TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-94-00130-CR
Shonda Haywood, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 6 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. 396,470, HONORABLE DAVID E. PURYEAR, JUDGE PRESIDING
Following a bench trial, the trial court found appellant Shonda Haywood guilty of criminal mischief. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(a) (West 1994). (1) The trial court assessed punishment at sixty days' confinement in the Travis County Jail and a $1,000 fine. The court probated the jail time and $700 of the fine, ordering appellant to pay $348 in restitution to the victim, David Grigsby. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
On June 9, 1993, David Grigsby attempted to merge into rush hour traffic on the "Mo-Pac" expressway in Austin, Texas. Either moving over from a center lane or continuing in the far right lane, appellant's car occupied the lane Grigsby sought to enter. Grigsby claims that appellant ran him off the road. Appellant claims that Grigsby almost hit her vehicle as he aggressively entered the lane. In either event, the two exchanged gestures and went their respective ways.
Grigsby and appellant met again as they each took the same exit. Each contends that the other drove in front, slamming on his or her brakes. Grigsby followed appellant to her place of work, allegedly cursing appellant once they came to a stop. In response, appellant retrieved a baseball bat from the trunk of her car. As she advanced toward Grigsby's vehicle, a security guard approached and asked Grigsby to leave. As Grigsby began to drive away, appellant struck his truck with the baseball bat. Based on the guard's assurance that no damage had been done to his vehicle, Grigsby drove away. However, some time after Grigsby left, he looked in his rearview mirror and noticed that his truck was dented. Grigsby returned to the scene of the incident to take up his complaint with appellant.
The State prosecuted appellant for criminal mischief, contending that she caused property damage to Grigsby's vehicle in an amount exceeding twenty dollars, but less than two hundred dollars. The trial court found appellant guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. See Act of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1253, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 5055, 5055 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(b)(2), since amended) (hereinafter "former section 28.03(b)(2)"). (2) Appellant appeals her conviction, complaining about the sufficiency of the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, the court must determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The question is not whether the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
DISCUSSION
In her single point of error, appellant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction for Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. She does not deny using the baseball bat; instead, she urges that the blow by the baseball bat did not inflict twenty dollars' worth of damage, thereby lowering her offense to a Class C misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(b)(1)(A) (West 1994). Appellant does not dispute Grigsby's $348 repair estimate. Rather, she claims that Grigsby left the scene of the incident, defaced his own vehicle, and returned to hold appellant accountable for the damage.
A person commits criminal mischief if one intentionally or knowingly: (1) damages another's tangible property; (2) tampers with another's tangible property and causes pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to either the owner or a third person; or (3) makes markings on another's tangible property. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(a) (West 1994). Penalties for criminal mischief vary depending on the amount of the resulting property damage. The statute in effect when this incident occurred provided that causing damage valued between twenty and two hundred dollars constituted a Class B misdemeanor. Former section 28.03(b)(2). Damage less than twenty dollars was a Class C misdemeanor with substantially lower penalties. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(b)(1)(A) (West 1994).
The evidence supporting appellant's conviction is abundant. Grigsby testified that appellant struck his vehicle with a baseball bat. The security guard confirmed his testimony, stating that appellant struck the bat against Grigsby's truck as he drove away. Grigsby testified that the blow must have dented his truck, and that the truck had not been dented before the incident. A body shop supervisor with years of experience performing auto repair estimates testified about the damage to Grigsby's truck. He stated that the dents were "fist size," "or something like a blunt object had just done a series of hits." He testified that the damage was inconsistent with that produced by hail or an automobile collision. Acknowledging that all of the dents came from the same angle, the witness indicated that the "series of dents" could have been the result of a "ripple effect." He did not specify the number of separate dents, but he estimated that the repair cost would be $348.
Appellant emphasizes inconsistencies in the evidence. She struck Grigsby's vehicle only one time; however, the damage consists of a "series of dents." In addition, the security guard testified that he saw only a single dent on the truck. Appellant claims that Grigsby left the scene of the incident, returning some time later with "newfound damage." Appellant infers that Grigsby must have damaged his own vehicle after the incident "for the purpose of inflating the appraisal."
The record reflects, however, that the security guard made only a cursory inspection of Grigsby's vehicle. Further, the auto body repair witness testified that a strike by a blunt object can cause a "ripple effect," making the dents most clearly visible when one looks down the side of the vehicle, as through a rearview mirror. He stated that it would be difficult to observe the damage when viewing the dents straight on. Finally, it is possible that a number of dents could result from a single blow. Given that all of the dents are from the same angle, the "series of dents" could be the result of the "ripple effect."
The evidence also offers an explanation for Grigsby's departure. Grigsby testified that he did not observe the damage until after he drove away. He left the area relying on the security guard's assurance that there was no damage, even though the guard later testified that he did not inspect the truck carefully. Further, the guard asked Grigsby to leave the area quickly to avoid further conflict. The auto body repair witness testified that this type of dent is more noticeable when looking down the side of the vehicle. He stated specifically that the damage would be more apparent when seen from a rearview mirror. Thus, the evidence reveals that the damage could have become apparent to Grigsby only after he left the area, and that he returned when it became evident.
Maintaining that she only caused one dent, rather than a "series of dents," appellant also argues that appellee did not offer proof of pecuniary loss resulting from one dent. According to appellant, the appraisal for the "series of dents" is insufficient to prove that the damage inflicted by appellant exceeded $20. Appellant's argument relies on the hypothesis that Grigsby damaged his own vehicle after the incident to inflate the repair bill. Based upon the evidence, however, a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that appellant caused the damage to Grigsby's vehicle in the amount charged. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Griffin, 614 S.W.2d at 159. (3)
CONCLUSION
We hold that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant damaged
Grigsby's vehicle causing damage in the amount charged. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Marilyn Aboussie, Justice
Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Aboussie and Jones
Affirmed
Filed: March 15, 1995
Do Not Publish
1. 1 This offense took place before September 1, 1994, and is governed by the law in effect at the time the offense occurred. Penal Code, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.18, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3705. Because the code amendments effective September 1, 1994, did not alter section 28.03(a), we cite the current code for sake of convenience.
2. 2 A Class B misdemeanor for the offense of criminal mischief required pecuniary loss of $20 or more, but less than $200. Former section 28.03(b)(2).
3. 3 We note that appellant cites Riggs v. State, 561 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), in support of her argument. In Riggs, the defendant appealed his misdemeanor conviction for stealing a CB antenna worth between $20 and $200, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish $20 worth of pecuniary loss. The prosecution did not offer evidence as to the value of the stolen antenna itself. Rather, the evidence established the value of a $29.95 antenna kit, which contained not only the antenna, but also a trunk mount and some wiring. Reasoning that there was nothing to show that the antenna, the only part stolen, was worth at least $20, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Id. at 197.
In Riggs, the issue was whether the pecuniary loss was within the range charged. Here, there is no doubt as to whether the damage to Grigsby's vehicle exceeds the amount necessary to support a conviction for Class B criminal mischief. Appellant does not dispute the amount of damage to the vehicle. Instead, she argues that she did not cause the damage.