COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-311-CV
IN RE SCOTT W. RHODES RELATOR
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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This is an original proceeding in which relator Scott W. Rhodes—a pro se
inmate incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional
Division (“the Department”)—challenges the trial court’s orders requiring the
Department to withdraw funds from his inmate trust account to pay for court
costs that he was ordered to pay as a result of his convictions. According to
Rhodes, the trial court violated his due process rights by rendering the order in
accordance with Texas Government Code section 501.014(e) without giving
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… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
him prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court has considered
Rhodes’s petition for writ of mandamus and is of the opinion that relief should
be denied. Accordingly, Rhodes’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
Background
On April 18, 2008, Rhodes was convicted in two judgments of multiple
felonies and sentenced to serve terms of confinement ranging from twelve
months to five years. One of the judgments awarded court costs of $320.00,
and the other awarded court costs of $270.00. While serving his sentences in
prison, Rhodes opened an inmate trust account provided by the Department.
On May 13, 2008, the trial court entered ex parte inmate trust fund withdrawal
orders on the two judgments. Both orders specified a formula for determining
the amount of each periodic withdrawal from Rhodes’s inmate trust account to
pay on both judgments for costs. Each order also specified that the
withdrawals would continue until the total for each was paid. Each order
further specified that, “on receipt of a copy of this Order, the Inmate Trust Fund
Supervisor shall withdraw money from the account of the inmate, hold same
in a separate account, and forward said money to the District Clerk of Tarrant
County.”
The trial court’s withdrawal orders both indicate that they are based on
Texas Government Code section 501.014(f)(5), which allows the Department
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to withdraw from an inmate’s trust account any amount the inmate is ordered
to pay by order of the court, “as directed by court order in accordance with
Subsection (e).” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.014(e), (f)(5) (Vernon
2004). Subsection (e) requires that the inmate receive “notification by a
court.” See id. § 501.014(e). The record before us establishes that each
withdrawal order directed the withdrawal of funds from Rhodes’s trust account
to pay the court fees and costs associated with each respective conviction, and
the total amount of court fees and costs for each case was specified in each
corresponding judgment.
On or about May 23, 2008, Rhodes received a copy of the court’s
withdrawal orders in the mail. The record reflects that the first withdrawal from
his trust account occurred on June 2, 2008. He then filed his petition for writ
of mandamus.
Discussion
In his petition, Rhodes, complains that he was not afforded procedural
due process prior to the State’s withdrawal of the funds. Specifically, he
argues that he was entitled to notice and that he “did not receive any notice of
any kind before his receipt of the above mentioned ‘withdrawal orders,’ nor any
notice after.” (emphasis added). Rhodes does not indicate how or why error
exists except to argue that the State was required to follow the garnishment
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procedures set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prior to withdrawing
the funds from his inmate trust account, which it failed to do. Rhodes
contends that the failure to follow the garnishment procedures resulted in a
violation of his due process rights as set forth in the United States Constitution
and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See U.S. Const. amend XIV; Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.04 (Vernon 2005). Rhodes asks this court to
enter an order vacating the two withdrawal orders because of the lack of due
process and asks us to order any money removed from his trust account be
returned to that account.
We have already determined that orders entered pursuant to section
501.014 of the government code, such as the orders entered in this case, are
final and appealable and that, therefore, mandamus is not available. See In re
Pannell, No. 02-08-00301-CV, slip op. at 10–11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb.
25, 2009, orig. proceeding). Thus, we conclude and hold that Rhodes had an
adequate legal remedy and is therefore not entitled to mandamus relief.
Rhodes’s petition is denied.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and WALKER, JJ.
DELIVERED: February 25, 2009
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