AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-94-578-CR NO. 3-94-579-CR AND NO. 3-94-580-CR
LEE ALBERT SHAW,
APPELLANT
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLLIN COUNTY, 296TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NOS. 296-81297-93, 296-81298-93 & 296-81299-93
HONORABLE VERLA SUE HOLLAND, JUDGE PRESIDING
PER CURIAM
Three indictments accusing appellant of aggravated sexual assault of a child were consolidated for trial. A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment in each cause at imprisonment for seventy-six years and a $10,000 fine. Act of May 26, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 573, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2275, amended by Act of July 18, 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 16, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 80 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021, since amended).
In his first point of error, appellant contends that the complaining witness, who was six years old at the time of trial, was not competent to testify. A child is incompetent to testify if, upon examination by the court, the child appears to lack sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which the child is interrogated. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 601. The issue of a witness's competence is a question for the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown by a review of the entire record, including the witness's trial testimony. Hernandez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Watson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
In his brief, appellant complains of the leading nature of the prosecutor's questions and points to evidence that the complainant discussed her testimony with the prosecutor prior to trial. These matters go to the weight of the child's testimony, not to her competence to testify. We have examined the testimony of the complaining witness and find that she manifested a capacity to observe and recall events and to understand questions and communicate answers. In addition, she demonstrated an appreciation of her obligation to tell the truth. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 603. The district court has not been shown to have abused its discretion by overruling appellant's challenge to the competence of the complainant to testify. Point of error one is overruled.
Appellant's second point of error complains of the admission of State's exhibits six and seven. The exhibits are certified copies of county criminal court documents that appear to be combined docket sheets and judgments. The exhibits reflect that a Lee Albert Shaw was convicted in 1990 of the misdemeanor offenses of driving while intoxicated and endangering a child. Appellant multifariously complains that the exhibits should not have been admitted because (1) neither exhibit was adequate to prove a conviction and (2) he was not shown to be the person previously convicted.
In support of the first contention, appellant cites an opinion by this Court in which we held, in conformity to a holding by the Texas Supreme Court, that an abstract of the defendant's driving record prepared by the custodian of records of the Department of Public Safety was not sufficient to prove a previous conviction for driving while intoxicated. Gentile v. State, 848 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, no pet.). The exhibits in question in these causes, however, are not abstracts of court records, but are certified copies of the court records themselves. Each exhibit recites that, on a specified date, the named defendant waived trial by jury, entered a plea of guilty or no contest, was adjudged guilty by the court, and was sentenced to a term of incarceration and a fine. Each bears the signature of the trial judge. We believe that each exhibit is sufficient to demonstrate a conviction.
Each exhibit bears what is identified as a print of the defendant's right index finger. An expert compared these prints to appellant's fingerprint and testified that they were identical. Such fingerprint comparisons are a well-accepted method for identifying the accused as the person previously convicted. Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). Nevertheless, appellant argues that the evidence of identity is not sufficient because the fingerprints on the two exhibits were not shown to belong to the person previously convicted. Beside the fingerprint on each exhibit is this certification: "I certify that I witnessed the defendant place his fingerprints hereon, on this the ___ day of ______, 19__" followed by a blank for the signature of a deputy county clerk. This certification is neither dated nor signed on either exhibit. Also appearing beside the fingerprint on each exhibit is this statement: "Fingerprint of Defendant's (Right)(Left) Index Finger" followed by a blank for the signature of a deputy county clerk. This statement is signed on exhibit seven, but not on exhibit six. Appellant argues, without citation to pertinent authority, that the absence of these signatures and dates rendered the exhibits inadmissible. We are not persuaded by this argument. We find that the fingerprint on each exhibit is adequately identified as belonging to the person convicted. It follows that appellant was shown to be the person previously convicted. Point of error two is overruled.
The judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and B. A. Smith
Affirmed on All Causes
Filed: January 11, 1995
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