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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CAIRA BYRD
Appellant No. 2776 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order June 13, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0001042-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2015
Appellant, Caira Byrd, appeals from the order entered June 13, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied Byrd’s
petition for a writ of certiorari following her municipal court conviction of
simple assault.1 After review, we reverse and remand with instructions.
On January 11, 2014, after a night of drinking with relatives, Byrd
engaged in an argument with her fiancé, Anthony Robinson. When the
argument escalated, Robinson called the police at approximately 3:11 a.m.
“to cool everything down.” N.T., Preliminary Hearing, 2/10/14, at 5. After
the police arrived, Robinson allegedly gave a signed statement indicating
that Byrd had punched him in the mouth and then continued to hit him
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a).
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several times with her fist. See id., at 7. Byrd was subsequently arrested
and charged with simple assault.
At the municipal court hearing, Robinson denied that Byrd had hit him
on the night of the incident. See id., at 6. When confronted with his
statement, Robinson acknowledged his name, age, race, sex and signature
on the statement, but denied having any memory of making the allegations
contained therein. See id., at 7. He admitted that he had had “[q]uite a
lot” to drink that night and consequently had little memory of what had
happened. Id. at 8. Although Robinson conceded that his mouth hurt the
next morning, he contended that he had bit his tongue. See id., at 9. When
the Commonwealth asked Robinson if he recognized a picture of what
purported to be his swollen face, he replied, “That’s me? It don’t look like
me.” Id., at 10. The municipal court proceeded to enter into evidence the
picture, but did not admit the statement.
At the close of the hearing, the municipal court originally ruled to hold
the case under advisement for 90 days until Byrd and Robinson completed
anger management counseling. See id., at 14-16. After Robinson and Byrd
left the courtroom, the assistant district attorney returned to inform the
court: “Your Honor, when I went out into the hallway, the defendant was
yelling and talking loud to the complainant.” Id., at 16. Without further
discussion, the municipal court summarily found Byrd guilty of simple
assault and sentenced her to eighteen months’ probation.
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Thereafter, Byrd filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Byrd’s
petition and upheld the municipal court’s conviction. This timely appeal
followed.
Byrd maintains that the Commonwealth presented insufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction. We agree.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows.
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency
claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume
and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and
satisfy the jury of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and
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speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail
even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
A person is guilty of simple assault if she “attempts to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
Instantly, the municipal court determined that although Robinson had
adopted certain items on his prior statement, including his name, age, race,
sex, date of birth and signature, he expressly disavowed the allegations in
the statement itself. See N.T., 2/10/14, at 11. Therefore, the municipal
court did not admit the statement into evidence. See id., at 11-12. The
Commonwealth argues on appeal that the statement was, in fact,
admissible. However, if the Commonwealth disagreed with the municipal
court’s decision to exclude the prior statement from evidence, it could have
preserved this issue by demanding a de novo trial or seeking certiorari
review. As it stands, the statement is not part of the record before us, and
we may not consider it.
The only other substantive evidence admitted at the municipal court
hearing was the photograph shown to Robinson at trial. Robinson maintained
that the photograph did not look like him, claimed that the alleged bruising
looked like freckles, and that the alleged swelling could have resulted from
drinking alcohol on the night of the incident. See N.T., 2/10/14, at 10.
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In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court explained that it
found the evidence was sufficient to support Byrd’s conviction based upon
information police gathered on the night of the dispute, “including
statements from Mr. Robinson and the fact that he was physically bruised
about the face with significant swelling to both eyes.” Trial Court Opinion,
11/17/14, at 4. As we have previously noted, Robinson’s statement was not
admitted into evidence, and therefore, the trial court could not consider the
statement as substantive evidence of the assault. We further note that the
record is devoid of any indication that the police determined that Robinson
was physically bruised or exhibited significant swelling. Rather, this fact is
only inferable from the picture of Robinson offered into evidence.
“[W]here the [s]ole evidence of guilt or an element of the offense is
inferential, then the inferred fact must follow beyond a reasonable doubt
from the proved facts.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 364 A.2d 368, 372 (Pa.
Super. 1976). Here, the Commonwealth was only able to prove that
Robinson called 9-1-1 for assistance due to an argument with Byrd and that
an argument had occurred. Without Robinson’s statement, there is simply no
evidence by which the trial court could have reasonably attributed the
alleged swelling and bruising depicted in the picture to an assault by Byrd.
There was no further testimony to establish what caused the swelling.
Without more, the photograph alone simply does not prove that Byrd caused
bodily injury to Robinson. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
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We find that the evidence admitted in the municipal court hearing was
insufficient to support Byrd’s conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court’s order denying Byrd’s petition for writ of certiorari and remand with
instructions to vacate Byrd’s judgment of sentence for simple assault.
Based upon our finding that the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict, we need not address Byrd’s remaining claim that the municipal
court erroneously relied upon statements made by the assistant district
attorney regarding Byrd’s conduct in the hallway at the conclusion of the
hearing.
Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/4/2015
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