TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-97-00071-CV
In the Matter of F. F.
NO. 161,375-C, HONORABLE EDWARD S. JOHNSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 29, 1996, appellant and another male approached the victim outside a convenience store in Killeen, Texas, and asked for a ride. After the victim refused the request, appellant punched him in the cheek hard enough to cause bleeding. Appellant and the other male ran off, and the victim followed them in his truck. After losing appellant's trail near an apartment complex, the victim stopped to question a woman who was standing outside. While the victim was stopped outside the apartments, he was attacked again. Appellant and another man ran up and, after both had hit the victim with metal table legs several times, appellant threw his table leg at the victim. The table leg struck the victim in the head, penetrating his skull, where it remained stuck. The victim was transported to a local hospital, where part of the table leg was cut off, before being taken to another hospital, where the table leg was surgically removed. A City of Killeen police officer testified that the metal table leg had been embedded about one and a half inches in the victim's skull.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile case, we use the sufficiency standard for criminal cases. In re M.S., 940 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, no writ). The standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases is that set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1970). The court must decide "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 127-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In this case, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant had the required mental state for aggravated assault. To be guilty of the offense of aggravated assault, a person must commit assault and, in addition, cause serious bodily injury to the victim or use a deadly weapon while committing the assault. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (West 1994). A person commits assault if he "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." Id. § 22.01(a). There was sufficient evidence presented at the trial which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that appellant acted intentionally to cause serious bodily injury to the victim. Appellant first struck the victim in the head with the metal table leg. Appellant then threw the table leg with such force that it became lodged in the victim's skull and had to be surgically removed. These circumstances clearly raise a reasonable inference that appellant intended to cause the victim serious bodily injury.
A consideration of inferences will almost always be necessary in determining a person's mental state. Here, the inferences raised by the violence of appellant's actions and the force with which he acted against the victim are ample evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find that appellant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in causing serious bodily injury to the victim.
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's order.
J. Woodfin Jones, Justice
Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Jones and Kidd
Affirmed
Filed: September 18, 1997
Do Not Publish
t because the State failed to prove that appellant had the required mental state for
aggravated assault. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 29, 1996, appellant and another male approached the victim outside a convenience store in Killeen, Texas, and asked for a ride. After the victim refused the request, appellant punched him in the cheek hard enough to cause bleeding. Appellant and the other male ran off, and the victim followed them in his truck. After losing appellant's trail near an apartment complex, the victim stopped to question a woman who was standing outside. While the victim was stopped outside the apartments, he was attacked again. Appellant and another man ran up and, after both had hit the victim with metal table legs several times, appellant threw his table leg at the victim. The table leg struck the victim in the head, penetrating his skull, where it remained stuck. The victim was transported to a local hospital, where part of the table leg was cut off, before being taken to another hospital, where the table leg was surgically removed. A City of Killeen police officer testified that the metal table leg had been embedded about one and a half inches in the victim's skull.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile case, we use the sufficiency standard for criminal cases. In re M.S., 940 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, no writ). The standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases is that set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1970). The court must decide "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 127-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In this case, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant had the required mental state for aggravated assault. To be guilty of the offense of aggravated assault, a person must commit assault and, in addition, cause serious bodily injury to the victim or use a deadly weapon while committing the assault. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (West 1994). A person commits assault if he "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." Id. § 22.01(a). There was sufficient evidence presented at the trial which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that appellant acted intentionally to cause serious bodily injury to the victim. Appellant first stru