AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-90-189-CR
WILLIE ARTHUR MILTON,
APPELLANT
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 39,130, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE
PER CURIAM
Willie Arthur Milton appeals his conviction for aggravated assault, enhanced (habitual offender) by allegations of prior felony convictions. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02 (1989). A jury found him guilty of the offense of aggravated assault and also found him a habitual offender, assessing punishment at 99 years imprisonment. We will affirm the judgment of conviction.
Appellant brings two points of error, contending that the trial court erred (1) in not properly admonishing appellant before allowing him to represent himself and, (2) in receiving prejudicial evidence of extraneous offenses.
BACKGROUND
This cause, 39,130, is a reindictment of cause 38, 725. On April 29, 1990, in cause 38,725, appellant was admonished concerning self-representation. The court explained that appellant was charged with aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon, a tree limb, to strike Debora Deville. The court explained the punishment range for the offense, then read the second paragraph of that indictment, which apparently contained a repeat offender allegation of a prior conviction, and explained how this paragraph would increase the range of punishment.
The court asked appellant if he were asking to represent himself, without an attorney appointed to represent or assist him. Appellant said that was his request. The court advised appellant that if he represented himself he would be bound by the rules of evidence and would receive no special consideration; that he would be bound by the same standard as a trained lawyer in responding to objections made by the State or when making objections himself. The court then told appellant that more was involved in presenting a defense than telling his story; for example, there could be problems acquiring evidence and properly presenting it. The court warned appellant that if he represented himself a number of harmful things could occur such as mistakes in presenting evidence or in asking questions that could make damaging evidence admissible that otherwise could have been excluded.
Appellant kept acknowledging that he understood. Appellant had filed a motion with the court labeled "Motion to the Court to Order that Competency Hearing Be Conducted in the Matter of Self Representation." The motion stated that appellant: could read and speak well; had 11 years of formal education; had completed his GED; had completed a number of hours from Clear Lake junior college; had completed an army course as a helicopter mechanic; had previously had some legal experience in representing himself in criminal law matters by having pro-se pleadings considered by the court in Milton v. State, 549 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977) (apparently hybrid representation or representation by counsel on appeal) and participating in unidentified actions in both state and federal court. Appellant asked for a hearing on this motion and numerous other pending defense motions. Appellant said that the only assistance he requested was the appointment of an investigator. He said he was aware of the $500.00 limitation on the expense of an investigator without prior approval of the court.
On June 29, 1990, a pretrial hearing was held on the reindictment. The prosecutor said that the only change was in the enhancement allegations of the indictment which now contained habitual offender allegations. The trial court asked appellant if he wished to continue to represent himself which he said he did. Appellant presented various motions such as for discovery of criminal records and medical reports, which the state said it already had furnished along with copies of the two pen packets intended to be offered in court that would cover the enhancement allegations. Appellant presented subpoena requests, a request for additional funds for an investigator, and a number of other motions: one for discovery of exculpatory evidence; one to prevent the State from calling his wife as a witness; one to compel the State to elect which two prior convictions of the three alleged it would rely on, citing "Sec. 12.42(d) V.A.T.C. Penal"; one to interview the State's witnesses; a motion in limine; an application for habeas corpus; and, a supplemental motion to quash.
On July 26, 1990, the court held another pretrial hearing. The court asked appellant if he wished to proceed without an attorney. Appellant's motion for discovery was granted, and the following heard: a motion to quash a subpoena; a motion for medical funds; a petition for habeas corpus; a motion to quash an arrest warrant; a motion to dismiss; a motion for exculpatory matters; and a motion to compel.
Prior to trial on August 20, 1990, the court and parties discussed which witnesses were present and how to schedule them. Appellant presented a motion for the transcription of prior statements of witnesses which was overruled. The trial court explained voir dire in appellant's presence. Appellant's motion to shuffle was granted. Appellant made no objections to any voir dire questions and does not now contend that any objections should have been made.
On voir dire, appellant did the following: asked whether anyone had a bias against him because he represented himself; asked whether any bias existed with regard to persons who used alcohol; discussed the State's burden of proof; discussed justification for using force; asked whether any member of the panel was related to local law enforcement agents; asked if anyone had read about the offense in the newspapers; asked if anyone worked for certain medical facilities; and asked if anyone had a bias as to race.
At trial, appellant cross-examined Debora Deville, received a copy of her prior statement and was able to overcome the State's objection to his cross-examination. Appellant took the next witness on voir dire; made certain objections that were overruled and others that were sustained. Throughout, appellant made other objections, some of which were sustained. Appellant called witnesses in his own behalf, presented a requested charge, had some objections to the charge sustained, and argued his case. At the punishment stage, appellant called several witnesses on his own behalf. He made valid objections to the records of prior convictions, causing the State to make corrections.
SELF-REPRESENTATION
In point of error one, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not properly admonishing appellant before allowing him to waive assistance of counsel and represent himself. An accused has the right to represent himself. In order to intelligently invoke that right, an accused must be made aware of the "dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 442 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). Although the choice must be knowingly and intelligently made, it need not be wise. Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989). The defendant's technical legal skill or ability to conduct an adequate defense are not prerequisites for self-representation. Id. The competence to represent himself is not the issue --rather, the competence to be evaluated is the competence to make the choice to represent himself. Id.
To decide whether a waiver is intelligent and voluntary the court should inquire into the defendant's background, age, education, and experience. Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980); Renfro v. State, 586 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979). The defendant should be made aware that there are technical rules of evidence and procedure that he will be obligated to comply with and that he will not be granted any special consideration because of his lack of formal training in the law. Geeslin, 600 S.W.2d at 314. He should be made aware of the general nature of the charge and the possible penalties that will be imposed. Id.
The record shows that the court explained the charge that appellant had assaulted a person with a tree limb. The record shows that appellant responded that he understood the charge; he had filed a motion to quash citing the appropriate penal code provisions and attacking the "deadly weapon" allegation. This motion, as well as many others, show an awareness of procedural rules. The appellant contends that the court failed to admonish appellant as to the range of punishment as respects the enhancement allegations of the indictment. The record shows that the court properly advised appellant respecting the punishment range for the offense itself and for one enhancement allegation with regard to the first indictment. The record does not show an explicit admonishment by the court with regard to the habitual offender allegations--however, the record shows defense motions citing correct authority, showing an awareness of the increased range of punishment. The court advised appellant that there was more to presenting a defense than telling his side of the story, and that errors in presenting evidence for example, could allow otherwise inadmissible matter to be admitted. The record shows that appellant was adequately advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and made a knowing and intelligent choice to represent himself. We overrule point of error one.
EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES
Appellant contends that the court erred in receiving prejudicial evidence of extraneous offenses that occurred prior to the case on trial. Appellant complains of two instances of the introduction of extraneous offenses.
The first instance in which the subject of extraneous offenses was brought before the jury occurred when Officer Kelly of the Killeen Police Department said that he had located appellant at the city jail and appellant was not in jail on the assault charge for which Officer Kelly was attempting to arrest him. Appellant objected. The trial court sustained the objection. Appellant did not request an instruction to disregard or move for a mistrial. The second instance occurred when appellant called Officer Kelly and asked him about any prior acquaintance with appellant. The State, on cross-examination, then asked a question which elicited an answer revealing that Officer Kelly knew appellant because of previous assault charges. Again, appellant's objection was sustained. He did not request an instruction to disregard or a mistrial.
The proper procedure in this situation was for appellant to object; request an instruction to disregard; and make a motion for a mistrial. Coe v. State, 623 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984). In general, an instruction to disregard cures testimony referring to or implying extraneous offenses. Id. Here, appellant's objection was sustained. He received all the relief he requested from the court and no error is preserved for appeal. We overrule point of error two.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
[Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and Kidd]
Affirmed
Filed: May 8, 1991
[Do Not Publish]