AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-92-537-CR
KENNETH LEON GARNER,
APPELLANT
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 40,835, HONORABLE STANTON B. PEMBERTON, JUDGE PRESIDING
Kenneth Leon Garner, appellant, appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021 (West 1989). After finding appellant guilty, a jury assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. Appellant contends that the district court erred by: (1) rendering judgment on the jury verdict, because the evidence was legally insufficient to support it; (2) denying appellant's motion to quash the indictment, because it was "duplicitous"; and (3) admitting appellant's written statement into evidence, because it contained extraneous offenses. Appellant further contends that he did not receive a fair trial and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial, because the prosecutor suppressed material evidence. Finding these points to be without merit, we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was the victim's Godfather and had known him since his birth on October 22, 1980. As a close family friend, appellant frequently kept the victim overnight. On October 30, 1991, appellant was indicted for sexually assaulting the victim on or about October 22, 1988, the victim's eighth birthday. At trial, the victim testified that, during an overnight visit on his eighth or ninth birthday, appellant sexually assaulted him in appellant's one-bedroom apartment in Temple. Appellant introduced evidence that he was living in Corsicana on the victim's eighth and ninth birthdays. On rebuttal, the victim testified that he had been sexually assaulted by appellant on other occasions in Temple as well, although he could not specify any dates. The jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
In his first point of error, appellant claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for two reasons. First, he claims that because of inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, contradiction of the victim by other State's witnesses, and "conclusive" evidence that appellant did not possess a one-bedroom apartment in Temple, Texas, on October 22, 1988, no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he claims that there is no evidence that the victim was not appellant's legal spouse, as charged in the indictment.
The critical inquiry on review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court does not ask whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts proved and of the weight to be given to the testimony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979). As such, the jury can choose to believe or disbelieve the witnesses, or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872 (1988). The jury is entitled to accept the state's version of the facts and reject appellant's version. Elkins v. State, 822 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). The state's witnesses do not have to testify consistently, and all the state's evidence does not have to support its theory of the case. Id.; see also Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd).
Portions of the evidence in the present case may appear to be irreconcilable. The victim testified that the assault occurred in appellant's one-bedroom apartment in Temple on October 22, 1988. Appellant presented evidenceapparently undisputedthat he had moved to Corsicana before that date. A rational trier of fact could, however, have believed the victim's testimony and disbelieved or disregarded appellant's evidence and found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A rational trier of fact could also have concluded that the assault occurred in a one-bedroom apartment to which appellant had access and which the young victim mistook for appellant's prior apartment. Therefore, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that the offense was committed on or about October 22, 1988, in Temple.
Even if the jury did not disregard appellant's evidence that he was living in Corsicana on October 22, 1988, the date alleged in the indictment, there is other evidence sufficient to support the conviction. The date alleged in the indictment as the date of the assault does not bind the State. A conviction may rest on evidence that the offense was committed before the return of the indictment and within the applicable period of limitations. Aylor v. State, 727 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Tex. App.Austin 1987, pet. ref'd). The statute of limitations for aggravated sexual assault of a child is ten years. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 12.01(2)(D), (12.03(d) (West Supp. 1993). The victim does not have to be able to provide an exact date for the offense. Wilson v. State, 730 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref'd). On rebuttal, the victim testified that he was sexually assaulted on other occasions when he spent the night with appellant in Temple. None of the assaults to which the victim testified were outside the ten-year period of limitations.
Appellant claims that the indictment was for one specific sexual assault and that any other sexual assault of the victim was an extraneous offense. The indictment alleged, however, that the offense took place "on or about" October 22, 1988. The jury could have disregarded the victim's testimony as to the date of the offense and found that the sexual assault for which appellant was indicted occurred on a different date when the victim spent the night with appellant. (1) Therefore, a rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
Also under his first point of error, appellant argues that there was no evidence that the victim was not his spouse. However, the record shows that at trial the victim was eleven years old and that both the victim and appellant are male. Texas does not recognize same-sex marriages. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1.01 and § 1.91 (West 1993). We hold, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the victim was not appellant's spouse. (2) Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, appellant complains of the trial court's denial of his motion to quash the indictment. Appellant claims that the indictment is "duplicitous" and did not give him fair notice of whether he was being indicted for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault. In particular, appellant claims that the "not the spouse of" language contained in the indictment pertains only to sexual assault and not to aggravated sexual assault. However, the indictment also alleges that the victim was under fourteen years of age, an element of aggravated sexual assault and not of sexual assault. Thus, appellant claims the indictment did not give him fair notice of whether he had been charged with sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault. We disagree.
The charging part of the indictment appellant complains of provides as follows:
did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause his sexual organ to contact the anus of [victim] and the said [victim] was then and there a child younger than 14 years of age and not the spouse of the said Kenneth Leon Garner.
The offense of sexual assault is committed if a person "(2) intentionally or knowingly: . . . (D) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). The term "child" is defined in Section 22.011(c) as "a person younger than 17 years of age who is not the spouse of the actor." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(c) (West 1989) (emphasis added).
The Texas Penal Code sets out the offense of aggravated sexual assault as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense:
(1) if the person:
* * *
(B) intentionally or knowingly:
* * *
(iv) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; and
(2) if:
* * *
(B) the victim is younger than 14 years of age.
(b) In this section, "child" has the meaning assigned that term by Section 22.011(c) of this code.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021 (West 1989) (emphasis added).
It is clear from the sections quoted above that both sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault require that the victim be a "child." To be a child, the victim must be younger than seventeen and cannot be the spouse of the actor. The offense is aggravated sexual assault only if the victim is younger than fourteen years of age. In the present case, therefore, the language in the indictment alleging that the victim was not the spouse of appellant tracked the statutory definition of "child," which is a requirement for both aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault. The language in the indictment that the child was younger than fourteen years of age, however, gave appellant notice that he had been indicted for aggravated sexual assault. Appellant's second point of error is overruled.
In his third point of error, appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence appellant's written statement which described an extraneous offense. Appellant gave the written statement to a Temple police officer after being questioned about the aggravated sexual assault complaint. In the statement, appellant describes his close relationship with the victim. He relates that in 1988 he lived in a one-bedroom apartment in Temple and often had the victim over to spend the night with him. He then describes "teaching" the victim to masturbate during one of these overnight visits. Finally, he disclaims touching the victim, or any other child, in a sexual way.
Before the statement was offered into evidence, appellant objected outside the presence of the jury that the statement was an extraneous offense and was not admissible. Appellant further objected that the probative value of the statement was greatly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. These objections were lodged against the entire statement, not merely the sentences where appellant describes teaching the victim to masturbate. This is typified by appellant's argument when addressing the timing of the objection:
[Defense Counsel]: "Your honor, if he is getting to talk about whether a statement was taken, I mean, what's next? I don't even want the point that the statement was taken before the jury."
At no time did appellant direct his objection to any particular portion of the statement. Appellant did not request that the court delete any portion of the statement offered, although the court had already deleted another portion of the statement that referred to a polygraph examination. When a facsimile of the statement, with the polygraph reference deleted, was offered into evidence, appellant's objections became even broader:
[Defense Counsel]: I have objection to it, your honor, in its entirety. The Xerox form, the original form, plus deletions, minus deletions, I have objection, running objection. I would not go on record saying anything but that.
When an exhibit contains both admissible and inadmissible material, the objection must specifically refer to the material deemed objectionable. Brown v. State, 692 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Wintters v. State, 616 S.W.2d 197, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Where the objection is not specific, error is not preserved for review. Brown, 692 S.W.2d at 501; Wintters, 616 S.W.2d at 202. The trial judge has no duty to ferret out objectionable portions of a statement, unless and until trial counsel puts him on notice of what is being objected to. Taylor v. State, 498 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
Appellant objected to the entire written statement as evidence of an extraneous offense. At no time did appellant point out any particular portion of the statement as the basis for his objection. Instead, appellant vehemently objected to everything about the statement. Clearly, some portions of the statement, such as appellant's description of his relationship with the victim and his admission of living in a one-bedroom apartment in Temple in 1988, were not evidence of an extraneous offense and were admissible. Therefore, appellant preserved no error for review. Appellant's third point of error is overruled.
In his last two points of error, appellant complains that the prosecutor actively suppressed evidence that was material to his defense. In point of error four, appellant complains that the prosecutor's actions in suppressing evidence denied him a fair and impartial trial. In point of error five, appellant complains that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor's actions.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, appellant filed a motion requesting the psychiatric history of all the State's witnesses and generally seeking exculpatory information. The State responded to this motion by denying that it had any such evidence. In closing arguments during the punishment phase of the trial, appellant argued that the jury should give him probation and require him to pay for counseling for the victim. Appellant implied that this would be the only way the victim would receive counseling. In rebuttal, the State argued,
I was really amazed that [appellant's counsel] said this was a broken man, because I ask you to recall and remember [the victim], and the fact that he has to go through the rest of his life, which is a lot longer than [appellant's] at this point, carrying the weight of this act on him, and yes, he is getting counseling. That's not for you to worry about. You don't have to worry that if you send [appellant] to jail, [the victim] is not going to get counseling.
I don't think it's incumbent upon the State to spread out every aspect of that little boy's life to you. His counseling is private, it's with his counselor, and there is no reason why we need to go into it and pick it apart here in Court.
Appellant made no objection to this argument. Instead, while the jury was deliberating, appellant prepared a bill of exceptions in which he questioned the prosecutor concerning her knowledge that the victim was receiving counseling. The prosecutor testified that her only knowledge was that the victim's mother had recently told her that the victim was going to get counseling in the future. She had no knowledge that he had in fact received counseling. Appellant questioned no other witnesses in his bill of exception and relies solely on this bill of exception for his fourth and fifth points of error.
In order to conclude that the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence, we must first determine that such evidence existed. See Isaacs v. State, 770 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. App.El Paso 1989, pet. ref'd). Appellant offers no evidence that the victim had actually received any counseling. The prosecutor expressly denied any knowledge that the victim had received counseling. Therefore, we conclude that appellant has not shown there was any evidence that was in fact suppressed. Appellant's fourth and fifth points of error are overruled.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
J. Woodfin Jones, Justice
Before Justices Aboussie, Jones and B. A. Smith
Affirmed
Filed: October 20, 1993
Do Not Publish
1. The victim admitted that he was unsure of the date of the assault, but thought it was
on his eighth or ninth birthday.
2. See also Murphy v. State, 653 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1983, pet. ref'd).
In that case, a male was convicted of the aggravated sexual abuse of another male. The jury
charge did not require the jury to find that the victim was not the spouse of the defendant.
The court held that this was not reversible error because, as a matter of law, two males may
not be married. Id. at 569-70.