiss it.2 See Tex. R. App.
P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MEIER, J.
DELIVERED: June 4, 2009
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… However, this dismissal should not be construed to prevent Mother
from later pursuing a timely appeal from an actual final judgment in this case.
3