COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-010-CR
MICHAEL JACKSON APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Michael Jackson entered an open plea of guilty to robbery. The
trial court found him guilty and assessed twelve years’ confinement as
punishment.2
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… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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… The punishment range for robbery is two to twenty years’
confinement and up to a $10,000 fine. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33,
29.02 (Vernon 2003).
Jackson’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Jackson was given the
opportunity to file a pro se brief, but he did not do so.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of
the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the
appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). Because
Jackson entered an open plea of guilty, our independent review for potential
error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of Jackson’s
plea, error that is not independent of and supports the judgment of guilt, and
error occurring after entry of the guilty pleas. See Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d
615, 620, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656,
666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
We have carefully reviewed the record, including the exhibits presented
at punishment, the sealed presentence investigation report, and counsel’s brief,
and we note a single clerical error: Jackson was indicted for robbery by threat,
and his written plea admonishments reflect that he was charged with robbery
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by threat, but the judgment states that he was convicted of robbery causing
bodily injury. However, we otherwise agree with counsel that the appeal is
wholly frivolous and without merit, and we find nothing in the record that might
arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); accord Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006).
Because an appellate court has the power to correct a trial court’s written
judgment if it has the information necessary to do so, we modify the trial
court’s judgment to reflect Jackson’s actual conviction for robbery by threat.
See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992); see also Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that an appellate court has the
authority to reform a judgment in an Anders appeal and to affirm that judgment
as reformed). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial
court’s judgment as modified.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, LIVINGSTON, and DAUPHINOT, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 16, 2009
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Michael Jackson v. State
Combined Opinion